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ABSTRACT 
Forestlands are one of the most important environmental resources. If a better conservation 
and management was achieved, then the social welfare and economic wealth would be 
higher. To obtain a better forest conservation, wildfires can be prevented by public policies. 
The first chapter of this thesis is focused on providing suggestions to improve the current 
public policies in order to reduce the wildfire occurrence. In this chapter spatial econometric 
models are developed in order to analyse the relations between socioeconomics, 
environmental and climatic variables with wildfires occurrence. In particular, Chap. I studies 
the heterogeneous behaviour of wildfire patterns within the Galician Forest Districts. The 
main results of this chapter highlight the importance of the role of socioeconomic factors in 
explaining wildfire occurrence. Based on these results, some policy guidelines are suggested. 
Chaps. II and III study the forest insurance as a tool for reducing the economic risk and 
guarantee the production of environmental services. The proposed insurance model includes 
the coverage of restoration costs and timber damages after wildfires. Hence, the production of 
environmental services will be guaranteed and the forest investment will reduce their 
volatility. Thus, in Chap. II the influence of forest insurance is analysed by employing Net 
Present Value model (NPV). In the Chap. III, forest insurance is studied as a tool to incentive 
the landowner to produce environmental services. Therefore, private and social forest 
valuation is conditioned by this incentive; so that the optimal forest rotation considers the 
valuation of environmental goods and services. 
In the last chapter, Chapter IV, the demand for forest insurance contracts is studied. A survey 
is conducted among 210 landowners and forest managers. A choice experiment of some 
possible insurance policies is included in this survey. The proposed insurance attributes 
contain both timber and restoration cost coverage; and forest certification, included as a 
requirement. The insurance demand according to landowners or forest managers’ preferences 
and their socioeconomic features is estimated. From these results, the willingness to pay for 
the forest insurance program is obtained (3.64 €/Ha). Finally, it can be concluded that the 
insurance demand is affected by both, insurance attributes and socioeconomic features of the 
forest managers. 
Keywords: environmental services, forest insurance, public policy, risk, wildfires. 
 
  
RESUMEN 
Los recursos forestales son uno de los principales activos ambientales. De esta manera, una 
mejora en su conservación y explotación redundará en un mayor bienestar social y un 
incremento de la riqueza económica. Para una mejor conservación forestal, los incendios se 
pueden prevenir mediante políticas públicas. El primer capítulo de esta tesis tiene por 
objetivo favorecer el diseño de políticas públicas que reduzcan los incendios. Para ello se 
estiman una serie de análisis econométricos en los que se incluyen variables 
socioeconómicas, ambientales y climatológicas para explicar la ocurrencia de incendio. Sus 
resultados sirven para estudiar el comportamiento de los incendios en los Distritos forestales 
gallegos. Los principales resultados de este capítulo demuestran la importancia de los 
factores socioeconómicos para explicar los incendios en Galicia. Asimismo, en este capítulo 
se ofrecen una serie de recomendaciones enfocadas en mejorar las políticas públicas. 
Los Capítulos II y III inciden en el estudio del seguro forestal como un mecanismo para 
reducir el riesgo económico de la explotación forestal y garantizar la producción de servicios 
ambientales. El seguro propuesto puede cubrir tanto la recuperación forestal como los daños 
en la madera tras un incendio. Esto provoca que la producción de servicios medioambientales 
se vea garantizada y que la inversión forestal reduzca su volatilidad. Así, en el Capítulo II se 
analiza su influencia del seguro forestal en la rotación forestal al incluir este factor en el 
modelo de Valor Actualizado Neto (VAN). No obstante, en el Capítulo III se analiza el 
empleo del seguro como un incentivo con el que se motive al propietario a producir servicios 
medioambientales. Por lo tanto, la valoración forestal pública y privada dependerá de la 
aplicación de este incentivo, lo que provoca que la rotación forestal óptima tenga en cuenta 
ambos intereses. 
En el último capítulo se estudia la demanda del seguro forestal. Para ello se realiza una 
encuesta a 210 propietarios y gestores forestales en la que se incluye un experimento de 
elección entre diversos seguros forestales. La póliza propuesta incluye tanto la cobertura de 
daños en la madera como los costes de recuperación del terreno forestal tras incendio. 
También se incluye la posible obligación de estar certificado para poder asegurar las 
propiedades forestales. Con esto se analiza la demanda del seguro forestal de acuerdo con las 
preferencias de los propietarios o gestores forestales y sus características socioeconómicas. A 
partir de esos datos se obtiene la disposición a pagar por el seguro forestal (3.64 €/Ha), así 
como por sus atributos. Con los resultados obtenidos se concluye que existe una demanda 
heterogénea dependiendo del tipo de seguro y de las características del propietario. 
Palabras clave: Incendio forestal, política forestal, riesgo de incendio, seguro forestal, 
servicios ambientales. 
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RESUMO 
Os recursos forestais son un dos principais activos ambientais. Deste xeito se producirse unha 
mellora na súa conservación e explotación redundará nun maior benestar social e nun 
incremento da riqueza económica. Para unha mellor conservación os incendios forestais 
poden ser previdos mediante políticas públicas. O primeiro capítulo desta tese ten por 
finalidade favorecer o deseño de políticas públicas que reduzan a incidencia dos incendios. 
Para elo neste capítulo estímanse una serie de modelos econométricos no que se inclúen 
variables socioeconómicas, ambientais e climáticas para explicar a ocorrencia de incendios. 
Os seus resultados serven para estudar o comportamento heteroxéneo dos incendios entre os 
Distritos forestais galegos. Os principais resultados deste capítulo demostran a importancia 
dos factores socioeconómicos para explicar os incendios en Galicia. Do mesmo xeito, neste 
capítulo ofrécense unha serie de recomendacións co obxectivo de mellorar as políticas 
publicas. 
Nos capítulos II e III estúdase o emprego do seguro forestal como ferramenta para reducir o 
risco económico da explotación forestal e garantir a produción de servizos ambientais. O 
seguro proposto pode cubrir tanto a recuperación forestal como os danos na madeira tras un 
incendio. Isto provoca que a produción de servizos ambientais este garantida e que a 
inversión forestal reduza a súa volatilidade. Así no Cap. II analízase a influencia dos seguro 
forestal na rotación forestal ó engadir este factor no modelo de Valor Actualizado Neto 
(VAN). Non obstante, no Cap. III analizase o emprego do seguro forestal coma un incentivo 
que motive o propietario a producir servizos ambientais. Por tanto, as valoracións forestais 
públicas e privadas dependerán da aplicación deste incentivo, o que provoca que a rotación 
forestal óptima teña en conta ambos intereses.  
O derradeiro capítulo estuda a demanda do seguro forestal. Para elo realizouse unha enquisa a 
210 propietarios ou xestores forestais na que se inclúa un experimento de elección entre 
diversos seguros forestais. Na póliza proposta inclúense tanto a cobertura nos danos na 
madeira como os custes de recuperación do terreo forestal tras incendio. Tamén se inclúe a 
posible obriga de estar certificado para poder asegurar as propiedades forestais. Con isto 
analízanse a demanda do seguro forestal de acordo as preferencias dos propietarios ou 
xestores forestais e as súas características socioeconómicas. A partir destes datos obtense a 
disposición a pagar polo seguro forestal (3.64 €/Ha), así como polos seus atributos. Os 
resultados conclúen que existen unha demanda heteroxénea dependendo do tipo de seguro 
forestal e das características do propietario.  
Palabras chave: Incendio forestal, política forestal, risco de incendio, seguro forestal, 
servizos ambientais. 
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1.1. INTRODUCTION 
Forestry areas provide several goods and services to society, including timber, biomass 
energy, nuts and biodiversity preservation. Forest products are the main raw material for 
forest companies, and timber is transformed into furniture, energy or other intermediate and 
final goods. Forestry areas also offer several environmental services to society and 
biodiversity that influences water and air quality. The human health is also related to forest 
conservation (Forget and Lebel, 2001). Furthermore, forest lands provide natural panoramas 
and recreational areas to citizens (Ulrich, 1986), making environmental conservation very 
important for the society as well as for the private welfare.  
Forestry areas are affected by floods, pests, wildfires and other risks that endanger timber 
stock and environmental areas as well as public and private economic interests. Landowners 
and society are concerned with reducing these risks. Landowners can reduce the probability 
of fire through specific forest management measures based on the characteristics of forest 
plantations and by contracting financial assets. In forest management, species selection and 
the amount and frequency of thinning or cleaning are determined according to the 
forestland’s characteristics. Management can also involve clearing service roads or 
constructing preventive infrastructures such as fire-breaks or water points. Asset management 
by landowners could be related to forest insurance or financial derivatives as means of 
covering possible damages. This decreases landowners’ uncertainty about forest investments 
and makes it possible to plan forest production according to financial criteria. These two 
types of measures are complementary and landowners can apply them simultaneously to 
forest management. To sum up, landowners can control exposure to forest damage through 
forest management efforts and financial decisions. 
The main risks for forest production are the wildfires. Researchers such as Martínez et al. 
(2009), Lavorel et al. (2007) or Aguado et al. (2007) have analysed the relationship between 
socioeconomic, environmental or climatic variables and wildfire occurrence patterns. Many 
studies use econometric models to analyse the implication of socioeconomic and/or 
environment variables in wildfire occurrence. The results suggest that specific forest policies 
could be designed to reduce the incidence of wildfires by controlling the socioeconomic 
influence of risks involving anthropomorphic or economic variables (Butry, 2009). 
Forest areas are subject to two main sets of interests: public and private. The first (private) 
are related to private land production and the second with the positive externalities of this 
production that the society enjoys. Social interests related to forest areas are defended by 
23 
 forest policies, which should be focused on preserving or increasing the well-being benefits 
that forest areas provide to society as a whole. Many forest policies are focused on 
controlling forest management by landowners.  
It will be shown that private and public interests could be linked by using payments that 
guarantee forest production. Though many studies have looked at payments for 
environmental services (Pagiola et al., 2005; Engel et al., 2008; Wünscher et al., 2008), none 
of them have included the subsidy of an insurance contract as a potential payment (or partial 
payment) for ecosystem services. Implementing this measure would change public and 
private forest valuation: landowners would receive more income to produce environmental 
services while the society would have to subsidize it. Thus, the production of environmental 
services would also be included in the private valuation and the optimal forest rotation would 
take into consideration public and private interests. This would give landowners an economic 
incentive to guarantee the production of environmental services. If landowners develop 
specific forest management practices based on public interests; timber production and 
restoration costs would be guaranteed by the societal payment of the insurance policy. 
Landowners try to maximize forest valuation based on expenses and forest revenues. Optimal 
forest rotation is the point of time when the maximum forest valuation is achieved. 
Faustmann was the first author to address forest production and optimal forest rotation 
(Faustmann, 1849). This work has since been extended by Hartman (1976), Samuelson 
(1976), Reed (1984) and others to include forest management costs, environmental services, 
and other factors in achieving optimal forest rotation. Within this framework, Barreto et al. 
(1998), Hyytiäinen and Haight (2010) or Hanewinkel et al. (2011), have used the Net Present 
Value (NPV) to calculate the optimal forest rotation. Accordingly, forest valuation models 
should be developed that include and link both private and public interests in order to obtain 
optimal forest rotation. However, private forest management decisions are currently 
developed according primarily to landowner criteria, while social interests remain 
unconsidered. 
1.2. WILDFIRES IN GALICIA 
Spanish forest production is mainly concentrated in Galicia (NW Spain), where wildfires 
stand out as the main cause of forest damage. Wildfires affect many hectares of forest and 
scrub lands and even threaten houses or human lives (Molano et al., 2007; Barrio et al., 2007; 
González-Gómez et al., 2013). Wildfire occurrence and/or affected areas are recorded in 
local councils or districts and described by spatial patterns (Balsa-Barreiro and Hermosilla, 
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 2013; Fuentes-Santos et al., 2013). Thus, most wildfires are concentrated in specific 
provinces, forest districts or municipalities. Figure 1.1 shows wildfire averages recorded in 
each Galician forest district from 2001 to 2010. Spatial patterns could be observed for each 
administrative area.  
 
FIGURE 1.1: Wildfires in Galicia 2001-2010. a) Number of wildfires. b) Total burned area 
(Ha.). 
Wildfire occurrence is accompanied by a high degree of human intentionality and varies from 
year to year. Spatial patterns also increase during these years. Among the highest years on 
record are 1989 and 2006, when wildfire affected 70%-100% of total area in some local 
councils or specific areas. Burned areas in 2006 were concentrated on the Atlantic Coast and 
in specific areas of the interior of Galicia, as shown in Figure 1.2. 
 
FIGURE 1.2: Burned area in 2006 (Ha). 
Identifying the causes of wildfire is therefore crucial to reducing the risk of wildfire in 
Galician forests. According to Molano et al. (2007), Galician site characteristics, human 
resources and research criteria involve wildfire classification. Therefore, most of them are 
related to anthropomorphic variables, so wildfire risk could be modified through public 
policies and forest management efforts (Sineiro, 2006; Molano et al., 2007). Galician 
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 wildfires are attributed to unavoidable or avoidable causes (Table 1.1). Unavoidable causes 
are those that do not associate wildfires with human behaviour. This category includes all 
natural hazards and lightning appears as the main cause, but it is only responsible for a small 
number of wildfires. In contrast, avoidable wildfires are associated with human influence and 
their occurrence can be prevented through public policy. Most wildfires in Galicia are due to 
avoidable causes, so there is room for greater development of public policy (Molano et al., 
2007, Balsa-Barreiro and Hermosilla, 2013; Fuentes-Santos et al., 2013). This category 
includes wildfire occurrence due to direct or indirect human causes and is sub-divided into 
three categories: intentional motives, negligence and unclassified causes. Intentional wildfires 
are directly related to human behaviour, and this sub-section represents the cause of most 
Galician wildfires. However, forest research is inconclusive regarding the main reasons 
behind most intentional wildfires (Molano et al., 2007). Neglect or negligence refers to 
wildfires that are indirectly conditioned by human behaviour. For example, agricultural 
burning is not intended to damage forest areas, but may become uncontrollable and affect 
other land. Finally, as the name indicates, the causes of wildfires in the third category are 
unidentified.  
TABLE 1.1: Classification of wildfire causes. 
HUMAN INFLUENCE CAUSES EXAMPLE OF MOTIVE 
Unavoidable  Natural Hazards Lightning 
Avoidable  
Intentional 
Clear scrubland 
Regenerate pastureland 
Identify property 
Change type of crop 
Revenge/reprisals 
Hunting 
Unknown 
Neglect or negligence 
Agricultural burning 
Railway 
Authorized burns 
Fireworks 
Sparks from machinery 
Wildfire reproduction 
Unclassified 
Source: Molano et al. (2007) 
Many wildfires remain unclassified because forest researchers have been unable to discover 
the main cause. Nevertheless, it is possible to indicate that human activity influences motive 
with regard to wildfires. Additionally, due to technical or human issues, it has not been 
possible to attribute some wildfires to either natural hazard or human intentionality.  
Many Galician wildfires are classified as intentional but the precise motive is unknown. 
Therefore, a socioeconomic analysis should be developed to identify the hidden factors that 
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 influence wildfire risk. Identifying these variables might lead to more effective public 
policies against wildfires. Researchers such as Balsa-Barreiro and Hermosilla (2013) or 
Barreal et al. (2011) looked at such variables in order to identify socioeconomic influences in 
Galician wildfire occurrence. The spatial patterns have been also highlighted in previous 
research relating spatial patterns with socioeconomic, climatic or environmental variables in 
other study areas (Chuvieco et al., 2010; Romero-Calcerrada et al., 2010). Even though 
wildfires and socioeconomic variables are heterogeneously related, however, forest policies 
can be applied in situations of spatial heterogeneity by designing specific policies for 
different geographical areas (Balsa-Barreiro and Hermosilla, 2013). 
 
1.3. FOREST INSURANCE IN FOREST MANAGEMENT 
Landowners can contract forest insurance to cover losses from wildfires affecting their forest 
stands. In Spain, this financial asset is subsidized by the national and regional governments, 
but seldom contracted by landowners in forest management. The low level of use might be 
related to coverage: at the present the public subsidy only covers restoration (BOE, 2011). 
The Spanish forest insurance program focuses mainly on public rather than private interests. 
It guarantees ecosystem production services by covering wildfire restoration costs to 
guarantee the next forest rotation, but does not cover timber damage. 
In fact, insurance companies do not usually provide coverage for possible timber damage; if 
it were offered, it would be expensive for the landowner. However, forest insurance coverage 
is an important factor in forest management and restoration coverage provides the landowner 
with a degree of security. If current forest production is lost to a wildfire, landowners are 
guaranteed resources to begin the next forest rotation. Social preferences in restoration 
coverage may be high due to the guarantee of environmental services production in case of 
wildfire. 
Forest insurance could be used to introduce better forest management practices to reduce 
wildfires. Forest certification could be used to guarantee proper forest management by 
requiring landowners to comply with forest certification criteria in order to obtain eco-
labelling status (Nussbaum and Simula, 2005). This certification establishes a schedule for 
planting, cleaning and cutting set by official foresters according to land characteristics, in 
order to achieve optimal forest rotation in a suitable environment. A wildfire is not desirable 
for the insurer, so insurance policies would be developed to dissuade it. Forest certification 
requirements could be included in the policy as a wildfire prevention incentive. If a wildfire 
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 occurs and the policy-holder has not fulfilled forest certification requirements, the landowner 
will not be eligible to receive insurance compensation. Thus, eco-labelling would guarantee a 
specific level of forest management in order to reduce wildfire risk. 
Researchers such as Holecy and Hanewinkel (2006), Brunette and Couture (2008), or 
Brunette et al. (2012), have analysed forest insurance in forest management and included the 
effect of public subsidies in forest management, along with information problems. However, 
there is no research that analyses the importance of each type of coverage or the effect of 
using forest certification as an insurance requirement. Even, none of previous forest valuation 
models include financial assets to cover possible forest losses. As it stands now, the 
relationship between forest valuation and insurance models has practically not been explored. 
 
1.4. FOREST INSURANCE DEMAND 
Forest insurance is rarely used as a forest management tool in Spain (Agroseguro, 2011), or 
in Galicia specifically. Insurance companies do not generally offer private insurance to 
landowners to cover wildfire losses. Given the low rate of contracting forest insurance, public 
policy may need to develop and promote insurance that addresses public and private interests 
and increases both coverage and requirements. Insurance coverage should include total or 
partial timber damage while requiring landowners to increase management efforts to reduce 
wildfire risk. Restoration coverage should also be maintained in forest insurance policies, 
implying a better balance of private and public interests. Forest management efforts could be 
controlled through forest certification requirements and eco-labelling that ensures proper 
forest management and increases timber value. In the current dissertation, these ideas will be 
developed and incorporated into the design of a new forest insurance model. 
Landowners can either contract forest insurance or assume wildfire risk according to their 
own forest management efforts. In order to increase contracting, demand for forest insurance 
and landowner preferences (Boxall et al., 1996; Adamowicz et al., 1998) for insurance 
attributes will be analysed. This will involve a survey of forest owners or managers to better 
determine their willingness to pay for insurance attributes. By including both private and 
public interests in this insurance policy, the implications of public interest can be considered 
to improve the analysis of private insurance demand. Other insurance attributes could be also 
included in the policy to improve risk sharing between the insurer and the insured. Insurance 
companies could consider these mechanisms to determine exposure to wildfire risk and exert 
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 control over landowners’ management. This dissertation also includes a survey that was 
conducted in order to analyse landowner preferences regarding a proposed insurance model. 
Demand for forest insurance is also very low in Galicia, suggesting that landowners do not 
invest in securing their forest production. This situation could be influenced by the size of 
property, the dimensions of forestland or ignorance about forest insurance. Approximately 
one in three Galicians are landowners, and those working in agriculture are generally of 
advanced age (Marey et al., 2007). This fact complicates the forest management, because 
elderly forest managers usually make decisions based on tradition and long experience in the 
primary sector. Since financial mechanisms do not exist in traditional management, they are 
seldom used to reduce forest investment risk. Such behaviour might be changed with 
informative campaigns. 
There is no research that analyses forest insurance needs; hence further research is needed to 
provide information about insurance in order to increase its demand. The current policy could 
then be adapted to incorporate landowners’ preferences, making forest insurance more 
attractive. Research will be conducted to analyse forest insurance demand in Galicia, based 
on questionnaires designed to uncover landowners’ preferences with regards to the forest 
insurance. The survey will cover questions related to knowledge about the insurance policy 
and the type of policy landowners find more attractive. A choice experiment model will be 
used to calculate the willingness to pay for insurance attributes. This model uses choice cards 
that represent different insurance contracts, carrying different prices and attributes. These 
results will provide a baseline for designing a forest insurance policy that landowners would 
find attractive, thereby increasing its demand. The choice experiment is often used in 
research to evaluate social preferences regarding a specific environmental policy (Horne, 
2006; Holmes et al., 2012). This model has also been used to analyse preferences for other 
agricultural insurances (Nganje et al., 2004; Mercadé et al., 2009).  
The age, gender or income of landowners could affect insurance demand. These 
characteristics are related to their experience and risk aptitudes in forest management. 
Landowners might act as owners and sole forest managers; they might be co-owners, or they 
might assign forest management to another. The goal of forest investment might be different 
for each kind of landowner, and all these characteristics can influence forest insurance 
demand. 
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 1.5. STATE OF THE ART 
This dissertation will improve the knowledge about wildfire occurrence and forest insurance 
as a way of reducing such economic and environmental losses. Socioeconomic factors are 
included to better understand their influence on wildfire occurrence. Previous studies include 
socioeconomic variables, but their influence on the incidence of Galician wildfires has not 
been analysed (Chuvieco et al., 2010; Romero-Calcerrada et al., 2010). Environmental and 
climatic variables are used to describe wildfire patterns. The combined use of spatial patterns 
in Galician Forest Districts with socioeconomic variables in this dissertation is fairly new; 
until now econometric models have rarely been employed to analyse Galician wildfire 
occurrence. Therefore, this dissertation provides according to previous literature an 
innovative analysis of Galician wildfire risk and proposes preventions through public policy. 
Traditionally, forest valuation has only considered forest management and production 
(Hartman, 1976; Reed, 1984). However, a new insurance model will be included in forest 
valuation in order to analyse its influence on landowner wealth. The previous section 
signalled how unusual forest insurance is in Spain; this model would improve Spanish forest 
management and it implies a novelty in forest valuation. This study also contributes to the 
design of effective forest insurance that covers timber damages in addition to restoration 
costs. In financial terms, the forest insurance proposed in this dissertation would influence 
financial decisions by covering 70% of timber damage and 95-100% of forest restoration 
costs. Researches in this area has generally focused on landowner decisions about forest 
management but has not contemplated the implications of forest insurance in forest valuation.  
Previous forest valuation will thereby be extended and will include public preferences or 
objectives. Hence, a forest valuation is subdivided into private and public objectives in order 
to understand forest rotation and study the difference between private and public optimal 
forest rotation. In the private context, forest decisions are made by each landowner without 
considering public preferences. To address this, an incentive to produce environmental 
services will be considered as a way of linking private and public forest decisions. This new 
forest valuation model explores incentives for improving the alignment of forest decisions 
and societal preferences by providing landowners with a form of payment based on 
ecosystem services production (PES).  
Finally, insurance demand for the previous policy will be studied. The forest certification 
requirement will be introduced into the forest insurance policy, as a way of guaranteeing 
proper forest management. No prior research has included this mechanism as a guarantee of 
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 proper forest management. For this reason, a choice experiment model will be used to 
identify landowners’ preferences to forest insurance attributes. Likewise, the use of choice 
experiment and other econometric models constitute a novelty to study the forest insurance 
demand.  
 
1.6. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The goal of the current dissertation is to analyse Galician wildfire risk and the application of 
insurance as a forest management tool. The main objectives of current dissertation are: 
− To identify the socioeconomic and forest variables that influence Galician wildfire 
risk to improve the public policies 
− To analyse both the spatial patterns and the temporal trends in Galician wildfires. 
− To incorporate both insurance models and wildfire risk into forest valuation trends 
in order to analyse their forest rotation influence. 
− To develop a forest insurance model that incorporates both public and private 
interests. 
− To analyse the role of forest insurance as a payment for producing ecosystem 
services. 
− To study the forest insurance demand in Galicia. 
The dissertation contains six chapters. The first and final sections are the respective 
introduction and conclusion. The four intermediate chapters contain the research 
developments. The study process initiates with the second chapter, it analyses wildfire risk 
and its prevention. The third and fourth following chapters propose a forest insurance model 
and its implication in forest management, ecosystem services and public policies. The fifth 
chapter studies the relation between forest insurance demand and the proposed insurance 
model. 
Chapter II of this thesis analyses the causes of wildfire in Galicia based on climatic, 
environmental, socioeconomic, temporal and spatial variables for Galician Forest Districts. 
Moran’s I and the Local Indicator of Spatial Association (LISA) statistics are used to identify 
the relation between wildfire occurrence and spatial patterns. Econometric models are then 
applied to relate wildfire occurrence with climatic, environmental, socioeconomic and 
temporal variables. In particular, an OLS Regression is estimated to model the ratio of 
wildfires to burned area with a set of explanatory variables. Since the dependent variable is 
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 the number of wildfires (counted data), a Negative Binomial Regression model is estimated, 
after finding statistical evidence of overdispersion. Spatial patterns are analysed using 
Random Effects (RE) or Fixed Effects (FE) according to the results provided by the Hausman 
test. These models quantify the error term effect on econometric regression. 
The third chapter develops a forest insurance model with restoration coverage that involves 
forest management and landowner investment. The proposed forest valuation model includes 
forest production, forest management costs, premiums and wildfire risk. All forest investment 
cash-flows are discounted by a continuous factor and the optimal forest rotation is analysed 
including the insurance policy. An empirical simulation is also developed for Pinus pinaster 
Aiton. plantations in Galician forest districts where high, medium and lower wildfire risk 
have been recorded. 
The fifth chapter extends the insurance model presented in the third chapter. Private and 
public interests are considered in this model, leading to the inclusion of environmental 
services in forest valuation. This section analyses both private and public forest valuation 
models, but no relation was included between them. To address this, a public incentive is 
developed to involve landowners in the production of environmental services. This incentive 
relates both public and private interests in this theoretical model. Information from the 
previous chapter as well as carbon sequestration data are used to simulate the previous forest 
valuation model. 
The fifth chapter analyses forest insurance demand in the area known as “A Mariña Lucense” 
(NW, Spain). A questionnaire is developed and a choice experiment conducted to analyse 
landowner preferences regarding forest insurance. Insurance cost, coverage of timber damage 
and/or restoration costs and a forest certification requirement are included on each choice 
card. Socioeconomic questions are also included in the survey. This makes it possible to 
analyse insurance demand according to the landowners’ characteristics. The Conditional 
Logit Model, and the Random Parameters Logit are used to calculate the WTP for forest 
insurance and its attributes according to choice card and landowner characteristics. The 
socioeconomic variables of the landowner’s age and relation to forest management were 
included in previous models.  
Conclusions are presented at the final chapter of this dissertation. In this section, the main 
results of each chapter are summarized and discussed, as well as their usefulness in achieving 
the goals of the current dissertation. Following this discussion, there is a section that 
highlights the main conclusions and outlines suggestions for future research. 
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 1.7. DERIVED PUBLICATIONS 
Some publications derived from Chapter II of the current dissertation: 
• Barreal, J., Loureiro, M.L. 2015. Modelling Spatial Patterns and Temporal Trends of 
Wildfires in Galicia (NW Spain). Forest Systems 24 (2), e022, xx pages. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5424/fs/2015242-05713. 
• Barreal, J., Loureiro, M., Picos, J. 2012. Estudio de la causalidad delos incendios 
forestales en Galicia, Economía Agraria y Recursos Naturales 12(1), 99-114. ISSN: 1578-
0732, http://recyt.fecyt.es/index.php/ECAGRN/article/view/earn.2012.01.04/10340 
• Barreal, J., Loureiro, M. 2012 Análisis espacial de la ocurrencia de incendios en Galicia 
durante 2006, Actas del V Congreso Forestal Español, ISBN: 978, 6CFE01-323, 
http://www.congresoforestal.es/fichero.php?t=41725&i=5153&m=2185 
Published paper from Chapter III: 
• Barreal, J., Loureiro, M., Juan Picos, J. 2014. On insurance as a tool for securing forest 
restoration after wildfires, Forest Policy and Economics 42, 15-23. ISSN 1389-9341, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2014.02.001 
The two prizes for Chapter II and III are: 
• Prize “Valentín Paz Andrade” of best contribution of Galician economy research for the 
paper “The causality of wildfires in Galicia” published in the Economía Agraria y Recursos 
Naturales 12(1).  
• Prize of Best Presentation in V AERNA Conference for the research “On insurance as a 
tool for securing forest restoration after wildfire occurrence”. 
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CHAPTER 2: MODELLING SPATIAL PATTERNS AND 
TEMPORAL TRENDS OF WILDFIRES IN GALICIA (NW 
SPAIN) 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: The goal of this paper is to analyse the importance of the main contributing factors 
to the occurrence of wildfires. We employ data from the region of Galicia during 2001-2010; 
although the similarities shared between this area and other rural areas may allow 
extrapolation of the present results. To this end, we conduct an econometric analysis 
modelling both, the number of fires and the relative size of afflicted woodland area as 
dependent variables, which depend on the climatic, land cover variables, and socio-economic 
characteristics of the affected areas. Fixed effects and random effect models are estimated in 
order to control for the heterogeneity between the Forest Districts in Galicia. Based on the 
obtained results, we conclude that in addition to direct forest actions, other agricultural or 
social public plans, can help to reduce wildfires in rural areas or wildland-urban areas. Based 
on these conclusions, a number of guidelines are provided that may foster the development of 
better forest management policies in order to reduce the occurrence of wildfires in rural areas. 
 
Keywords: Cause-effect relationship, climatology, spatial and temporal indicators, fixed 
effects, random effects, socio-economic factors. 
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2.1. INTRODUCTION 
It is estimated that more than 1.3 million hectares of forest are destroyed by wildfires in 
Europe each year (FOREST EUROPE, UNECE and FAO, 2011). Spain is one of the five 
southern European countries with the highest level of damage caused by wildfires, with a 
yearly average of 19,705 wildfires from 1998 to 2007, affecting a total of 130,714 hectares 
(SECF, 2010). Within Spain, the case of Galicia is particularly relevant. While only 
representing 6% of national surface area, between 1991 and 2010 Galicia registered an 
approximate average of 46% of Spanish wildfires and 21% of the total burned surface area 
(Figure 2.1), according to MARM (2012) and the regional government (Xunta de Galicia, 
2011). Given the geographical concentration of this problem, we limit our analysis to the 
wildfires occurring in this region, also due to the lack of comparable data for other Spanish 
regions. We believe, however, that the current paper may provide insights which are closely 
applicable to other European rural and wild land-urban areas. 
 
FIGURE 2.1: Galician wildfires with respect to the total number of Spanish wildfires (1991-
2010). 
According to data provided by the Galician Institute of Statistics (IGE, 2012a), since 2001 the 
number of wildfires reveals an upward trend until 2005, decreasing then in number. With 
regards to the affected surface area, this increased gradually from 2002 to 2006, but since 
then it has decreased considerably as well. It should be noted that the number of affected 
areas reach catastrophic levels during 2006. Furthermore, the evolution of wildfires 
throughout Galicia varies considerably in spatial and temporal terms (Fuentes-Santos et al., 
2013). Geographically, and based on the data published by the IGE (2012a), wildfires affect 
more severely southern districts than northern districts of Galicia, both in terms of the 
number of fires and forestry area affected (Figure 2.2). Also, western districts are the area in 
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 which forestry lands are the most affected in relation to their surface area, while the southern 
districts record the highest numbers of wildfires. 
 
FIGURE 2.2: Geographic distribution of the occurrence of wildfires during 2001-2010. a) 
Representation of the number of wildfires per district with respect to the total number of 
Galician wildfires. b) Representation of the affected forestry area per district with respect to 
total affected area in Galicia. 
The wildfire risk depends on several climatological, social or environmental factors, which 
could be modified by public policies at short or medium term. Nevertheless, decision-making 
is characterised by the presence of dynamic risk factors (Rogalski, 1999)1.  
In order to study wildfires in depth, it is necessary to be aware of the current situation of the 
agro-forestry areas in Galicia. Certain areas have scattered populations with a constant rural 
depopulation and continuing migration of young people to more highly populated areas 
(Marey et al., 2007). In addition, the thinning out of the agro-forestry sector within the 
economy has been clear for some time now, as well as the reduction in employment in this 
sector. This has contributed to make much more difficult youth employment in the 
countryside, while at the same time, fewer farms use woodland areas to obtain productive 
resources (Vega, 2007; Sineiro, 2006). This trend has also caused forestry land to become 
increasingly neglected, allowing for an increase in the severity and spread of wildfires. 
Moreover, the structure of forest property is often very divided, with a high level of private 
1 Following Molano et al. (2007) and Martínez et al. (2009), the causing factors of wildfires can be divided into two main 
categories: avoidable and unavoidable. Unavoidable causes are considered those that cannot be foreseen or dissuaded, 
whereas avoidable causes are those that can be prevented through individual actions or forestry policies. This implies that 
there are exogenous factors, which are uncontrollable, to which other endogenous factors must be added. In general, the 
unavoidable category contains natural phenomena, whilst the avoidable can be divided into three possible sub-categories: 
intentional, negligent and unknown causes. Avoidable causes represent almost all of the causes, although the majority of 
these are classified as unknown, showing that the causality of wildfires is not recorded reliably and depends heavily on the 
criteria of investigators (Pérez and Delgado, 1995; and Molano et al., 2007).  
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 property increasingly belonging to elderly people, making it more difficult to manage the 
lands correctly (Sineiro, 2006). 
Galicia contains different climatic areas, resulting in an uneven availability of biomass that 
can be burnt (Martínez et al., 1999). This makes it difficult to organise the prevention and 
extinguishing of wildfires. Taking these circumstances into account, together with the social 
and environmental impacts caused by wildfires, over the last few years the government has 
prioritized the design of preventative policies, although most of its budget goes toward 
extinction activities. For these policies to work well, it is important to identify the factors that 
affect the occurrence of wildfires. To this end, the proposed model must be simple, structured 
and easy to standardise so that it can be easily updated (King and MacGregor, 2000). 
Until now, several methods have been used to identify wildfire risk factors. Some studies 
have used various explanatory variables in order to explain the reasons why some areas are 
more heavily affected than others, although they do not quantify the described relationships 
and/or support their arguments in a quantitative way (Lavorel et al., 2007). However, other 
papers use techniques based on Geographic Information Systems (GIS), using probability risk 
models and linking variables to the forest environment. (Cabrera, 1989; Vilar et al., 2008; 
Chuvieco et al., 2010; Martínez et al., 2009; Romero-Calcerrada et al., 2010). GIS techniques 
are used in several models in which geographic and other statistical variables are included 
(Pew and Larsen, 2001; Vega-García and Chuvieco, 2006). Relevant geographic variables 
include the location of roads, and industrial or recreational areas, amongst other factors 
(Romero-Calcerrada et al., 2010). Therefore, geographical implications in the occurrence of 
wildfires have also been widely studied. As a result, this study focuses on assessing the 
geographical differences in the occurrence of wildfires.  
In some earlier work, researchers have studied the error term to identify geographical and 
temporal trends (Disdier and Head, 2008; Prestemon et al., 2002; Jones, 1991; Moulton, 
1986). Testing the error term allows the researcher to control for the unobservable factors 
across the different entities, implying that this research can be used to determine whether 
differences across entities are significant. Therefore, an econometric model with random 
effects (RE) or fixed effects (FE) can be developed in order to account for specific local 
effects. Other papers explore the possible relationship between wildfires and a specific group 
of variables (Finney et al., 2009), including forest management (Prestemon et al., 2002; 
Butry, 2009; Wimberly et al., 2009), meteorological variables (Aguado et al., 2007), and 
socio-economic factors (Mercer and Prestemon, 2005). This research, as well as Prestemon et 
al. (2002), uses time series models to analyse temporal trends in wildfire risk. Other relevant 
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 research also includes socioeconomic variables such as income, machinery used, and/or 
number of livestock (Vilar et al., 2008). Wildfire risk is also analysed from the perspective of 
the different phases in the duration of a fire, and the ignition, intensity or area affected are 
used as dependent variables (Genton et al., 2006).  
Several international studies analyze the problem of fires from a spatial context. For example, 
Prestemon et al. (2002) developed a model with fixed effects as to assess whether there is a 
spatial behavior in the occurrence of fires between administrative units from North Florida. 
Preisler et al. (2004) used temporal and spatial effects through a logistic regression to study 
the probability of fires in Oregon (USA) since 1970. Meanwhile, Brillinger et al. (2006) 
developed an empirical model for analyzing the evolution of fire risk. Their model contains 
both, FE and RE to analyze the fires occurrence in California (USA) during the years 2000-
2003. Finally, Chen et al. (2014) also analyze the risks and causes of fires using spatial 
econometrics. 
The aim of this study is to extend previous analyses using current data and taking into 
account the impact of socio-economic factors, land cover, and climatology using spatial 
analysis. Thus, econometric models have been developed to analyse the possible influence of 
socioeconomic factors on the risk of wildfires. The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and 
econometric models for counted data are used to identify these socioeconomic factors. 
Random effects (RE) and Fixed Effects (FE) are also estimated to assess the presence of 
spatial patterns. Other methods, such as the Moran’s I and LISA statistics, are included to 
determine whether wildfire occurrence shows spatial patterns. We expect the present results 
can help to improve public policy focussing on exploring spatial and temporal impacts on fire 
occurrence. This research starts by explaining the data and methods used. In the next section, 
the results are described and discussed, and then it follows a section in which the main 
conclusions of the research are summarized and policy implications are provided.  
 
2.2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
2.3. DATA 
Data have been gathered from 2001 to 2010. The most up-to-date data available from the 19 
forest districts established by the Galician regional government were collected (Xunta de 
Galicia, 2011). Variability over time and between districts will be one of the desirable data 
properties (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). Data have been grouped by forest districts in order 
to have a common geographical reference. Therefore, some variables had to be transformed 
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 prior to be included into the model by aggregating municipal data up to the district level. In 
the following analysis, the hectare is the unit used to measure the surface area. 
The explanatory variables are shown in Table 2.1, and these can be grouped into seven main 
categories, including: the population structure, weather variables, territorial features, 
economic information, agroforestry situation, wildfire characteristics and time dummy 
variables. To avoid perfect multicollinearity in the econometric models, the dummy year for 
2001 has been used as a baseline, and time effects are interpreted by using this year as a 
reference point. As several variables for different groups showed high correlations with each 
other, a limit of 70% was set for the value of the linear correlation coefficient. Furthermore, 
the variance inflation factor (VIF) was used to analyse the level of multicollinearity among 
the chosen variables (Neter et al., 1983). The VIF had values lower than 2.16 for each 
variable and 3.70 for the set. These values indicate that multicollinearity is not a problem in 
the selected variables.  
Wildfires data were recorded from the Galician Forest Districts. On the other hand, 
meteorological data were recorded directly by the weather stations, and such data had to be 
linked and extrapolated to the District level. Finally, the agro-forestry data are mainly 
recorded by Geographic Information Systems (GIS). Thus, a shape-file with the Galician 
Forest Districts was designed adding the municipality limits obtained from the National 
Geographic Institute (IGN, 2011). To conclude, agro-forestry data were obtained cropping 
GIS information with the previous defined shape-file.  
The data for the climatic variables were collected from MeteoGalicia (2012). The climate 
stations belonging to each district were geographically located. The average maximum 
temperature and rainfall recorded per month during the summer were collected2. The 
proportion of the protected areas in each district was also included to describe relevant 
territorial features. The protected areas were obtained from the MAGRAMA (2010). These 
data were provided by two maps containing the Community Interest Sites (CIS) and Special 
Protection Areas for Birds (SPAB). Thus, the GvSig software was used to compute the size 
of both protected areas by Forest District (GvSig, 2014). In this way, the ratio of protected 
areas is computed using the total protected area divided by total district area.  
The density per hectare is used to describe the population structure. Therefore, the total 
population divided by the total Forest District area is used to calculate this variable. Both data 
2 In some cases, climatological data were not available for all of the time periods and/or forest districts. The unavailable data 
had to be supplemented with those from other forest districts according to the climatic areas established by Martínez et al. 
(1999). 
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 were recorded from IGE (2012a) and municipality statistics. This density variable presents 
high correlations with the personal income, level of studies or employment rate. In order to 
avoid such multicollinearity problems, variables referring to personal income, education and 
employment rates had to be dropped from the final specification due to their high correlations 
among each other.  
TABLE 2.1: Variables. 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION DATA  
SOURCE MEAN 
STANDARD  
ERROR MIN MAX 
WILDFIRES CHARACTERISTICS 
Number of 
wildfires 
Number of wildfires per year 
in each district1 IGE 381.179 275.987 23.000 1,268.000 
Ratio of 
burned-forest 
area  
Affected area, in hectares, 
between the total forestry 
areas in each district 
IGE 0.017 0.030 0.000 0.223 
CLIMATOLOGY 
Summer 
average 
rainfall 
Annual average rainfall 
during the summer (l/m2) MeteoGalicia 43.217 19.821 13.55 120.917 
Summer 
maximum 
temperature 
Average maximum 
temperature, in Celsius, 
during the summer in each 
district 
MeteoGalicia 22.946 2.663 16.747 30.367 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC VARIABLES 
Territorial 
Ratio of 
protected areas 
Total protected areas over the 
total Forest District area MAGRAMA
2 0.140 0.142 0.011 0.474 
Population 
People Density People by hectare in each Forest District IGE 1.049 1.163 0.104 5.081 
Agro-Forestry 
Ratio of equine 
stock 
The ratio of equines in Forest 
District livestock IGE 0.036 0.028 0.004 0.110 
Ratio of natural 
pasture 
Total natural pasture area 
over the District area CORINE 0.113 0.074 0.006 0.294 
Ratio of Pinus 
pinaster 
Total Pinus pinaster area 
over the forested area by 
District 
IFN3 0.390 0.201 0.044 0.831 
Economy 
Agricultural 
cooperatives 
Number of cooperatives in 
each Forest District IGE 18.158 13.627 2.000 49.000 
DUMMY VARIABLE 
Dummy year t3 Represents each individual year t   1.100 0.301 1.000 2.000 
1 Forest administrative entity determined by Xunta de Galicia (Xunta de Galicia, 2011) 
2 Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality 
3 t= (2002,…,2010) 
The Third Spanish National Forest Inventory (NFI3), the Corine Land Cover and the 
Livestock Census were the main sources to gather information about the agro-forestry 
situation (IGE, 2012b). Tree dominant tree species were recorded in order to describe the 
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 forest plantations. The forestry areas, in which the Pinus pinaster is the main specie, were 
calculated from the NFI3 (MAGRAMA, 2008) while the district-forested areas were recorded 
from IGE (2012b). Hence, the ratio of Pinus pinaster was included in order to describe the 
forestry structure. The natural pasture was obtained by accounting for the lands where this 
activity is recorded according to the Corine Land Cover database (European Environment 
Agency, 2010). The GvSig software was employed to calculate both the agricultural and 
forestry area (GvSig, 2014). The ratio of equines was also taken into account in order to 
describe the livestock structure, as in Barreal et al. (2011). This variable was considered 
given that previous literature related the presence of equines with land management and fuel 
treatments (Rigueiro et al., 2002). The percentage of equines represents 1% up to 11% of 
total livestock according to each Forest District data (IGE, 2012b). Although cattle are the 
main livestock in Galicia; equines usually graze in pasturelands or forest areas. The number 
of agricultural cooperatives is also included in the model. This variable can be a proxy for the 
dynamics of the rural areas. These data were collected from IGE (2012b). However, we 
should note that there are some years in which yearly data are missing, so that the series had 
to be completed with the closest data points available.  
The wildfire variables were also obtained from the IGE (2012b). For the first six years, 
municipalities provided the data, then the burned area and the number of wildfires had to be 
aggregated by forest districts. The ratio of burned area was calculated using the total forest 
area provided by IGE (2012a). The GeoDa software was used to obtain the spatial statistics of 
the dependent variables (Anselin et al., 2006; GeoDa, 2014). In order to create the final 
database, and conduct the estimation process, the Stata 10.1 software was used (Stata, 2010). 
 
2.4. METHODOLOGY 
2.4.1 Descriptive Spatial Analysis 
Graphs and statistics are useful in order to identify the spatial patterns in Galician wildfires. 
The first one involves the representation of the data to identify the temporal trends and the 
heterogeneity between the Galician forest districts. Then, in case of existing temporal trends, 
these could be identified showing differences of each entity’s mean value. Another 
alternative is to represent the data for each year by a graph. The independent years could 
register more or less spatial differences.  
The Moran’s I statistic (Moran, 1948) was used for statistical analysis, as well as the Local 
Indicators of Spatial Association -LISA- (Anselin, 1995). With both statistics, the spatial 
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 dependence can be analysed using the autocorrelation coefficients between the Galician 
forest districts. The first statistics analyses the spatial heterogeneity of the sample. 
Meanwhile, the second focuses on the relationship between each geographic unit, identifying 
the clusters of study. 
The Moran’s I statistic takes into account the number of geographical areas (N); the analyzed 
areas (j and i); the study variable for each location (y); the mean of the variables of interest in 
all areas ( ); and finally the weight matrix that describes the relationship between both 
locations (Wj,i). Then, the Moran’s I statistic could be expressed by the Eq. 2.1. 
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According to the definition of the weight matrix, the relations between close forest districts 
are included. Therefore, the closest neighbors to each polygon are identified with this matrix. 
Mathematically, the weight matrix could be expressed as Eq. 2.2, in which ŵij represents the 
spatial matrix of adjacent polygon (j), respect to the polygon that we are studying (i). 
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The spatial relationships in this matrix can be used with different contiguity interpretations. 
In other words, if a regular grid is designed, the weight matrix could be constructed according 
to four spatial relationships: linear (Fig. 2.3.a), Rook (Fig. 2.3.b), Bishop (Fig. 2.3.c) and 
Queen (Fig. 2.3.d). These relations depend on the number and directions of spatial 
dependences that the researchers may find. In this research, the polygons are irregular, so the 
criterion with more spatial directions is selected (Moreno and Vayá, 2000), and as a 
consequence, the queen contiguity is chosen to analyze the spatial patterns. This contiguity 
can be used at several levels (Lesage and Kelley, 2009). This research analyzes the direct 
relationships between the closed forest districts in terms of fire occurrence. 
y
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FIGURE 2.3: Types of contiguity for direct relations. 
The LISA statistics can be developed from the Moran’s I statistics (Anselin, 1995). This is 
described in the Eq. 2.3 where zi represents the normalized value of the selected variable in 
respect to the mean and Ji is all polygons (districts) next to i. Therefore, the LISA statistics 
analyzes the spatial patterns between each entity to the selected data. In other words, the 
spatial autocorrelation is individually analyzed. 
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2.4.2 Econometric Analysis 
In order to analyse the relationship between the previous variables and wildfires in Galicia, a 
baseline lineal regression estimated by OLS was used. In this baseline estimation the 
coefficients are controlled by the heterogeneity of each district through the Huber-White 
correction of standard errors (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). Thus, the econometric model is 
presented by Eq. 2.4, in which the variables are arranged into a panel according to each 
district and their respective periods of time. In this equation, the subscripts j, k, h represent 
the type of variable, i is the forestry district, and t is the period. 
0it j jit k kit h hit itY X X Xb b b b e= + + + +         [2.4] 
With this common specification, two independent equations were estimated. The first model 
used the ratio of forest-burned area in each forest district as the dependent variable, and the 
second specification modelled the number of wildfires. The independent variables in both 
models include socio-economic factors represented by Xjit, (mainly population structure, 
territorial features, economic information and agroforestry data for each forest district), 
climatology represented by Xkit (including the variables of average maximum temperature and 
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 average monthly precipitation); and finally, the vector Xhit represents the dummy yearly 
indicators.  
Using the Box-Cox test, the functional form of the Eq. 2.4 was selected. The Box-Cox test 
develops a transformed dependent variable represented by the Eq. 2.5, in which the residual 
(μit) assumes a normal distribution in order to estimate the parameters β and θ. 
( ) 1itit it i ityg y X
q
q b m
q
-º = +          [2.5] 
As such, if the estimation of θ is close to zero, then the best specification to be used would be 
the log-lineal model. However, if the respective statistics are significant and close to one, a 
lineal model should be used. Eq. 2.6 is then formulated according to the following 
specification. 
it j jit k kit h hit itY X X X
j jb b g e= + + +        [2.6] 
Since, the number of wildfires is a counted data variable, the Poisson Regression Model 
(PRM) shown on Eq. 2.7 is employed, with the specification earlier presented in Eq. 2.4: 
( )0expit it j jit k kit h hitE y x X X Xb b b bé ù = + + +ë û       [2.7] 
Given that count data can exhibit overdispersion (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005), we need to 
assess whether this is present by estimating Eq. 2.8. Overdispersion implies that the variance 
depends on the mean plus square parameter (α2). In this case if α = 0, then the variance is 
equal to the mean and there is no overdispersion; and thus, the PRM can be a suitable model. 
( ) ( ) ( )2it it itVar x =E x +α E xit it ity y y         [2.8] 
On the other hand, if the coefficient α is different from zero, then the number of wildfires 
should be estimated by a Negative Binomial Regression model (NBRM). This model is more 
general than the PRM and should prove to have a better goodness of fit in case of 
overdispersion (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). 
In order to interpret the coefficients of the previous model, the use of the Incidence Rate 
Ratio (IRR) is recommended as its results are easier to interpret (Long and Freese, 2001). As 
such, the IRR coefficients are estimated to directly quantify the values of the respective 
parameter estimates. This ratio is calculated by Eq. 2.9, in which the results can be analysed 
as a change in the probability of wildfire occurrence, when there is a change in the analysed 
independent variable, whenever the others parameters are constant. 
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In this setting, two different models could be used to analyse the error term: FE and RE. The 
FE represented by the Eq. 2.10 in which the error term (εit) of the Eq. 1.4 is broken into two 
parts: one fixed term (vi) and another error term (τit).  
0it j jit k kit h hit i itY X X Xb b b b n t= + + + + +                [2.10] 
In the following RE models, the previously fixed term (vi) is now random. The specification 
of this model is equal to Eq. 2.10, but in this case the random term will have a mean of vi and 
different variance from zero (Var(vit)≠0). These unobservable factors are used for the OLS 
model but also for the MRP (Eq. 2.11), or NBMR in case of overdispersion. 
( )0expit it j jit k kit h hit itE y x X X Xb b b b né ù = + + + +ë û               [2.11] 
The Hausman test (H) is used to select between RE and FE models. The specification of this 
test is shown in Eq. 2.12 and analyzes the consistency of estimators for both models. The null 
hypothesis states that there is no correlation between the unique errors and the independent 
variables. This hypothesis is tested at the 5% significance level. If the null hypothesis is not 
rejected, then FE are selected over RE. Otherwise, RE should be used. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2           RE FE RE FE RE FE nH Var Var Hb b b b b b a¢ é ù= - - - ~ë û             [2.12] 
 
2.5. RESULTS 
2.5.1 Spatial patterns and temporal trends analysis 
The spatial patterns of the number of wildfires and burned-forest area ratio can be observed 
with graphical displays. The variation of the burned-forest area ratio by year is represented in 
the Figure 2.4.a In this graph the x-axis represents the Galician forest districts according to 
each number (Xunta de Galicia, 2011). Different values between the districts are recorded in 
all graphs; however its difference depends on the year. Another way to identify the existence 
of spatial patterns is by using the average of the burned-forest area ratio for the sample. This 
is included in the Figure 2.4.b where the difference between districts can be observed. Also, 
the temporal trends are observed per year. 
b) 
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FIGURE 2.4: Graphical representation for variation of burned-forest area ratio in Galicia 
from 2001 to 2010. a) Data represented by year. b) Data recorded by year and the mean of 
each district. 
Figure 2.5.a and Figure 2.5.b describe the evolution of wildfires per year from 2001 to 2010. 
The spatial patterns can be identified in this graph. Figure 2.5.b shows also spatial patterns in 
the mean of wildfires according to each district. Data show significant differences across 
years, therefore the number of wildfires contains also temporal effects. 
 
FIGURE 2.5: a) The number of wildfires represented by year in Galicia from 2001 to 2010. 
b) The number of wildfires recorded each year according to Galician Forest Districts from 
2001 to 2010. 
A weight matrix should be constructed to develop the spatial statistics. As stated earlier, the 
direct Queen contiguity is selected to analyse the relationship between districts (Fig. 2.3.d) 
and its histogram is represented in Figure 2.6. In this graph, it can be observed the lowest and 
highest contiguity between forest districts. Thus, Galician forest districts have at the 
minimum two influential neighbours and six as a maximum. This histogram also highlights a 
big number of districts with six entities around them. However, the biggest contiguity group 
has only three neighbours. 
a) 
a) b) 
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FIGURE 2.6: Histogram of contiguity according to Level 1 for Galician Forest District. 
The Moran’s I and LISA statistics are used to analyse the spatial patterns of wildfires and the 
yearly burned-forest area ratio in Galicia. Figure 2.7 reports the Moran’s I statistic by year, 
and its average for the entire sample. It can be observed that Moran’s I registers higher values 
for the number of wildfires than for the ratio of burned-forest area. Thus, more spatial 
autocorrelation is detected for the number of wildfires than for the ratio of burned-forest area. 
Also, in 2007 no spatial correlation is found for burned-forest area. This may be explained 
because in 2006 wildfires affected many areas (Molano et al., 2007). This caused social 
alarm, therefore over the next year, the wildfires occurrence has been drastically reduced. 
Even the recorded data for the burned-forest area diminished a 97% in 2007 with respect to 
2006. 
 
FIGURE 2.7: The Moran’s I statistic for the burned-forest area ratio and the number of 
wildfires recorded in Galicia during 2001-2010. 
The LISA statistic represents the various significant spatial patterns as follows (Anselin, 
1995; Lesage and Kelley, 2009):  
− High-High (H-H): a particular forest district and their neighborhoods have high 
values. This type of relationship is represented by the red color. 
− High-Low (H-L): a particular forest district has high values and their neighborhoods 
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 have lower values. This type of relationship is represented by the pink color. 
− Low-High (L-H): is similar to the previous category, but in this case the forest district 
has high values and their neighborhoods have lower values. This type of relationship 
is represented by the sky-blue color. 
− Low-Low (L-L): the forest district and their neighborhoods have low values. This 
type of relationship is represented by the blue color. 
The remaining values are represented by a grey color because these entities have a random 
relationship (Moreno and Vayá, 2000). Figure 2.8 represents the LISA statistics related to 
each dependent variable. The colored results are significant at the 5% level. Taking into 
account the burned-forest area ratio, the LISA statistics is represented in Figure 2.8.a. In each 
map the LISA statistic for each district is represented according to the relation with its 
neighborhoods. With this result, the Low-Low (L-L) relation is mainly recorded in the North 
of Galicia, although, this relationship was also recorded in the South for some particular 
years. However, the High-High (H-H) relationship occurs primarily in the South. Thus, 
Southern forest districts and their neighbourhoods record high values of burned-forest area 
ratio. 
 
FIGURE 2.8: a) LISA statistic for the burned-forest area ratio in Galicia during 2001-2010. 
b) LISA statistic for the number of wildfires in Galicia during 2001-2010. 
In order to analyze the number of wildfires, the LISA statistics are shown in Figure 2.8.b. In 
these maps the Low-Low (L-L) relationship could be observed in the Northeast districts. On 
the other hand, Higher-Higher (H-H) relations are recorded in the South and Southeast. 
Therefore, there is evidence of spatial patterns in the number of wildfires.  
All previous graphs and statistics show the existence of relevant spatial patterns and temporal 
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 trends. Therefore, these should be included in the econometric model for both dependent 
variables. The temporal trends are included in the empirical models by using dummy 
variables for each year, considering 2001 as the baseline year. On the other hand, in order to 
correct for spatial patterns in the research, data are set according to a panel of forest districts 
and controlling the heterogeneity by district through standard errors correction. The spatial 
patterns are also analyzed using FE and RE models.  
 
2.5.2 Econometric models results 
a. Results for the burned-forest area 
In order to specify the most suitable econometric model to analyse the evolution of the 
burned-forest area ratio, a Box-Cox test was estimated (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009), being 
its results reported in Table 2.2. A logarithmic model is used in accordance with the results 
obtained in the Box-Cox test. In other words, the statistics could not reject the logarithmic 
specification both for the dependent and independent variables.  
TABLE 2.2: Box-Cox test for the regressions of the ratio of burned-forest area. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Test H0 
Restricted 
log likelihood 
LR Statistic 
chi2 
P-value 
(Prob > chi2) Test H0 
Restricted 
log likelihood 
LR Statistic 
chi2 
P-value 
(Prob > chi2) 
Θ = -1 360.932 742.700 0.000 λ = -1 445.396 9.150 0.002 
Θ = 0 732.266 0.030 0.859 λ = 0 449.422 1.100 0.295 
Θ = 1 448.330 567.900 0.000 λ = 1 448.330 3.280 0.070 
Following the results displayed in Table 2.3. the estimation by OLS captures 69.04% of the 
variation of the burned forest area rate. Taking into account the F-statistic, we find that all 
parameters are jointly significant. As regards the choice between the use of FE and RE in the 
previous models, the Hausman test recommends the use of RE to estimate the burned-forest 
ratio model (Prob>chi2= 0.98).  
The dummy variables determine significant effects over several years. A positive trend is 
identified from 2002 to 2006. The majority of dummy variables are significant and positive 
with respect to the 2001 year. However, after 2006, the trend is clearly negative and 
significant for all years. These results are robust across the econometric selected models.  
The climatological variables show in particular the importance of rainfall in order to reduce 
the burned-forest area ratio. This variable is significant carrying a negative effect in the 
causes of wildfire occurrence. Thus, the average effect of rainfall on burned-forest areas ratio 
is -0.643, when the precipitation changes by one unit over time and between districts. 
However, the maximum temperature has a positive effect, although this variable is not 
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 significant in order to predict the burned area. The small variability in this variable may be 
responsible for this finding.  
In terms of socioeconomic variables, the ratio of the equines and the number of agricultural 
cooperatives have both a negative and significant effect on the burned-forest ratio area for the 
OLS and RE models. Their effects show that if the value changes over time and between 
districts by one unit, then the average effect of equine radio stock and the number of 
agricultural cooperatives over the burned-forest area will respectively decrease by a factor of 
-0.385 and -0.555.  
TABLE 2.3: Econometric results for the regressions of burned-forest area. 
 OLS OLS WITH FE OLS WITH RE 
 Coef, P>t Coef, P>t Coef, P>t 
Dummy 2002 
0.418 
0.046 
0.314 
0.208 
0.357 
0.146 (0.195) (0.248) (0.246) 
Dummy 2003 
0.173 
0.531 
0.263 
0.301 
0.241 
0.334 
(0.270) (0.253) (0.249) 
Dummy 2004 
0.659 
0.003 
0.681 
0.006 
0.698 
0.004 
(0.1949 (0.245) (0.243) 
Dummy 2005 
0.883 
0.000 
0.912 
0.001 
0.942 
0.000 
(0.179) (0.263) (0.256) 
Dummy 2006 
1.172 
0.001 
1.188 
0.000 
1.230 
0.000 
(0.291) (0.267) (0.259) 
Dummy 2007 
-1.037 
0.002 
-1.288 
0.000 
-1.126 
0.000 
(0.290) (0.271) (0.259) 
Dummy 2008 
-1.557 
0.000 
-1.827 
0.000 
-1.632 
0.000 
(0.227) (0.265) (0.251) 
Dummy 2009 
-0.738 
0.004 
-0.739 
0.048 
-0.731 
0.011 
(0.226) (0.371) (0.287) 
Dummy 2010 
-0.797 
0.005 
-0.751 
0.044 
-0.732 
0.008 
(0.248) (0.369) (0.277) 
Summer average 
rainfall 
-0.576 
0.000 
-0.720 
0.000 
-0.643 
0.000 
(0.130) (0.189) (0.176) 
Summer maximum 
temperature 
1.043 
0.297 
-0.749 
0.552 
-0.215 
0.838 
(0.970) (1.256) (1.051) 
Ratio of  
natural pasture 
0.119 
0.405 
0.000 
 
0.084 
0.695 
(0.139) (omitted) (0.215) 
People Density 
0.344 
0.026 
-2.651 
0.272 
0.266 
0.302 
(0.142) (2.405) (0.258) 
Ratio of  
Pinus pinaster 
0.538 
0.037 
-5.369 
0.165 
0.611 
0.027 
(0.239) (3.851) 
 
(0.277) 
Ratio of  
equine stock 
-0.419 
0.054 
-0.182 
0.612 
-0.385 
0.045 
(0.203) (0.357) (0.192) 
Ratio of  
protected areas 
0.446 
0.019 
0.000 
 
0.404 
0.051 
(0.173) (omitted) (0.208) 
Agricultural  
cooperatives 
-0.520 
0.002 
-0.901 
0.621 
-0.555 
0.029 
(0.141) (1.819) (0.253) 
Intercept 
-3.352 
0.317 
-4.353 
0.581 
0.819 
0.836 
(3.256) (7.864) (3.949) 
Number of observations 190 190 190 
F Statistic 112.150     
Prob > F 0.000     
R2 0.690     
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 On the other hand, the density of Pinus pinaster and the ratio of protected areas are positively 
related with this dependent variable. The coefficients are significant for the OLS and RE 
results. We also find that the ratio of natural pasture has no statistical impact on any of the 
econometric models. 
 
b. Results of the number of wildfires 
For the purpose of determining the functional form for the regression of wildfires, the Box-
Cox test does not provide conclusive evidence of the superiority of any functional form 
(Table 2.4). However, in order to compare the number of wildfires with the regression of the 
burned-forest area ratio, the logarithmic model is selected. Also, this functional form is 
estimated to allow for comparability between all regressions.  
TABLE 2.4: Box-Cox test for the regression of number of wildfires. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Test H0 
Restricted 
log likelihood 
LR Statistic 
chi2 
P-value 
(Prob > chi2) Test H0 
Restricted 
log likelihood 
LR Statistic 
chi2 
P-value 
(Prob > chi2) 
Θ = -1 -1,368.202 417.560 0.000 λ = -1 -1,223.004 7.630 0.006 
Θ = 0 -1,163.885 8.930 0.003 λ = 0 -1,221.815 5.250 0.022 
Θ = 1 -1,225.002 131.170 0.000 λ = 1 -1,225.002 11.620 0.001 
Following the results displayed in Table 2.5, the estimation by OLS explains 78.60% of the 
variation of the number of wildfires. In addition, the parameters are all jointly statistically 
significant. In the OLS results, temporal trends are also identified. Until the year 2005, the 
coefficients are not significant; however, from this year onwards, all yearly dummies are 
significant and negative. Therefore, from 2005 onwards, the wildfire occurrence diminishes 
with respect to 2001. Taking into account the climatological variables, the rainfall carries a 
significant and negative effect on the number of wildfires (-0.430). On the opposite, the 
maximum temperature is significant and positively related to wildfire occurrence (1.696).  
Some variables, such as the ratio of equines and the agricultural cooperatives do not have a 
significant relationship with the number of wildfires during 2001-2010, are not significant in 
the assessment of the wildfires using the OLS models. However, the rest of the 
socioeconomic variables, are significant and have positive effects over the wildfires 
occurrence.  
The number of wildfires is modelled by count data models. Therefore, overdispersion should 
be studied in order to select the best econometric model. Taking into account the results of 
Table 3, the data show overdispersion, and hence, the NBMR is selected to estimate the 
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 number of wildfires. The Hausman test recommends the use of RE to estimate the number of 
fires by the NBMR (Prob.>chi2=1.00). 
Analysing the effects of the yearly variables, temporal trends are found according to the 
NBMR results, both with FE or RE. In this way, since 2006, it is observable that the wildfire 
occurrence diminishes with respect 2001. However, the NBRM also detects a significant 
growth in wildfires in 2005 with respect to the baseline year. The OLS and NBMR models, 
with or without RE, demonstrate the presence of temporal trends in Galician wildfires. 
TABLE 2.5: Econometric results for the regressions of the number of wildfires. 
 OLS NBMR NBMR with FE NBMR with RE 
 Coef, P>t IRR P>t IRR P>t Coef, P>t 
Dummy 2002 
0.147 
0.222 
1.039 
0.665 
0.985 
0.808 
1.003 
0.965 
0.116 0.092 0.063 0.063 
Dummy 2003 
-0.006 
0.968 
1.004 
0.970 
0.950 
0.474 
0.956 
0.502 
0.147 0.110 0.068 0.065 
Dummy 2004 
0.067 
0.526 
1.077 
0.351 
1.088 
0.165 
1.088 
0.160 
0.104 0.085 0.066 0.066 
Dummy 2005 
-0.099 
0.552 
1.004 
0.965 
1.160 
0.027 
1.134 
0.055 
0.163 0.094 0.077 0.075 
Dummy 2006 
-0.894 
0.000 
0.602 
0.000 
0.674 
0.000 
0.653 
0.000 
0.164 0.071 0.053 0.049 
Dummy 2007 
-1.366 
0.000 
0.370 
0.000 
0.320 
0.000 
0.328 
0.000 
0.214 0.048 0.030 0.030 
Dummy 2008 
-2.155 
0.000 
0.223 
0.000 
0.218 
0.000 
0.227 
0.000 
0.201 0.027 0.023 0.022 
Dummy 2009 
-1.289 
0.000 
0.405 
0.000 
0.379 
0.000 
0.376 
0.000 
0.236 0.061 0.040 0.036 
Dummy 2010 
-1.625 
0.000 
0.333 
0.000 
0.365 
0.000 
0.345 
0.000 
0.187 0.042 0.036 0.032 
Summer average 
rainfall 
-0.430 
0.002 
0.990 
0.000 
0.994 
0.000 
0.994 
0.000 
0.120 0.002 0.001 0.001 
Summer máximum 
temperature 
1.696 
0.031 
1.022 
0.576 
0.972 
0.074 
0.981 
0.189 
0.726 0.039 0.015 0.014 
Ratio of 
natural pasture 
0.227 
0.010 
149.018 
0.000 
43.453 
0.109 
141.696 
0.000 
0.079 213.364 102.163 185.066 
People 
Density 
0.339 
0.004 
1.173 
0.190 
1.313 
0.078 
1.180 
0.015 
0.104 0.143 0.203 0.080 
Ratio of 
Pinus pinaster 
0.354 
0.031 
5.437 
0.084 
5.135 
0.074 
6.132 
0.000 
0.151 5.331 4.705 2.838 
Ratio of 
equine specie 
-0.201 
0.227 
0.005 
0.257 
0.035 
0.163 
0.004 
0.007 
0.161 0.022 0.085 0.008 
Ratio of 
protected areas 
0.253 
0.042 
3.276 
0.060 
4.334 
0.209 
4.072 
0.024 
0.116 2.068 5.060 2.538 
Agricultural 
cooperatives 
-0.110 
0.363 
1.012 
0.167 
1.010 
0.421 
1.015 
0.052 
0.118 0.009 0.013 0.008 
Intercept 
3.662 
0.138 
12,259.780 
0.000 
1,775.902 
0.000 
1,391.861 
0.000 
2.360 13,443.070 1,497.628 936.366 
Number of 
 
190 190 190 190  
F Statistic 107.240       
Prob > F 0.000       
R2 0.786       
OVESDISPERSION ANALYSIS 
Muhat   
0.111 
0.000     
  0.015     
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 Furthermore, the estimator of summer rainfall is significant and carries a negative effect on the 
number of wildfires (0.994). According to the estimation with RE, if this independent variable 
changes over time and between districts by one unit, then the average effect of the average summer 
rainfall over the number of wildfires is significant (0.944). Otherwise, the average of the maximum 
temperature during the summer is not significant to explain the wildfires according with the NBMR 
models. 
In the NBMR models, the ratio of natural pasture, Pinus pinaster and protected areas are 
statically significant. The effects of these variables on wildfire occurrence are positive. By 
analysing the IRR, if the ratio of natural pasture, the ratio of Pinus pinaster and the ratio of 
protected areas per landowner show an increase by one unit, then the number of wildfires 
increases by a factor of 149.018, 5.437 and 3.276, respectively.  
In addition, socioeconomic variables are significant in the NBRM with RE. Nevertheless, the 
remaining variables have different impacts on wildfire occurrence. The agricultural 
cooperatives and population density have a positive relationship with the occurrence of 
Galician wildfires. If these previous variables increase by one point, the rate of the number of 
wildfires would be expected to increase by a factor of 1.015 and 1.180, respectively, while 
holding all other variables constant. Furthermore, the ratio of equines has a negative 
relationship with wildfires occurrence.  
The summer average rainfall is significant in order to predict the wildfires occurrence. This is 
explained by the absence of raining, given that this increases the wildfire risk. Nevertheless, 
the summer maximum temperature is only significant in the OLS results.  
 
2.6. DISCUSSION 
Spatial patterns and temporal trends can be observed with graphical data representation. 
Furthermore, the spatial dependence of wildfires can also be determined by spatial statistics. 
Various econometric models are employed to assess the impact of socio-economic, climatic 
and geographical variables, as well temporal and spatial effects. Following the econometric 
models employed, and in particular those from RE models, the number of wildfires and the 
affected area ratio are estimated for each Galician forest districts in 2010. The estimations 
portrayed in Figure 2.9 show the actual data for both dependent variables and predictions. 
The data of these variables are distributed in quantiles and represent each district. In doing so, 
the geographical patterns of wildfire occurrence can be clearly differentiated in these maps. It 
is shown that the wildfire risk depends on the forest district; and as such, regulators should 
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 focus their forestry efforts on the areas in which the prediction of wildfires is higher. In other 
words, and for the area of study, public policy efforts should focus more closely on the 
southern rather than the northern districts. 
In terms of the econometric results, it was found that the agro-forestry features are important 
factors given that the land cover is conditioned by this activity. The type of forest plantation, 
the livestock used in the farms or the land assigned to agricultural activity influences the 
wildfire occurrence. The ratio of equines is slo important in order to reduce the wildfire 
occurrence (Rigueiro et al., 2002; Pasalodos et al., 2009). This species grazes freely in the 
surrounding farm; fed mainly with grass, bushes or seeds; keeping the land cover cleaner. 
Thus, the wildfire risk diminishes where there are more equines than other livestock species. 
The presence of agricultural cooperatives also affects the wildfires occurrence. This happens 
because of the traditional agricultural management practices using fires. Nevertheless, the 
effect is the opposite for the burned area, because in general terms, the lands are better 
managed when the agricultural sector is more powerful in rural areas.  
 
FIGURE 2.9: Estimation of wildfire occurrence in 2010. a) Actual ratio of burned area (%). 
b) Estimated rate of burned area (%). c) Actual number of wildfires. d) Estimated number of 
wildfires. 
We also find that the Pinus pinaster ratio has a positive influence on the occurrence of 
wildfires, because this species is pyrophyte, with wildfires spreading more where Pinus 
pinaster are being planted. Protected areas could also be expected to have a negative 
relationship with wildfire occurrence; however the social rejection or ineffective protection 
measures could cause a positive influence. Furthermore, climatology variables condition the 
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 occurrence of wildfires, how they spread or the suppression efforts. Finally, the evolution of 
wildfires over time demonstrates high variability. This is the justifying reason why yearly 
dummy variables were included.  
In general terms, the population density is important in order to predict the wildfire 
occurrence. However, in some of the empirical models, results are not conclusive. For 
example, in the OLS with RE, this variable is not significant when explaining the burned-
forest area ratio. The same happens in the NBRM when analysing the wildfire number. In the 
remaining models, the population density is positively related to the occurrence of wildfires. 
This result is explained by the progressive migratory flow from the rural to urban areas. 
Then, the wild land-urban density around to main areas is increasing. In addition, the new 
residents are not involved in the agricultural sector and they are not involved with forest 
production (Barreiro and Hermosilla, 2013). This generates worst environmental conditions, 
causing an increase of wildfires (Herrero-Corral et al., 2012). Public policies may supervise 
the surrounding environment of these areas and aware society to avoid wildfire occurrence. 
The types of forest covers are represented by the ratio of Pinus pinaster. The results show a 
positive influence on both, the ratio of burned-forest area and wildfires number. These results 
are related with the species characteristics because these are more inflammable and the 
wildfires, when occurring, move faster than with other species. The preventive measures and 
supervision should also be incremented in these areas in order to avoid wildfires.  
Unexpectedly, the protected areas influence positively the occurrence of wildfires. This result 
may show the general rejection towards having protected lands in rural areas. This result 
could also imply an inadequate public policy to manage these areas against wildfires (Carroll 
et al., 2006). Therefore, the zooning of protection areas may be revised in order to identify 
the possible social and environmental factors that can be improved when reducing 
management conflicts. These improvements will imply lower wildfire occurrence if these 
factors are corrected. 
 
2.7. CONCLUSION 
This research provides evidence characterizing the wildfire occurrence in the agricultural 
sector in relation to the climatic conditions, the forest cover, the social context, and time and 
spatial patterns. A relevant finding is that the forest species and the farming systems condition 
the wildfire risk. Hence, public policies may mitigate the factors that affect the wildfire risk. 
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 In this way, the presence of equines and extensive agricultural practices should be promoted 
in order to reduce the wildfire risk.  
According to the main results, some guidelines could be developed as a reference for regional 
and local governments to help in the fight of wildfires. In particular, public policies could 
regulate the quality and quantity of woodland made available, as well as the plantation of 
different species. These regulatory agencies should also consider the geographical and spatial 
differences in the occurrence of wildfires in order to formulate better forest policies, and deal 
with possible “contagion” effects across districts.  
Finally, we should remark that the current research has some limitations. In particular, 
additional variables would be desirable by employing more geographical disaggregated data, 
such as roads and infrastructures. Unfortunately, such data are not currently available, 
although, they are expected to be in the near future. In spite of that, many of the obtained 
conclusions could be applicable to other similar European areas, especially in depopulated 
rural areas. In particular, these main results could be implemented in the French 
Mediterranean basin (INSEE, 2015; PROMETHEE, 2015) and Portugal (INE, 2015), among 
others. 
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CHAPTER 3: ON INSURANCE AS A TOOL FOR 
SECURING FOREST RESTORATION AFTER WILDFIRES 
 
 
Abstract: The recovery of the affected areas after a wildfire is important in order to restore 
the production of the various ecosystem services. We develop a theoretical valuation model 
that contains a forest insurance policy, in order to protect the landowner against total or 
partial losses caused by wildfires. Restoration costs of affected areas are explicitly included. 
Such model is used to simulate the changes in rotation and profitability of Pinus pinaster 
Aiton. in Galicia (NW Spain). We find that in the areas where the risk of wildfires is higher, 
forest owners may profit the most from subscribing such insurance. Overall, we conclude that 
insurance is an effective tool to increase the net present value (NPV) of forest investments, 
particularly when restoration costs are covered.  
 
Keywords: Forest insurance, restoration, optimal forest rotation 
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3.1. INTRODUCTION 
In Europe, forest fires are concentrated in the Southern countries, with Portugal, Spain, Italy, 
and Greece being the most affected, both in terms of the number of fires recorded and forest 
area affected (European Commission, 2011). Nevertheless, these Mediterranean countries 
represent less than 30% of Europe’s forestry areas. The case of Spain is even more serious in 
terms of fire intensity: while representing around 10% of Europe’s forest area, it suffers about 
24% of the total number of wildfires per year, representing approximately 25% of the total 
amount of burned forest area in Europe. There are also important regional variations within a 
given country. For example, in the case of Spain, Galicia is the Spanish region with the most 
wildfires. Galicia represents 15% of the Spanish forest area, while in recent years it has 
experienced around 42% of Spain’s total number of wildfires (MAFE, 2012). 
Wildfires cause significant damage to both, the forest stand and soil quality, while the 
affected growing stocks may take a long time to recover (Inbar et al., 1997). Therefore, if 
there are no forest restoration measures in place, the chances of success for a post-wildfire 
forest depend on its natural regeneration speed and how badly degraded the soil is (Bautista 
et al., 2009). However, forest restoration is expensive for landowners, who may be interested 
in covering wildfires losses with insurance in exchange for an insurance premium. In order to 
mitigate the significant losses caused by wildfires, some private companies offer the 
possibility to take out forest insurance. In particular, in countries such as Norway, Germany 
and France, landowners can contract fire insurance (Mahul and Stutley, 2010). In general, 
these policies can cover damage caused by storms, snow, or wildfires. These damages could 
affect forest production and ecosystem services during a short or long period (Barrio et al., 
2007; González-Gómez et al., 2013). The forest insurance policies in these countries can also 
cover other restoration costs, including all the damages caused, although different restrictions 
and conditions may apply. Keeping this in mind, it is therefore necessary to assess the impact 
of forest insurance as a compensation mechanism for the damage caused by wildfires on 
forest management. Forest insurance contracts are offered in several countries around the 
world. In some of them the forest insurance is semi-public, for example in Mexico, and in 
other countries is private, such as in New Zealand or Brazil. However, in Germany or 
Canada, where the forest insurance are private, the government subsidize the insurance 
premium. These insurance policies could cover different risks and damages. For example, the 
forest insurance in Costa Rica covers timber-standing damages and the forest damages caused 
by storms are covered in Mexico. This study is motivated by a number of experimental 
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 Spanish fire insurance programmes. Some forest insurance programs have appeared in this 
country over the last few decades, and a legal protocol for their implementation is currently 
underway. These insurance programs have been designed to cover the costs of replanting 
affected areas for a wide range of species, while wood and other commercial losses are only 
covered for a limited number of species. The size of the insurable Spanish forest reached 
6,224,029 hectares in 2010, while only 77,103 hectares were insured in the same year 
(Agroseguro, 2011). This implies that only 1.25% of the forests that fulfil the criteria to be 
covered with a forest insurance policy. 
The Spanish Strategic Forestry Plan (Ministry of the Environment, 1999) highlights the 
importance of forest insurance as a mechanism to cover wildfire losses, with a special 
emphasis on forest restoration. This insurance can have positive implications for the 
landowner and society, because the forest returns to production faster and provides new 
environmental and ecosystem services for the community. Consequently, it is necessary to 
design an insurance model in which these forest restoration costs could be covered in order to 
improve the forest management. This type of coverage may provide more sustainable forest 
management strategies, guaranteeing that forest profitability is not depleted and generates 
higher incentives to invest in forest production. Therefore, insurance may also help to restore 
and recover forest areas, whilst guaranteeing that landowners do not lose all their 
investments. With this insurance program, the recovery of burned areas is expected to be 
quicker in insured forests than in uninsured ones.  
In this research area of forest insurance against wildfire hazards, there are still few references 
(Manley and Watt, 2009), although research had already begun in the first half of the 
twentieth century (Averill and Frost, 1933; Shepard, 1935; Willians, 1949). Recently, the 
issue of forest insurance is gaining again importance in the literature, particularly in Europe 
(Brunette and Couture, 2008; Pinheiro and Ribeiro, 2011; Brunette et al., 2012). A relevant 
contribution in this area of forest insurance is the research carried out by Holecy and 
Hanewinkel (2006) in which an insurance model was developed for coniferous forests in 
southwest Germany. These researchers developed a forest destruction probability model, in 
which several elements, such as fire and windstorms are taken into account. Subsequently, 
they carried on a number of forest valuations which depended on timber production and 
forest management. They described a possible insurance model that analysed the damage risk 
and the insurance premium. However, none of the previous references to forest insurance 
explicitly analyse the possibility of covering forest restoration costs. Meanwhile, there are 
many researchers who have highlighted the importance of forest restoration after wildfires. 
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 Authors such as Kauffman (2004) or Alloza and Vallejo (2006) also underline the positive 
consequences of the application of insurance policies for the environment (Beschta et al., 
2004). With this in mind, this paper aims to develop a forest insurance model against 
wildfires, in which timber damages and restoration costs after wildfires will be included, 
given that these are important for landowners' wealth and secondly for providing ecosystem 
services. 
The main goal of this paper is to analyse the implications of forest insurance policies with 
restoration measures in private forest management. To achieve this, a private insurance model 
is developed in which the level of coverage, the productive variables and the risk level of a 
wildfire occurring are included. With this insurance, forest restoration and timber damages 
could be covered (either wholly or in part). These characteristics should be included 
implicitly or explicitly in the insurance policy. In this study, some hypotheses will be 
enunciated and demonstrated in order to analyse the effect of this type of insurance on forest 
rotation and on forest economic returns, measured by the Net Present Value (NPV). 
Following this theoretical section, an empirical simulation applying this insurance model to a 
Pinus pinaster Aiton. plantation in the region of Galicia (Spain) is represented. Finally, in the 
last part of this paper, the main results and conclusions of this research will be presented. The 
importance of insurance in reducing the volatility of forest investments will be highlighted. 
 
3.2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.2.1 Forest insurance model 
A number of previous research papers have developed economic insurance models from 
different perspectives. For example, Holecy and Hanewinkel (2006) developed an insurance 
model in which the gross insurance premium was analysed, and the probabilities of forest 
destruction were computed. Another interesting piece of research is by Brunette and Couture 
(2008), who presented an insurance model to analyse the impact of public subsidies after 
natural disasters. This model uses the landowner’s preferences in order to investigate the 
implications of a subsidy on forest management. Therefore, in these papers, the effect of an 
insurance policy on the landowner’s wealth and the effect of this financial asset on forest 
rotation is not explicitly studied. 
In this study, the NPV will be used to understand the economic implications of forest 
insurance policies on forest management for one forest rotation period (Hanewinkel et al., 
2011). Taking into account previous contributions, such as those by Amacher et al. (2005) or 
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 Martell et al. (1998), the insurance model includes the forest management costs, which 
contain the cleaning and maintenance costs to prevent wildfires, amongst others. 
Additionally, the application of public subsidies for forest management and the intensity of 
the wildfire are taken into account as variables of interest that modify the NPV estimate. 
In order to motivate a forest insurance model, it is first necessary to consider a landowner’s 
forest wealth, which suffers damages (D) when a wildfire occurs. These losses cannot be 
greater than the initial landowner’s wealth and are related to the risk of a wildfire. The 
wildfire risk is defined as δ, while the complementary probability of a wildfire not occurring 
is the remainder (1-δ). As stated, this wildfire risk depends on the forest management (s); so, 
if preventive efforts are applied, the risk may decrease (González et al., 2005). These 
preventive actions influence the forest insurance (Ehrlich and Becker, 1972). Therefore, if the 
insurance requires preventive strategies that make it possible to reduce the probability of a 
disaster (self-protection efforts), then insurance and preventive measures will be 
complementary. However, when the insurance premium does not depend on prevention 
efforts, then the insurance and self-protection will be substitutes. In this paper, the risk 
depends inversely on forest management efforts [δ’(s)<0]; this relationship is concave, as 
there is a level after which additional forest management efforts cannot reduce the wildfire 
risk [δ’’(s)<0](Martell et al., 1998; Amacher et al., 2005). Therefore, landowners can alter 
the risk with their actions (Chang, 1983, 1984; Amacher et al., 2009). We acknowledge that 
there are other exogenous variables to the landowners, such as climatic and geographic 
conditions that may play an important role in the risk. However, this last set of variables will 
not be considered into the model as they cannot be altered or modified by any contracting 
party. In summary, the wildfire risk will depend on all of the preventive measures that are 
designed to reduce the risk of wildfire occurrence, and it is assumed that the insurer will have 
information about this preventive effort. 
However, forest management implies a cost to the landowner, although this management cost 
may be altered if the government provides public subsidies in order to share the forest 
management costs with the landowner (Lankoande et al., 2005; Yoder, 2008). We consider 
that the rate of the cost paid by the landowner is defined by α, while (1-α) indicates the level 
of public subsidies contributing to forest management. The value of this proportion is 
between zero and one, so that mathematically α є [0,1]. 
Otherwise, if the landowner is insured against wildfire damages, then they have to pay an 
insurance premium (γ), which offers a chance to receive compensation (Ω) after a wildfire 
(Brunette and Couture, 2008; Brunette et al., 2012). In this model, forest restoration costs (h) 
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 are covered by this insurance, while this coverage can be total (full coverage) or partial. This 
coverage will be linked to the recovery plan in order to determine the possible expenses and 
the type of restoration that the landowner desires to undertake. In order to simplify this 
model, the insurance policy will predefine the recovery costs, which do not vary as a function 
of wildfire intensity. Thus, compensation could be determined using Eq. 3.1, where μ is the 
damage rate covered by the insurance policy, while (1-μ) is the proportion that is not covered 
by the insurance program. If μ = 1, then the insurance would cover all direct damages (full 
coverage), whereas if μ = 0, then no insurance has been taken out. Nevertheless, the insurer 
covers up to the level λ of forest restoration expenditures, while the remainder is covered by 
the insured landowner. Thus, if λ = 1, the insurer will bear all of the costs of forest 
restoration, and if λ = 0, then, the insured landowner will cover these costs. We will therefore 
define the compensation as: 
            0 1,0 1D hm j m jW= + £ £ £ £       [3.1] 
According to the previous considerations, landowners have to take out an insurance policy if 
they wish to be entitled to receive a compensation in the case of a wildfire. As landowners 
face different payments depending on the state of nature, then the owner's wealth will be 
modified accordingly (Rees and Wambach, 2008). In this way, and for motivation purposes, 
the net revenues associated with two different states of nature (x = no wildfire and y = 
wildfire occurs) are represented in the two following equations: 
( ) ( ) ( ), , , , , ,x PQ t C Q s Q t sa g m j= - -        [3.2] 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , , , , , , , ,y PQ t C Q s D Q t I h Q t sa m j g m j= - - - -    [3.3] 
In the first case, timber revenues (PQ), forest management cost (C) and the insurance 
premium (γ) are taken into account. Subsequently, it is assumed that the forest produces a 
growing stock (Q) which depends, for a given site productivity, on the time factor (t). The 
relationship between production and time is positive and concave [Q’(t)>0; Q’’(t)<0]. Also, it 
is assumed that the timber price (P) is constant over time. Moreover, the management cost 
depends on the public subsidy (α), the forest management effort (s), and the timber 
production (Q). Further, the management costs depends inversely on public subsidies 
[C’(α)<0; C’’(α)>0]; while they exhibit the following relations with respect to the 
aforementioned variables [C’(s)>0; C’(Q)>0; C’’(s)<0; C’’(Q)<0]. 
All the previous variables depend on the landowner’s attitudes toward risks, although these 
have not been included in the present model (Brunette and Couture, 2008). The insurance 
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 premium depends on the time factor (t), the coverage level (μ; λ), the management effort (s), 
and growing stock (Q). Eq. 2.3 presents the forest net revenues in the specific case where the 
damages are not covered by a wildfire insurance. These damages (D) depend on the forest 
management effort (s), and on forest restoration cost [h(λ)]. The damages depend on time (t), 
the growing stock (Q), the insurance coverage (μ) and the wildfire intensity (I). 
 
3.2.2 The optimal forest rotation model 
The techniques used to value forest wealth are usually based on the Faustmann’s rotation 
model (Faustmann, 1849). This model has been applied and extended by many researchers, 
such as Hartman (1976), Samuelson (1976) or Reed (1984). The aim of these models is to 
calculate the optimal rotations. Forest characteristics and/or financial variables, such as the 
afforestation costs (R) or timber revenues (PQ) are taken into account. Following earlier work 
by Barreto et al. (1998); Hyytiäinen and Haight (2010); or Hanewinkel et al. (2011), the NPV 
computation is used in this paper. We also followed Reed (1984), in order to select the use of 
the continuous discount factor in this model. This continuous discount factor depends on the 
interest rate (r), and the time period (t) that is taken as the reference point. The equation of 
interest is presented in Eq. 3.4, in which the NPV for one rotation is described. 
( ) rttNPV PQ t e R-= -          [3.4] 
In order to better describe the NPV, and as an extension of this paper, the wildfire risk and 
insurance policy will be included. As a result, the new valuation depends on the risk of 
damages. This extended NPV is presented in Eq. 3.5. In this case, the forest management cost 
and damage risk are also considered. Forest management influences both forest production 
risks and costs, and so it is an important variable for determining the NPV, and consequently, 
the optimal forest rotation. However, these effects are opposed to each other; if the forest 
management effort increases, then the premium to be paid for the insurance and the expected 
damage will decrease, although the management effort and related management costs will 
increase. The expected damage is the cross product of the wildfire probability (δ) and damage 
(D); which depends on the forest management effort (s), and the amount of the possible 
losses, which occur in the timber stand (Q), plus other forest restoration cost (h). 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ), , , , rttNPV PQ t C Q s s D Q t I h e Ra d -é ù= - - + -ê úë û     [3.5] 
If a landowner takes out wildfire insurance, the previous equation should reflect the insurance 
characteristics. So, the insurance premium (γ) should be included as an additional cost. 
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 Therefore, if the coverage level (μ, λ) and timber value increase, or if the forest management 
effort decreases, then the insurance premium cost increases. Also, the damages show a 
negative relationship with respect to the coverage level. Consequently, the expected damage 
to the timber stand or forest restoration costs will decrease with higher levels of coverage. 
However, if the wildfire intensity is high, then the damage increases. This new modified NPV 
function is represented by Eq. 3.6, in which a landowner’s decision to take out an insurance 
policy or not is taken into consideration. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ), , , , , , , , , rttNPV PQ t Q t s C Q s s D Q t I h e Rg m j a d m j -é ù= - - - + -ê úë û  [2.6] 
The optimal forest rotation is now computed. According to the previous literature (Reed, 
1984; Clarke and Reed, 1989; Alvarez and Koskela, 2006), this rotation could be conditioned 
by different elements. Thus, there are economic and forestry uncertainty variables that 
condition forestry management (Marshall, 1987; Gong and Löfgren, 2003; Pasalodos-Tato et 
al., 2010). Following González et al. (2005), we can see that the rotation length decreases 
with both economic and wildfire risks, but the difference depends on the relative importance 
of both variables. Therefore, the landowner’s decision depends on both types of risks. 
 
Proposition 3.1: At the optimal forest rotation point, the landowner is indifferent between 
keeping the forest growing with the protection of wildfire insurance, or cutting down the 
forest and investing the money from the harvest at a rate « r ». 
 
Demonstration 3.1: As the landowner wants to maximize the forest’s expected value, they 
have to maximize the previous equation. To achieve this, the partial derivative with respect to 
time is taken and set equal to zero. This result determines the optimal forest rotation (T*). By 
rearranging this expression, Eq. 3.7 emerges, in which the optimal forest rotation is achieved 
when the rate of growth value of the forest stand with insurance against wildfire risks, which 
also covers restoration costs, is equal to the interest rate. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
* * *
* * *
' ' , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , ,
PQ T Q T s s D Q T I
r
PQ T Q T s C Q s s D Q T I h
g m j d m
g m j a d m
- -
=
- - - +
  [3.7] 
The left hand side (LHS) of Eq. 3.7 depends on the forest stand value, forest management, the 
wildfire risk and/or the insurance policy. Conversely, the RHS only depends on the interest 
rate. Therefore, the point where both functions cross each other determines the optimal forest 
rotation point. Based on the previous demonstration, if the wildfire risk increases, then the 
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 LHS of the equation will decrease and the optimal forest rotation will increase, ceteris 
paribus. However, if some values vary and offset the increment of the wildfire risk, then this 
rotation will not be modified. An opposite effect would occur if the forest management costs 
decrease. Thus, if the government increases subsidies for forest management, the costs will 
be reduced, making the denominator smaller; and consequently, the optimal forest rotation 
will be shorter. In cases when the government decides to reduce these subsidies, the optimal 
forest rotation would be increased, ceteris paribus. 
 
Proposition 2: Marginal timber revenues should be equal to the marginal increase of the 
insurance premium plus the marginal expected losses in order for the optimal forest rotation 
to remain unchanged. 
 
Demonstration 2: According to Eq. 3.7, timber production, the insurance premium and the 
risk of damage of the forest stand could modify the slope of the rate of the marginal net 
revenue curve with insurance against the risk of wildfires. Therefore, if the forest stand grows 
faster or prices increase significantly, then the optimal rotation may be shorter than for other 
types of forests or locations where growth occurs at slower rates, ceteris paribus. In the same 
way, if the insurance premium or damage risk increases, the optimal forest rotation should 
take longer. The reverse happens if these variables decrease with respect to the rotation 
length. Following Eq. 3.7, the slope will not change if the rotation effects are void. This is 
represented in Eq. 3.8. In this expression, the marginal growth of timber revenues is equal to 
the marginal increase of the insurance premium and the marginal change of expected damage. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )' ' , , , , ' , , ,PQ t Q t s s D Q t Ig m j d m= +       [2.8] 
 
Proposition 3: An optimal change in forest management effort should equal the 
corresponding reduction in the insurance premium and expected losses. 
 
Demonstration 3: The optimal management effort is achieved when the derivative of Eq. 3.6 
with respect to forest management efforts (s) is set equal to zero. Eq. 3.9 is then obtained. 
The (RHS) of this equation represents the marginal costs due to management efforts, while 
the corresponding reduction of other associated costs linked to management are presented on 
the LHS. So, if the cost of forest management is greater than the reduction of the premium 
and wildfire risk [C’(Q,s,α)>γ’(Q,t,s,μ,λ)+δ’(s)], then the optimal forest rotation will be 
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 larger, ceteris paribus. The opposite occurs if the reductions of the premium and wildfire 
risks are higher than the costs [C’(Q,s,α)<γ’(Q,t,s,μ,λ)+δ’(s)]. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )' , , ' , , , , ' , , ,C Q s Q t s s D Q t I ha g m j d m j=- - +     [3.9] 
Following this equation, the landowner will try to achieve the equilibrium point where the 
NPV will be the highest with respect to forest management. This optimal point is reached 
when the marginal management costs are equal to the marginal net revenues of forest 
management. 
 
3.3. EMPIRICAL SIMULATION 
According to Figure 3.1, wildfires affect Galicia more than any other Spanish region. This 
region has the highest number of wildfires and the highest ratio of burned forest area in 
Spain. 
 
FIGURE 3.1: Ratio of wildfire occurrence in the regions of Spain during 2001-2010 
(MAFE, 2012). 
For the purpose of simulating the effects of the previous theoretical models, we first compute 
the expected wildfire risk in the study areas. Thus, it is assumed that the risk will be 
accounted for by considering geographic variations throughout the Galician forest districts 
(See Figure 3.2). Based on previous research by Barreal et al. (2012), the wildfire risk was 
calculated as a prediction based on socio-economic and geographical variables, as well as 
climate related variables for each of the administrative demarcations. Running regression 
models, fire risk prediction indexes were obtained for all of the districts, only selecting those 
that corresponded respectively to low, medium and high-risk indexes. In particular, the 
wildfire risk used in the following simulation is the estimated 0.07% for the area of “A 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
Galicia Castilla y León Andalucia Extremadura Asturias Castilla-La Mancha Others Regions
Ratio of number of wildfires Ratio of burned area Ratio of burned forestry area
75 
 Mariña Lucense” (very low risk), 0.53% for the area of “Fisterra” (representing the average 
monthly risk in the entire region) and 1.57% (higher risk) for “Verín-Viana” (Figure 3.2). 
 
 
FIGURE 3.2: Galician Forest Districts. 
As a working hypothesis, it is assumed that these risk levels do not vary within each specific 
forest district. Another assumption is that all landowners could take out the forest insurance 
described above, and all owners have the same wildfire risks, regardless of the size of their 
lands or their management. To select the discount factor, the simulation employs a given 
interest rate of 3%, as used by Pasalodos-Tato et al. (2010). The rest of the variables take 
random values, as their respective roles are only to simulate the effect of a forest insurance 
program and to identify their possible implications if this kind of insurance is used. 
Therefore, the given values are set to μ=70% and λ=95%, assigned to damage and restoration 
coverage respectively. Therefore, there is a deductible that is represented by a portion of 
damages and costs that landowners have to face, respectively. Using the previous values, we 
assume that 30% of restoration costs and 5% of timber damage are not covered by the 
insurance respectively. The timber damage coverage is set as partial coverage, and only 
commercial values are considered. Note that a proportion of the non-commercial value is not 
refundable due to the deductible that is not covered for restoration costs. 
In order to determine the NPV of the forest stand, an example based on the silvicultural 
production system of a regular stand of Pinus pinaster Aiton. is used. This species is chosen 
because it attracts large commercial interests in Galicia, and this region has suitable 
edaphoclimatic conditions for its cultivation. Also, one should note the importance of this 
species in traditional production and uses of the Galician forest, while this is one of the 
species included in the experimental forest insurance program. The growth rate of this species 
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 depends on climatic conditions and on soil characteristics, among other factors. The Quality 
II for Pinus pinaster Aiton. corresponds to a site index of 1.70 m with 20 years as a reference 
age. The average forest productivity differs between districts, but to prevent this differential 
effect the current research has compared stands with the same site index. 
This simulation uses a simplified silvicultural regime, which includes the plantation of 1,111 
trees per hectare, no thinning during the length of the rotation and a final clear-cut. By 
increasing the growing space available to the remaining trees, a landowner can increase the 
growth rate of the remaining trees and, more importantly, the rate at which their value 
increases. Thinning can also be used to remove poorly formed trees that would have little 
future value. Thus, if the landowner does not make these intermediate cuts, the average tree 
in the final cut will be smaller and it will have less commercial value. Nevertheless, in the 
case of the Galician small non-industrial forest owners, this is a common forest management 
method due to the cost and difficulty of thinning. 
To determine restoration costs, the prices included in the afforestation incentives enacted by 
the Galician Government are applied. These costs are set to a maximum of 1,853 €/ha and 
include the cost of preparing the soil, purchasing the seeds or saplings, and the subsequent 
sowing or planting, in addition to the cost of defending these plants with protectors, or other 
necessary materials, and the elaboration of preventive actions against wildfires (Consellería 
de Medio Rural, 2009). It also includes other tasks that could be carried out immediately after 
plantation. Therefore, considering the average slope of the land and soil conditions and the 
initial density of this silviculture regime, the cost of restoration is assumed to be 1,400 €/ha 
(BOE, 2010). 
The forest stand value is calculated based on the possible income generated from the final 
harvest for each possible rotation. The timber price is obtained from Molano et al. (2007). 
These values are the average price at mill gate for the year 2006, which have been updated 
with an enquiry to companies and loggers. Production tables and profile curve for this species 
have been obtained for each year according to regional publications (Rodríguez et al., 2000). 
Finally, in order to obtain the net revenue of the timber that will be received by the 
landowner, transportation (6 €/m3) and logging costs will be subtracted. The latter costs 
depend on the tree size and machinery performance as shown in Nakagawa et al. (2010). In 
this way, Eq. 3.10 is used to calculate forest stand value per hectare (Vk) for Pinus pinaster 
Aiton. 
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In the previous equation the timber stand net value depends on the density of trees per hectare 
(n) for the respective year (k) and the value of the timber stand. This valuation depends on the 
timber grade (i). In this model, the timber is graded as pulpwood, sawlogs and premium 
sawlogs. The description of this timber classification is detailed on Table 3.1. The growing 
stock per hectare (Q), the mill gate price (Pf) and the harvesting cost (Ca) per m3 of timber 
depends on its grade of forest production. Finally, to determine the timber stand net value, the 
cost of transportation to the factory per m3 (Ct) is subtracted. 
TABLE 3.1: Timber classification according to technical characteristics. 
TYPE OF TIMBER LOGS DIAMETER DESTINATION 
Pulpwood 2.5 m Between 4 and 14 cm Panel manufacturing as well as pulp 
Sawlogs 2.5 m Between 14 and 24 cm Sawn wood manufacturing 
Premium sawlogs 2.5 m bigger than 24 cm Premium sawn wood manufacturing 
Based on the previous considerations, the timber stand value per hectare is represented by 
Figure 3.3. This graph shows that for the first thirteen years the production value is zero, as 
the timber stand does not have any commercial value or it is too low to cover the costs of 
harvesting, hauling and transport. From that point on, the timber stand value starts to grow, 
but the first stage of production is mainly of pulpwood and sawlogs which have less value 
than premium sawlogs. This happens because as the tree increases in diameter, first it 
produces pulpwood, then later sawlogs and finally premium sawlogs, so the price received 
increases as the timber age increases. Timber valuation increases when timber technology 
changes from pulpwood to sawlogs and even more if this change is from sawlogs to premium 
sawlogs. 
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FIGURE 3.3: Forest stand value for Pinus pinaster Aiton. in Galicia. 
In order to take out the insurance policy, the landowner has to pay a premium according to 
Eq. 3.11. This equation is based on Eq. 3.6. Therefore, if a landowner is indifferent about 
buying insurance, the NPV should be the same in both states of nature. Thus, the optimal 
premium will be calculated between the difference in expected damage with and without 
insurance. 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ), , , , , , , , ,Q t s s D Q t I h s D Q t I hg m j d d m j= + - +             [2.11] 
  
3.4. RESULTS 
3.4.1 NPV of forest investment 
Using the previous data and Eq. 3.6, the NPV for different risk levels is calculated on the last 
row of Table 3.2. As expected, the main result is that forest fire risk reduces the NPV. If 
landowners can purchase an insurance policy, then their NPV does not necessarily increase, 
as the risk is transferred to the insurance company in exchange for an insurance premium. 
The maximum NPV is reached on the optimal rotation point, which in this case is about 36 
years for all considered districts. Thus, the risk levels do not vary sufficiently across districts 
to impact the optimal rotation length significantly. This is due to the fact that the optimal 
rotation is conditioned mainly by the interest rate or by a very high wildfire risk (Reed 1984; 
González et al., 2005; Pasalodos-Tato et al., 2010). However, in these results it is possible to 
empirically observe the importance of reducing wildfire risks in order to achieve a better 
NPV for the landowners. The NPV for the three districts is also detailed in Table 3.2. 
According to this, in the presence of risk, landowners prefer to invest in timber production in 
the safest area, “A Mariña Lucense”, instead of investing in the other two areas, where risk 
levels are higher (“Fisterra” and “Verin-Viana”) at an interest rate of 3%. 
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 TABLE 3.2: NPV for Pinus pinaster Aiton. plantation. 
YEAR NPV  
WITHOUT RISK 
NPV WITH RISK 
A Mariña 
Lucense Fisterra Verín-Viana 
0 -1,400.00 € -1,400.98 € -1,408.02 € -1,421.66 € 
5 -1,400.00 € -1,400.84 € -1,406.90 € -1,418.64 € 
10 -1,400.00 € -1,400.72 € -1,405.94 € -1,416.04 € 
15 -899.26 € -900.23 € -907.24 € -920.81 € 
20 -323.62 € -324.90 € -334.18 € -352.15 € 
25 855.77 € 853.74 € 839.06 € 810.64 € 
30 1,242.34 € 1,240.11 € 1,223.95 € 1,192.66 € 
35 1,402.33 € 1,400.04 € 1,383.48 € 1,351.40 € 
40 1,369.13 € 1,366.91 € 1,350.86 € 1,319.77 € 
45 1,289.25 € 1,287.12 € 1,271.77 € 1,242.03 € 
Max. 1,402.33 € 1,383.56 € 1,400.05 € 1,351.63 € 
 
3.4.2 The effect of insurance on the NPV 
The mean wildfire risk in Galicia can be used to calculate an average premium for each 
district. Employing this average, the NPV for the three districts changes, as described in 
Table 3.3. These values underline the importance of identifying properly the genuine wildfire 
risk or expected risk. Following this, if the premium charged is significantly higher than the 
expected damage, then the NPV decreases, as expected.  
TABLE 3.3: NPV with a normal insurance premium for Pinus pinaster Aiton. 
YEAR 
NPV WITH A NORMAL INSURANCE 
A Mariña  
Lucense Fisterra Verín-Viana 
0 -1,408.59 € -1,415.63 € -1,429.27 € 
5 -1,407.39 € -1,413.46 € -1,425.20 € 
10 -1,406.36 € -1,411.58 € -1,421.69 € 
15 -906.85 € -912.09 € -922.25 € 
20 -332.87 € -338.36 € -348.99 € 
25 842.20 € 835.47 € 822.43 € 
30 1,227.71 € 1,220.86 € 1,207.59 € 
35 1,387.50 € 1,380.81 € 1,367.85 € 
40 1,354.87 € 1,348.57 € 1,336.37 € 
45 1,275.68 € 1,269.80 € 1,258.40 € 
Max. 1,380.98 € 1,387.60 € 1,368.15 € 
As such, the landowners in “A Mariña Lucense” have a lower NPV than in the case of paying 
a premium closer to a fair premium, so they have incentives to demonstrate their genuinely 
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 low wildfire risk. Nevertheless, the landowners of “Verín-Viana” obtain a higher valuation, 
and may prefer to take out this insurance paying this premium. Finally, in the “Fisterra” 
district, the NPV does not change because in this area the wildfire risk is set equal to the 
mean risk level (used to compute the premium), so landowners are indifferent between taking 
out insurance coverage or assuming the wildfire risks. Thus, the establishment or reasonable 
premiums (according to expected risks) is crucial in order to promote the diffusion of 
insurance programs. 
 
3.4.3 Expected losses when a wildfire occurs 
If landowners take out forest insurance, they have the option of receiving compensation for 
the covered losses. All of these results are shown in Table 3.4, in which the different 
scenarios reflect a lower NPV at the start of the rotation, given that there is no timber 
production. Meanwhile, it can be seen that compensation only partially covers commercial 
damages. Following the results in the next table, the landowners have less variability in their 
forest investment if they take out insurance with restoration because they reduce their 
possible wildfire losses. 
TABLE 3.4: Economic losses for Pinus pinaster Aiton. 
  NPV OF LANDOWNER WITH FOREST DAMAGE AND INSURANCE 
YEAR 
DISCOUNTED LOSSES 
WITH FOREST DAMAGE 
AND 
WITHOUT INSURANCE 
WITHOUT RESTORATION INSURANCE WITH RESTORATION INSURANCE 
A Mariña 
Lucense Fisterra Verín-Viana 
A Mariña 
Lucense Fisterra Verín-Viana 
0 1,400.00 € 1,400.00 € 1,400.00 € 1,400.00 € 70.93 € 77.62 € 90.57 € 
5 1,400.00 € 1,400.00 € 1,400.00 € 1,400.00 € 256.06 € 261.81 € 272.97 € 
10 1,400.00 € 1,400.00 € 1,400.00 € 1,400.00 € 415.40 € 420.35 € 429.95 € 
15 1,900.74 € 1,550.47 € 1,552.23 € 1,555.65 € 703.01 € 709.04 € 720.72 € 
20 2,476.38 € 1,723.44 € 1,727.23 € 1,734.57 € 994.03 € 1,001.49 € 1,015.94 € 
25 3,655.77 € 2,077.83 € 2,085.77 € 2,101.16 € 1,450.02 € 1,461.12 € 1,482.63 € 
30 4,042.34 € 2,193.99 € 2,203.30 € 2,221.32 € 1,653.63 € 1,665.65 € 1,688.94 € 
35 4,202.33 € 2,242.06 € 2,251.93 € 2,271.04 € 1,776.97 € 1,789.18 € 1,812.83 € 
40 4,169.13 € 2,232.09 € 2,241.84 € 2,260.73 € 1,831.78 € 1,843.55 € 1,866.33 € 
45 4,089.25 € 2,208.09 € 2,217.55 € 2,235.90 € 1,863.54 € 1,874.74 € 1,896.44 € 
  
3.4.4 The effect of wildfire intensity on expected losses 
The intensity of a wildfire causes variations in the NPV of forest investments. Thus, in all 
previous cases it is assumed that the wildfire burns all of the forest area and that there is no 
salvageable wood. Table 3.5 has been designed to analyse the effect of intensity on the 
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 landowners’ damage, in which it is supposed that a different percentage of burned timber 
could be salvageable for the purpose of selling.  
TABLE 3.5: Economic damage to landowner depending on wildfire intensity. 
YEAR WITHOUT  
INSURANCE 
AREA LOW-RISK: A 
MARIÑA LUCENSE AREA MID-RISK: FISTERRA 
AREA HIGH-RISK: VERÍN-
VIANA 
WITHOUT  
RESTORATION 
WITH  
RESTORATION 
WITHOUT  
RESTORATION 
WITH  
RESTORATION 
WITHOUT  
RESTORATION 
WITH  
RESTORATION 
0 1,400.00 € 1,400.00 € 70.93 € 1,400.00 € 77.62 € 1,400.00 € 90.57 € 
5 1,400.00 € 1,400.00 € 70.80 € 1,400.00 € 76.56 € 1,400.00 € 87.71 € 
10 1,400.00 € 1,400.00 € 70.69 € 1,400.00 € 75.64 € 1,400.00 € 85.24 € 
15 1,550.22 € 1,375.21 € 115.90 € 1,376.97 € 121.93 € 1,380.39 € 133.61 € 
20 1,722.91 € 1,346.71 € 167.91 € 1,350.50 € 175.37 € 1,357.84 € 189.82 € 
25 2,076.73 € 1,288.31 € 274.56 € 1,296.25 € 285.66 € 1,311.64 € 307.16 € 
30 2,192.70 € 1,269.17 € 309.48 € 1,278.47 € 321.50 € 1,296.50 € 344.79 € 
35 2,240.70 € 1,261.25 € 323.90 € 1,271.12 € 336.11 € 1,290.23 € 359.76 € 
40 2,230.74 € 1,262.89 € 320.85 € 1,272.64 € 332.62 € 1,291.53 € 355.41 € 
45 2,206.77 € 1,266.85 € 313.58 € 1,276.32 € 324.79 € 1,294.66 € 346.49 € 
In order to represent the economic damage of a wildfire, we assume for illustration purposes 
that 50% of the wood production has been burned. In this situation, and as expected, the 
landowners’ damage diminishes in comparison with higher degrees of affection, so that the 
affected timber is reduced. The losses are even smaller if the landowners have taken out 
insurance with post-wildfire restoration. So, the landowners are not only concerned about the 
occurrence of wildfires, but also about their intensity and the wood value that cannot be 
recovered after a wildfire. 
 
3.5. DISCUSSION 
Manley and Watt (2009) highlight the existence of a limited number of studies that deal with 
forest insurance models (Brunette and Couture, 2008; Holecy and Hanewinkel, 2006). This 
reduced amount of literature has been recently extended by Brunette et al. (2012). However, 
these contributions provide different perspectives on forest insurance issues and depart 
significantly on their methodological approaches. In this regard, for example, Brunette and 
Couture (2008) look at public compensation versus insurance, highlighting the negative 
influence of public compensation after catastrophic events on both, the investment in 
protective forest management activities, and the development of private insurance markets. 
The authors conclude that public funds are used to compensate private damages that could be 
otherwise covered by private insurance markets without affecting the public budget. Holecy 
and Hanewinkel (2006) provide a theoretical framework and empirical estimation of forest 
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 insurance premiums that may be useful for researchers in this field, finding that the insurance 
model provides high premiums, especially for higher age clasess. Brunette et al. (2012) look 
at the demand of insurance under an ambiguous scenario, characterized by the existence of 
unknown probabilities about the occurrence of risky events. In an experimental context, they 
find that ambiguity increases the willingness to pay for insurance. The current contribution 
adds to the previous literature in two ways. First, it looks at the impact of the provision of 
forest insurance covering restoration costs after wildfires on forest optimal rotations, finding 
that forest rotation is sensitive to insurance conditions. Furthermore, it assess empirically the 
changes in NPV that may occur for landowners when they buy a private insurance covering 
restoration costs. Economic results expressed by NPVs are simulated under different risk 
scenarios. Future research may add to the present conclusions by analysing how insurance 
contracts (that are currently being offered in various countries, see for example Mahul and 
Stutley, 2010) may change incentives for better management and landowner’s preventive 
efforts. Furthermore, and in a more aggregated level, industry incentives may also be changed 
due to the existence of insurance and differences in rotations; and as such, productivity of 
some regions may be enhanced just by the development and provision of insurance markets, 
particularly if potential restoration costs are included. Thus, multiple applications remain to 
be analysed in order on how to better design insurance policies that increase social welfare. 
 
3.6. CONCLUSION 
Landowners may take out the insurance policy described in this study, as a result of which 
the expected forest losses in the event of fires are reduced. However, returns from forests also 
depend on the landowners’ investment in forest management. This influences the risk of 
wildfire and, subsequently, the insurance premium. Forest management depends on its cost 
and the forestry policy applied. The latter is exogenous to the landowners and to the 
insurance company, but it can affect the wildfire risk depending on the stringency of public 
policy (Yoder, 2008). All of this is taken into account to determine the optimal premium, 
which is calculated according to the wildfire risk, the value of possible damage, the cost of 
forest regeneration and the fire intensity. Finally, this insurance premium is conditioned by 
the level of coverage. 
However, if the insurance policy does not cover any restoration measures, then the 
landowners may only be able to guarantee possible timber damages and not retiming a new 
harvest of forest land. Therefore, a restoration policy could guide the production of wood 
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 after wildfires. Without restoration, timber production is not guaranteed in the future, and this 
may pose additional future effects related to the viability of the forest sector and the 
availability of timber. 
In this research, the optimal rotation is linked to the risk of wildfires and the interest rate, in 
the same way as Reed (1984). Nevertheless, the differences between the risk levels of the 
districts are fairly low, so the optimal rotation does not change significantly throughout the 
areas. However, larger risk differences will result in significant changes. Furthermore, if the 
insurance company does not identify the individual risk of each insured landowner or if there 
are larger differences between the expected average risk (which is used to compute the 
premium) and the specific district risk, this will affect the NPV. 
The presence of forest restoration in the insurance policy deserves further consideration. 
Reforestation after a wildfire is important in order to be able to continue with forest 
production and to prevent land being abandoned. This coverage is also important because the 
landowner may not have enough resources after suffering from wildfire losses to cover 
additional costs. Restoration actions also have positive effects for society, because continuing 
forest production increases overall ecosystem services. 
This research framework extends the knowledge of wildfire insurance, and helps to 
understand the different assets that could be covered with an insurance policy and how they 
affect forest management and profitability. Future research may extend these results using 
actuarial methods. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE PRODUCTION OF FOREST 
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES WITH INSURANCE 
 
 
 
Abstract: The production of forest ecosystem services is very important for the wellbeing. In 
many countries, wildfires are the main risks that affect forest production, resulting in both 
private and public losses (due to the loss of ecosystem services). We analyse the role of forest 
insurance as an incentive to provide ecosystem services. In our setting, forest insurance can 
be subsidized by social planners in order to increase the provision of ecosystem services. We 
find that forest insurance policies can create suitable incentives for producing forest 
ecosystem services. We simulate the impact of forest insurance in a special case of 
production of Pinus pinaster Aiton. In this simulation, an economic incentive is included in 
order to link the landowner and public interests through the insurance policy. In summary, 
this paper highlights the importance of forest insurance as a means of guaranteeing the 
continuous production of forest ecosystem services.  
 
Keywords: Ecosystem services, provision of public goods, forest management, forest 
valuation, incentives, insurance. 
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 4.1. INTRODUCTION 
For a landowner, decisions related to forest management are conditioned by the value of 
timber and forest management costs. However, society at large is also influenced by private 
forest management decisions, as ecosystem services are needed for their survival or 
recreation. In this way, the society consumes environmental services to improve their wealth. 
Some examples of these services are the water or air quality, the biodiversity or the 
recreational values. Hence, the production of these services is very important to the society 
and the social planner is interested in protecting this forest output using public policies. In 
many countries wildfires are becoming the main risks that affect forests. If a wildfire occurs, 
the forest value decreases, both in economic terms (private value) and social terms (public 
good), due to the reduction of the ecosystem services generated. The risk of fire depends on 
several factors, including socio-economic characteristics, forest management, and forestry 
law. Certain preventive measures may reduce wildfire risks.  
The wildfire risk influences the forest valuation, given that the production of each forest 
rotation depends on whether wildfires occur or not. Therefore, both, the private landowner 
and the society as a whole will lose welfare if a wildfire occurs. To calculate the forest 
valuation the wildfire risk should be included as well as the timber stock and the ecosystem 
services. In practice, calculating the Net Present Value (NPV) of a forest involves both 
market and non-market values. The former is related to the forest production that can be 
valued at market prices, while the latter does not have specific market prices, valuated using 
special techniques, such as contingent valuation, travel cost or hedonic prices, among others. 
However, the landowners will include in their valuation the goods and services for which 
payments are received.  
On the other hand, forest management also has a private or public cost, and this affects the 
quality and quantity of forest production and other natural resources, such as water or soil. 
Thus, the landowners’ decisions determine, for example, the effect of the size of timber stock 
on carbon sequestration, or the biodiversity level that society can enjoy as a whole. Following 
this argument, it is important to develop policies to encourage the creation of ecosystem 
services (Wünscher et al., 2008). Therefore, the public policy may influence the production 
of ecosystem services using incentives, and regulations. Therefore, the government decisions 
also influence the ecosystem services production. 
The social planners can design public policies in which payments or incentives are included 
to encourage the creation of ecosystem services. Therefore, some different types of contracts 
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 can be used with the aim of involving the landowner in the generation of ecosystem services 
(Engel et al., 2008) and as a result, social welfare may increase (Pagiola et al., 2005; Wunder, 
2008). In this context, the landowner will also have more public and private economic 
incentives to carry out production in their forest land (Tallis et al., 2008), and consequently 
less rural land may be abandoned (Daniels et al., 2010). These contracts could give 
landowners the chance to access certain markets or resources (land-use rights and/or access to 
markets through certification), and to also receive a partial transfer or a form of payment in 
exchange for the provision of ecosystem services (Wymann von Dach et al. 2004). Therefore, 
a public policy could introduce tax incentives, subsidies or regulations to encourage the 
production of forest goods and services (Cortner et al., 1996; Jacobson et al., 2009). These 
actions may have different objectives, such as cleaning, prescribed burning and/or the 
implementation of preventive infrastructure (Vaske, 2005). Therefore, an insurance payment 
could be used to motivate the landowner decisions according to ecosystem services 
production. This type of incentive for ecosystem services is not considered in any previous 
research. In the current paper these incentives are included in the forest valuation to identify 
their influence on forest management decisions. 
As the wildfires is one of the most important hazards that forest investments are exposed to, 
the landowners could contract a forest insurance policy to protect themselves against wildfire 
losses (Chen et al., 2014). In several countries, this type of insurance is subsidized to 
encourage market provision (Goodwin and Vado, 2007). However, this could be also used to 
develop better forest management practices or to increase the production of ecosystem 
services. In this way, the public policy could be more or less extrict in order to achieve its 
objectives. Thus, if the forest policy includes compulsory forest insurance to encourage the 
production of ecosystem services, then the behaviour of landowners, and forest management 
are likely to change. Mandatory insurance may also be important for choosing the type of 
forest or the level of investment in forest management. Accordingly, all of these 
considerations can change the production of ecosystem services and forest valuation.  
This paper introduces a forest insurance policy as a tool to cover wildfire damages, as it 
outlines incentives for the generation of forest ecosystem services. This insurance policy is 
considered when assessing the present value of forest rotation, using the rotation model 
postulated by Faustmann (Faustmann, 1849), and extending it according to Hartman’s model 
(Hartman, 1976). Using this model, the landowner’s wealth and the creation of social welfare 
will be analysed. Following these models, in this research will be developed incentives to 
produce environmental services. To achieve these goals, this chapter begins with a literature 
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 review about forest valuation and forest insurance literature. The research carries on 
describing the wealth of both, the landowner and society at large. Therefore, the NPV is 
presented to value the timber stock from the perspective of the landowner, public interest and 
society. Next, the effects of insurance on private and public welfare are examined in depth, 
followed by an analysis of the implication of forest incentives in private and public welfare. 
To this end, an empirical simulation which complements the theoretical previous framework 
is developed for the Galician production of Pinus Pinaster Aiton. Finally, forest valuations 
with and without insurance incentives are simulated. The main conclusions of this research 
and simulations are described in the final section. 
 
4.2. BACKGROUND 
Traditional applications of the Faustmann rotation model (Faustmann, 1849) make it possible 
to calculate the optimal forest rotation, ignoring all of the externalities of forest production. 
However, more recent research allows for the inclusion of ecosystem services into forest 
valuation, after the seminal paper by Hartman, (1976), including the recreational value 
(Englin et al. 2000), or water quality (Creedy and Wurzbacher, 2001). There are many 
services in addition to wood production that should be included in forest valuation, including 
the quality and the quantity of ecosystem services (Krieger, 2001). Nevertheless, the 
Faustmann rotation model is taken into account in this research, as it is used accounting for 
other variables, such as the insurance (as a cost in forest valuation or incentives to produce 
ecosystem services). We acknowledge that others papers, such as Reed (1984), have taken 
into account the wildfires risk in the forest valuation. 
There is a considerable amount of academic research in which insurance is studied as 
coverage against possible damages ((Brunette and Couture, 2013; Ehrlich and Becker, 1972; 
Rees and Wambach, 2008). The application of forest insurance depends on the policymaker 
and the insurance companies (Goodwin and Vado, 2007). If subsidies are provided for forest 
management, then the behaviour of the landowners will change in such a way that they will 
invest less in management and take out less insurance (Brunette and Couture, 2008). 
Depending on whether the insurance policy is pooled or individualized, the insurance demand 
and the investment in forest management will also be affected (Lankoande et al., 2005). All 
of these issues may have an impact on the generation of ecosystem services. Therefore some 
of them are taking into account in the current research. 
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 Research in environmental economics and forest management has not yet examined in depth 
the use of forest insurance as a tool to cover wildfire damages (Manley and Watt, 2009). One 
contribution is the study by Holecy and Hanewinkel (2006), in which an insurance model was 
developed for the conifer reserves in the southwest of Germany. In their analysis, a 
catastrophic risk model is used and forest production is valued. As far as we know, there are 
no scientific references in which insurance is analysed as an incentive to produce or 
guarantee a certain level of ecosystem services. In one of the closest references to this work, 
Brunette and Couture (2008), compares public compensation versus private insurance after 
catastrophic events, highlighting the negative influence of public compensation after 
catastrophic events, on both the investment in protective measurements and the development 
of insurance markets. Most recently, Brunette et al. (2012) applied an insurance model under 
ambiguity, observing that the willingness to pay is higher in the context where there are 
unknown probabilities of wildfire occurrence. This paper contributes towards this scarcely 
explored area, analyzing the influence of insurance policies on forest management. Pinheiro 
and Ribeiro (2013) and Barreal et al. (2014). use the forest insurance to private landowners to 
reduce their investment risk. In particular, in Pinheiro and Ribeiro (2013) the forest valuation 
is applied to analyse the wildfire risk, the forest insurance and the forest plantation 
implications. Barreal et al. (2014) analyse the forest insurance as a tool to secure the 
restoration forest. The forest valuation is also used to analyse the effect of forest insurance on 
landowners’ wealth. 
. Recent papers relate the insurance program with the coverage of carbon credits (Subak, 
2003; Wong and Dutschke, 2003 Figueiredo et al., 2005). In this area, Grover et al. (2005) 
design an insurance program in which only the losses of carbon credits are covered. With this 
framework, the research analyses the effect of hurricanes risk and forest insurance in the 
carbon sequestration. Therefore, some papers study the forest insurance a tool to protect the 
income that the ecosystem services provide to the landowner or society. However, none of 
them uses the forest insurance as a tool to protect and promote carbon sequestration. 
 
4.3. THE LANDOWNERS’ INVESTMENT MODEL 
Landowners aim to maximize profits on their forest investment. The most commonly used 
baseline model is Faustmann’s rotation model (1849), which was later extended by several 
authors, including Pearse (1967) and Reed (1984). According to this framework, authors such 
as Gaffney (1957), Samuelson (1976) and Walter (1980) have examined the forest valuation 
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 models in depth, in which the discount factor and/or the forest production expenses are 
included. 
Based on this earlier research, the NPV of forest production for one rotation is calculated in 
order to understand the economic implications of forest insurance on forest management 
(Hanewinkel et al., 2011). This is also considering that landowners could take management 
or financial decisions at the end of each rotation. In this way, the forest production has returns 
that are related to the forest growth rate and its price. It is assumed that the standing timber 
stock value is represented by Vm, which depends positively on the standing timber stock 
[Vm’(Q)>0], and the time factor [Vm’(t)>0], while the timber price is exogenous, and given by 
the market.  
On the other hand, additional forest management costs (C) could be included. These costs 
depend on the self-protection expenses (s) and standing timber stock (Q), which are 
positively related to these management expenses [C’(s)>0; C’(Q)>0]. In all forest rotations, 
the landowner pays these costs, so the new NPV should take this into account.  
If we assume that the forest production is conditioned by the risk of a wildfire, this risk 
depends on the self-protection expenses (Chang, 1983, 1984; Amacher et al., 2009), so that 
this relationship is represented by δ (s) ∈ [0,1], which has a negative effect on the NPV 
[NPV’(δ)<0], and on the self-protection expenses [δ’(s)<0] (Martell et al., 1998; Amacher et 
al., 2005). The forest management influences the forest insurance demand. Thus, depending 
on whether the insurance integrates the self-protection strategies that allow for the reduction 
of the probability of a disaster, the insurance contract and self-protection measures will be 
respectively complementary or substitutive (Ehrlich and Becker, 1972). In this model, the 
landowners pay all self-protection expenses. This payment identifies the landowners’ aptitude 
towards wildfire risk and their knowledge of it.  
The wildfire risk will affect the NPV because it could cause damages (Dv), which depend on 
the fire intensity (I), standing timber stock (Q), the time factor (t), and restoration costs after 
wildfires (h). Thus, damages will increase if the intensity, the standing timber stock or 
restoration costs increase. As a result, there is a positive relationship between these variables 
and the damage function [Dv’(I)>0; Dv’(Q)>0; Dv’(h)>0].  
In order to protect against the risk of wildfires, landowners may wish to take out a forest 
insurance policy in order to be covered against the possible losses. The owner (insured) has to 
pay an insurance premium (α), which is positively related to the potential losses, which 
include the burned standing timber stock and potential restoration costs [α’(Q)>0; α’(h)>0]. 
The insurance premium is the cost of being insured. In case of wildfire, landwonwers have 
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 the right to receive compensation for their damages. This compensation will be set according 
to recoverable timber, insurance coverage and timber stock. Therefore, the possible economic 
losses will be reduced. 
In this model, it is assumed that the restoration costs are fully covered by the insurance policy 
[h=1]. Otherwise, the premium is negatively related to coverage rate of timber damages (µ) 
and self-protection expenses [α’(s)<0; α’(µ)<0]. So, if the risk of damages, or coverage level 
increases and/or self-protection expenses decreases, then the insurance premium is higher. 
The self-protection expenses are very difficult to be observed by the insurance company; 
however, in the insurance policy certain requirements to evaluate this self-protection could be 
included. For example, the insurance company could require prior forest certification or all 
information about the self-protection activities that are developed according to a protection 
plan. In this way, the asymmetric information can be also reduced. The coverage rate of 
timber damages could be total, partial or not being considered [µ ∈ [0,1]]. If the landowners 
take out an insurance policy, then the total cost of forest production will be higher, while the 
risk of recording wildfire damages will decrease. This reduction depends on the coverage 
level, ceteris paribus. Also, the model assumes that the landowner contracts forest insurance 
at the beginning of the forest rotation. However, the insurance policy will be paid every year 
until the end of the forest rotation. Finally, afforestation costs (R) are considered as a fixed 
cost that all landowners should pay. All previous factors are updated by a continuous 
discount factor with an interest rate (r). However, this factor is not applied to the harvesting 
cost, as this is paid at the beginning of the forest rotation. Therefore, taking into account all 
these previous considerations, Eq. 4.1 is formulated. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ), , , , , , , , , rtt m vNPV V Q t Q t s h C Q s s D Q t I e Ra m d m -= - - - -   [4.1] 
 
Proposition 4.1: Landowners maximize their NPV, when the growth rate of the value of the 
standing timber stock with insurance against the risk of wildfires is equal to the interest rate. 
This is directly derived from the Hotelling rule. Meanwhile, the equilibrium point determines 
the optimal forest rotation (T*). 
 
Demonstration 4.1: Landowners try to maximize the previous equation in order to obtain the 
highest forest value. Therefore, the period that maximizes the NPV according to the value of 
the standing timber stocks (T*) is found. 
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 To obtain the optimal forest rotation, the first order conditions are computed. Thus, the partial 
derivative of this equation is taken with respect to time and its result is set equal to zero. 
Then, Eq. 4.2 is obtained, which represents the maximum NPV. Solving Eq. 4.2, we find the 
solution expressed in Eq. 4.3. On the left hand side, this shows the interest rate, while on the 
right hand side, it represents the rate of growth value of the standing timber stock with 
insurance against the risk of wildfires. Therefore, the optimal forest rotation is achieved when 
the value of the marginal growth of forest value is equal to the interest rate. This equilibrium 
depends on the insurance policy, the wildfire risk, the timber stand, and the forest 
management. 
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This equation reflects how the variables included in the NPV equation affect the optimal 
forest rotation. In this way, if the timber stock grows quickly, then the optimal forest rotation 
will be achieved faster than in the case of slow growing species, ceteris paribus. In summary, 
the type of standing timber stock will condition the optimal forest rotation. 
 
Proposition 4.2: Optimal forest management will be achieved when the marginal costs of 
forest management are equal to the marginal reduction of the insurance premium and 
wildfire damages.  
 
Demonstration 4.2: Returning to Eq. 4.1, it is possible to compute the optimal forest 
management that maximizes the NPV. The landowner invests in management until the 
marginal revenues of this activity are equal to zero, so that the partial derivative of Eq. 4.1 is 
taken with respect to the self-protection expenses and its result is set equal to zero. Using this 
expression, the point at which the landowner is indifferent between investing or not in forest 
management can be established (See Eq. 4.4). Thus, if this equation is solved, Eq. 4.5 can be 
obtained. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )' , , , , ' , ' , , , 0rtt vNPV Q t s h C Q s s D Q t I es a m d m
-¶ = - - - =
¶
   [4.4] 
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 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )' , ' , , , , ' , , ,vC Q s Q t s h s D Q t Ia m d m=- -     [4.5] 
According to the previous equation, the landowners will make efforts in forest management 
up to the point where the marginal cost of forest management is equal to the marginal 
reduction on the insurance premium and the expected losses. In this way, if the marginal cost 
of forest management is larger than the marginal reductions on wildfire risk, then the 
landowner will be spending more money than the reduction caused to the risk of damage. The 
opposite occurs when the marginal cost is lower than the marginal reduction on risk. 
 
Proposition 4.3: The NPV is maximized (with respect to the quantity of standing timber 
stock), when the marginal value of the timber stock is equal to the sum of the marginal 
insurance cost, the expected marginal losses caused by fires, and the marginal management 
expenses. 
 
Demonstration 4.3: If the landowners wish to maximize their standing timber stock value, 
then they should maximize the NPV with respect to the timber stock. Therefore, the partial 
derivative of Eq. 4.1 with respect to the timber stock is taken and its result is set equal to 
zero. In this way, Eq. 4.6 is obtained, and reorganizing the terms, the optimal standing timber 
stock which maximizes the NPV can be achieved (Eq. 4.7). 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )' , ' , , , , ' , ' , , , 0rtt m vNPV V Q t Q t s h C Q s s D Q t I eQ a m d m
-¶ = - - - =
¶
 [4.6] 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )' , ' , , , , ' , ' , , ,m vV Q t Q t s h C Q s s D Q t Ia m d m= + +     [4.7] 
According to the previous equation, the optimal NPV is achieved when the marginal increase 
in the timber stock value is equal to the marginal increase of forest management, marginal 
expected damages and the marginal insurance premium.  
 
4.4. THE TOTAL NPV FOR SOCIETY 
When taking into account the fact that the timber stock produces ecosystem services 
(Hartman, 1976), then the valuation of these externalities (γ) should be included into Eq. 4.1. 
These ecosystem services depend on time (t) and on the standing timber stock (Q). Also, the 
value of such ecosystem services has to be updated by a discount factor. It is assumed that 
these services are all positive and depend inversely on the wildfire risk [γ>0; γ’(δ)<0]. 
Consequently, the wildfire risk conditions the total NPV for the society as a whole. 
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 Therefore, the new forest valuation could be formulated as in Eq. 4.8, in which the first part 
of the equation represents the net profits that the landowner makes from wood production, 
while the second part is the wealth that the society achieves through the ecosystem services 
produced by the forests. 
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In the previous equation, the private and public damages are different [Dv(Q,t,I,µ)≠Dγ(Q,t,I)]. 
The damages depend, in both cases, on the standing timber stock, time and wildfire intensity. 
However, the landowner can recover the rate of affected timber stock that is insured.  
 
Proposition 4: The optimal forest rotation is achieved when the net growth rate of the value 
of the timber stock and the value of ecosystem services with insurance is equal to the interest 
rate.  
 
Demonstration 4: The optimal forest rotation can change with respect to Eq. 4.7 when 
private and public interests are taken into account, so that there is a new rotation that is 
achieved when Eq. 4.8 is maximized respect to time. To solve the maximization problem, the 
partial derivative of Eq. 4.8 has to be taken with respect to time, and its result should be set 
equal to zero. Thus, Eq. 4.9 is reached. 
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This is described in Eq. 4.10 and it is also based on the Hotelling rule, while including the 
production of positive externalities. The equilibrium determines that the optimal forest 
rotation is achieved when the rate of growth of the value of the standing timber stock and 
production of ecosystem services with insurance is equal to the interest rate. 
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 One conclusion of this equation shown above is the importance of externalities on the optimal 
forest rotation. If the generation of ecosystem services occurs quickly, then the optimal forest 
rotation should be shorter in comparison with the case of slow growing forest species, ceteris 
paribus. The presence of externalities increases the total NPV for society and it is larger than 
if the standing timber stock is only valuated. The optimal forest rotations of Eq. 4.3 and Eq. 
4.10 are different if the marginal growth of forestry externalities is positive [γ’(t)>0]. This 
happens because the private interests do not include the externalities, or the risk of losing 
them, in their productive decisions. To sum up, to create incentives for the creation of 
externalities, measures should be developed to share the value of ecosystems services with 
landowners. With this, the optimal forest decisions will depend, mainly, on standing timber 
stock but, secondarily, on the value of these services. 
 
Proposition 4.5: From the perspective of forest externalities, the optimal rotation depends on 
the marginal production of ecosystem services and their potential destruction.  
 
Demonstration 4.5: If we only consider that the ecosystem services valuation is represented 
by Eq. 4.11, the optimal forest rotation will change. This valuation is determined by the 
production of ecosystem services and the risk of losing them. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ), , , rtt ExternalitiesNPV Q t s D Q t I egg d -= -                [4.11] 
With the previous equation, the optimal forest rotation of the production of ecosystem 
services can be obtained. Then, this equation has to be derived with respect to time and this 
result has to be set equal to zero. Thus, the optimal forest rotation is represented by the 
equilibrium point of Eq. 4.12. 
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There are no variables in this equation that alter the NPV for the landowners, as they decide 
on the optimal forest rotation without considering the production of ecosystem services. This 
situation is common because public policy often does not pay for these services and the 
landowners will not receive any income for this kind of production. 
 
Proposition 4.6: The optimal valuation of forest production is achieved when the marginal 
productions of timber and ecosystem services are equal to their respective marginal costs. 
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Demonstration 4.6: The forest production involves the standing timber stock and ecosystem 
services. Accordingly, in order to find the optimal forest production, in which the maximum 
total NPV for society is obtained, Eq. 4.8 will be maximized with respect to the standing 
timber stock. To solve this problem, the partial derivative of Eq. 4.8 has to be taken with 
respect to the standing timber stock in order to obtain the maximum forest value according to 
timber stock and ecosystem services will be reached. 
To solve the maximization problem, as customary, the partial derivative has to be taken with 
respect to Q and the result set equal to zero. Reorganizing the terms, the optimal standing 
timber stock could be described as a point at which its marginal production is equal to its 
marginal costs and risks. This equilibrium is depicted by Eq. 4.13. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )' , ' , ' , , , , ' , , , ' , , ' ,m vV Q t Q t Q t s h s D Q t I D Q t I C Q sgg a m d mé ù+ = + + +ë û        [4.13] 
This new approach determines that the optimal forest production may be different to that of 
Eq. 3.7. This is because this new valuation takes into account both the marginal revenues and 
marginal costs of standing timber stock and ecosystem services.  
 
4.5. ECOSYSTEM SERVICES, INCENTIVES AND INSURANCE 
To encourage the production of ecosystem services, it is necessary to develop appropriate 
forest policies. Based on this approach, the landowner could receive an incentive to produce 
and manage their forest lands, so that the ecosystem services will also be produced.  
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.1: Incentives to produce ecosystem services. 
In Figure 4.1, the welfare gain of public interests and landowners is illustrated. Incentives can 
be paid by the public policy to encourage landowners to produce ecosystem services. In this 
way, society could achieve better ecosystem services, but will have to pay for them. Thus, the 
landowners earn more money through forest production but have to satisfy the demand for 
Ecosystem services Incentives 
Landowner valuation 
Society 
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 ecosystem services. In this case, the public authorities may design measures to develop this 
sharing of benefits, which could be achieved through public policy. 
The marginal cost (MC) and marginal revenues (MR) for both private landowners (Pv) and 
the general public (Pu) should be analysed to learn more about the suitability of various forest 
policies. Following Eq. 4.7 and Eq. 4.13, the difference of marginal revenues and costs 
between the landowner and public interests can be calculated. Thus, the condition that should 
be satisfied in order to introduce forestry incentives is described by the Eq. 4.14. 
Pu Pv Pu pvMR MR MC MC- > -                  [3.14] 
The equation shown above concludes that a given public policy would be designed to apply 
economic incentives for the production of ecosystem services, if the difference between 
marginal revenues is greater than the corresponding difference of marginal costs. Thus, a 
given forest policy could include incentives to take out an insurance policy as long as the 
difference in the marginal revenues between the private and public interests is greater than 
the difference in their corresponding marginal costs. 
 
Proposition 4.7: The regulator should invest in incentives to produce ecosystem services as 
long as the marginal value of their production is greater than the expected marginal damage. 
 
Demonstration 4.7: Based on Eq. 4.14, Eq. 4.15 can be obtained. The marginal increase of 
the externality should be equal or greater than its potential destruction. This condition will be 
met when the wildfire risk is equal or greater than zero and lower than one (0≤δ(s)<1). 
According to this condition, the expected damage risk will grow below proportionally with 
the services. However, Eq. 3.15 is not met if the wildfire risk is equal to one (δ(s)=1). 
Therefore, the public authorities will be interested in investing in incentives to introduce 
forest insurance if the marginal increase of ecosystem services is greater than the marginal 
damage risk. 
( ) ( ) ( )' , ' , ,Q t s D Q t Igg d>                   [4.15] 
Assuming that the public policy provides an economic incentive (wγ) to landowners for the 
production of ecosystem services, this payment will depend on timber stock (Q) and time (t). 
A direct relationship between the growth of ecosystems services and incentives is also 
assumed [wγ’(t)=γ’(t)], but not necessarily related with the timber production [wγ’(t)≠Vm’(t)]. 
This consideration is taken given that the timber production does not grow at same rate as 
forest services production. Therefore, there may be payments from the public policy to the 
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 landowners, and consequently, there is a wealth sharing between the private and public 
interests. This payment could be designed according to several criteria. Nevertheless, in this 
paper, this incentive is focused on subsidizing the forest insurance in order to protect the 
production of ecosystem services. 
 
Proposition 4.8: The government will be interested in investing in incentives to produce 
ecosystem services if the marginal cost of this incentive will be equal to the marginal growth 
of the ecosystem services net of the marginal expected damage. 
 
Demonstration 4.8: The change in public wealth is determined by Eq. 4.16. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ), , , , rtt ExternalitiesNPV Q t ws D Q t I Q t eggg d -= - -              [4.16] 
Based on this equation, the society wants to maximize the public wealth, including the 
production of ecosystem services with respect to the standing timber stock. Then, the partial 
derivative with respect to the timber stock is taken and this result is set equal to zero. Solving 
this equation results in Eq. 4.17, in which society would pay for their ecosystem services until 
their marginal costs are equal to their marginal values, net of the marginal risk. The following 
expression is obtained: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )' , ' , ' , ,Q t Q t t Iw s D Qg gg d= -                 [4.17] 
 
Proposition 4.9: The optimal forest rotation will change if the incentives for ecosystem 
services production are included in the public and private landowner’s NPV. 
 
Demonstration 4.9: Following Eq. 4.16, the partial derivative with respect to time can be 
taken. Therefore, if this result is rearranged, the optimal rotation is obtained. The optimal age 
for forest rotation, is achieved when the rate of growth value of externalities with incentives 
and risk of wildfires is equal to the interest rate. This equilibrium is represented by Eq. 4.18. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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               [4.18] 
Now, if the optimal rotation of the previous equation is compared with Eq. 4.12, it is 
observable that the optimal forest rotation depends on the economic incentives. In other 
words, the optimal rotation for ecosystem services with incentives is different with respect to 
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 those provided without incentives. Note that the effects of the incentives on wildfire risk are 
not considered. 
On the other hand, if the landowner’s valuation includes the reception of incentives, then this 
new NPV is represented by Eq. 4.19. In this case, the landowners earn money for producing 
ecosystem services, although it is assumed this does not impact the wood production and 
forest management. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ), , , , , , , , , , rtt m vNPV V Q t Q t s h C Q s ws D Q t I Q t e Rga m d m -= - - - + -       [4.19] 
The optimal rotation for the landowner with incentives can be obtained by taking the partial 
derivative with respect to time, setting this result equal to zero. In this way, the optimal 
rotation is reached when the rate of growth value of the standing timber stock with insurance 
against the risk of wildfires and incentives is equal to the interest rate. This equilibrium is 
represented by Eq. 4.20. 
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If we compare this equation and Eq. 4.3, it is observable that the optimal rotation for the 
landowner is modified by the application of incentives, given that the slope of marginal 
productivity is greater than the marginal productivity without incentives for the same interest 
rate. Also, it should be noted that the incentives can be of different types, as they could be 
directed to reduce the forest management expenses, the premium cost or the reduction of the 
wildfire intensity. All of these measures depend on the public policy. 
 
4.6. EMPIRICAL SIMULATION 
4.6.1 The insurance model 
In order to simulate the insurance model, firstly, the risk of wildfires should be determined. 
Thus, it is assumed that the risk is going to be measured geographically according to the 
Galician Forest Districts in Northern Spain. These districts represent a forest limit which the 
regional administration organizes the plan to protect forest areas against wildfire. Therefore, 
this demarcation could be used to implement incentives to produce environmental services 
because the regional government uses this area to apply other forest policies. Then, following 
the research of Barreal et al. (2012), this risk index is calculated according to the predictions 
based on climatic and socio-economic conditions for each of the administrative demarcations 
from 2001 to 2010. Three districts are selected according to the highest, average and lowest 
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 wildfire estimated risk indexes. These areas are shown in Figure 4.2. Meanwhile, the 
dependent variable, which determines the wildfire risk, is the ratio of the total burned forest 
area divided by the forest area. In summary, and based on the results obtained, the risk of 
wildfire used in the simulation is 0.07% for “A Mariña Lucense”, 0.57% for Fisterra and 
1.55% for Verín-Viana. 
 
FIGURE 4.2: Galician Forest Districts. 
In this research, it is assumed as a main hypothesis that these risk levels do not vary within 
the same district. Another assumption is that all of the landowners could take out the 
previously described forest insurance, so all the owners have the same wildfire risk regardless 
of the size of their land or their type of management. To select the discount factor, the 
simulation employs a given interest rate of 3%, as used by Pasalodos-Tato et al. (2010). The 
rest of the variables take arbitrary values, given that their respective roles are only to simulate 
the effects of the forest insurance and to identify their possible implications. The selected 
value for the insurance coverage is μ=70%, so that on average, the insurance policies do not 
provide full coverage of the damages, given the existence of deductible fees. In addition, the 
timber damage coverage is set as a partial coverage, so only commercial values are 
considered.  
 
4.6.2 Timber forest production 
To determine the standing timber stock value, the silvicultural production system based on a 
regular stand of Pinus pinaster Aiton. is taken into account. This species is chosen as it is of 
great commercial interest in Galicia, and the region has the suitable edaphoclimatic 
characteristics for its growth. Also, this species is particularly important in terms of the 
traditional production and uses of the Galician forest, as it is one of the species included by 
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 the regional government in the forest incentives program in reforested agricultural lands. The 
growth rate of this species depends on climate and or soil characteristics, amongst other 
factors. The Quality II for Pinus pinaster Aiton. corresponds to a site index of 170 dm with 
20 years as the reference age.  
This research uses a simplified regime, which includes the plantation of 1,111 trees per 
hectare, no thinning during the whole rotation, and a final clear-cut. By increasing the 
growing space available to the remaining trees, a landowner can increase the growth rate of 
those trees and, more importantly, the rate at which they increase in value. Thinning can also 
be used to remove poorly formed trees that would have little future value. Thus, if the 
landowner does not make these intermediate cuts, the average tree in the final cut will be 
smaller and it will have less commercial value. Nevertheless, in the case of Galician small 
non-industrial forest owners, these intermediate cuts is frequently used due to the cost and 
difficulty of programming thinning. This model also allows for the simplification of the 
calculations, and easily describes the application in Galicia of the theoretical framework of 
the restoration insurance model developed in this research. 
To determine the restoration costs, the prices included in the afforestation incentives 
promoted by the Galician Government are applied. These costs are set to a maximum of 
1,853 €/ha and include the cost of preparing the soil, buying the seeds or saplings and sowing 
or planting them, the cost of defending the plants with protectors, or other necessary 
materials, and the design of preventive actions against wildfires (Consellería de Medio Rural, 
2009). It also includes other tasks that could be done immediately after plantation. Therefore, 
considering average slope and soil conditions and the initial density of this silviculture 
regime, the restoration cost is assumed to be 1,400 €/ha (BOE, 2010). 
The standing timber stock value is calculated from the possible income generated from the 
final harvest for each possible rotation. The timber price is obtained from Molano et al. 
(2007); these values are the average price at mill gate for the year 2006, which have been 
updated based on a survey of companies and loggers. The profile curves for this specie have 
been obtained for each year according to regional publications. 
Finally, the net price of forest timber at stump, which is received by the landowner, will have 
to be reduced by the transportation (6 €/m3) and logging costs. This last expense depends on 
the tree size and machine performance, as described in Nakagawa et al. (2010). In this way, 
Eq. 4.21 is used to calculate the timber stock value per hectare (Vk) for Pinus pinaster Aiton. 
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In the previous equation, the forest stand value depends on the density of trees per hectare (n) 
for the respective year (k) and the value of the standing timber stock. This valuation depends 
on the timber grade (i). In this model, the timber is graded as pulpwood, sawlogs and 
premium sawlogs (Table 4.1). The stock per hectare of timber (E), the factory price (Pf) and 
the harvesting cost (Ca) per m3 of timber depend on the grade of the forest products. Finally, 
to determine the net timber stock value, the cost of transportation to the factory per m3 (Ct) is 
subtracted. 
TABLE 4.1: Timber classification according to technical characteristics. 
TYPE OF TIMBER LOGS DIAMETER DESTINATION 
Pulpwood 2.5 m Between 4 and 14 cm. Panel manufacturing as well as pulp 
Sawlogs 2.5 m Between 14 and 24 cm. Sawn wood manufacturing 
Premium sawlogs 2.5 m bigger than 24 cm. Premium sawn wood manufacturing 
Based on these considerations, the timber stock value per hectare is shown in Figure 4.3. This 
figure shows that for the first thirteen years, the production value is zero, because the 
standing timber stock does not have any commercial value or it is too low to cover the costs 
of harvesting, hauling and transportation. From this point on, the timber stock value starts to 
grow, although the first stage of production is mainly pulpwood and sawlogs, which have less 
commercial value than premium sawlogs. This happens because as the diameter of the tree 
increases, it first produces pulpwood, then sawlogs and finally premium sawlogs, so that the 
value increases as the timber ages. 
 
FIGURE 4.3: Timber Stock Value for Pinus pinaster Aiton. in Galicia. 
 
4.6.3 A proposal of payment for ecosystem services 
The government could pay to guarantee the production of ecosystem services. Then, the 
public policy could consider the payment for environmental services as an incentive to 
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 protect them. In order to design this incentive, it will be necessary to take into account that 
when the production of ecosystem services increases; the incentive should grow at the same 
rate. This could be expressed as Eq. 4.22. 
( ) ( ), ,Q t Q t
t t
wg g¶ ¶=
¶ ¶
                  [4.22] 
Furthermore, this incentive is not related to the value of the standing timber stock. The 
growth of this production does not imply that ecosystem services increases at same rate, so 
the incentive should not depend on timber production. Therefore, the marginal increase of 
incentive is not equal to the marginal growth of timber stock. Mathematically, this could be 
expressed as Eq. 4.23: 
( ) ( ), ,mQ t V Q t
t
w
t
g¶ ¶¹
¶ ¶
                  [4.23] 
The insurance premium and carbon sequestration are taking into account to design the 
incentive. In other words, the landowner will receive a payment based on the insurance 
premium. However, the incentive is designed as a proportional payment of forest insurance 
according to the carbon sequestration that the plantation made during each year. This 
proposal takes into account that the incentive not influences the insurance cost, so the 
incentive does not influence in the premium. To sum up, the Eq. 4.24 represents the premium 
payment that the landowner will receive for the production of ecosystem services.  
( ) ( )
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, , , ,t
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=                  [4.24] 
Other type of incentives could be considered to involve the production of ecosystem services 
into the landowner valuation. However, this research takes into account the forest insurance 
because this financial mechanism protects the next forest rotation. 
 
4.6.4 Ecosystem services valuation 
Forest carbon sequestration is considered to simulate the production of ecosystem services. 
To determine this type of externality, the carbon sequestration of Pinus pinaster Aiton. is 
obtained for the Galician forests using the research of Balboa-Murias et al. (2006), Barrio-
Anta (2006) and Diéguez-Aranda (2009). Based on this information, we obtain the tonnage of 
CO2 sequestered per hectare for this type of forest. Then, the production of carbon 
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 sequestration is shown in Figure 4.4, in which the ecosystem production grows up during the 
forest rotation.  
 
FIGURE 4.4: Carbon sequestration for Pinus pinaster Aiton. in Galicia. 
To obtain the value of carbon sequestration, the average price of the electronic trading service 
of carbon dioxide emission rights is employed (SENDECO2, 2013). The average price was 
12.67 € per ton for the period between 02/01/2008 to 31/10/2013. The economic value of 
CO2 sequestration is calculated by using this market price.  
 
4.7. RESULTS 
According to the above data, and Eq. 4.1 and Eq. 4.8, the NPV of forest production for 
private and public interests can be simulated. Also, the production of ecosystem services can 
be valued separately from the private and public perspective; namely, this valuation is 
developed according to Eq. 4.11. The main results are shown in Table 4.2, in which the 
importance of wildfire risk on the NPV is demonstrated, in the same way as in Reed (1984). 
Thus, in the district where there is a lower wildfire risk, the forest will be more highly valued. 
On the other hand, the valuation of ecosystem services is also affected by the wildfire risk, 
and if their value is added to the NPV, then it will increase. Finally, the optimal forest 
rotation for the landowner is 36 years and for the public interest is 38 years, considering in 
first case only the ecosystem services and in second all the forestry production. None of these 
rotations are affected by the various risk levels used in the simulation. This happens because 
the insurance premium used equals the risk of wildfires and does not take into account other 
intermediate cost (such as commercial costs). Furthermore, there is only a minor difference in 
the optimal forest rotation between forestry districts because the wildfire risk does not change 
in practice sufficiently to allow for this (Reed, 1984). 
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TABLE 4.2: Net Present Value for Pinus pinaster Aiton. 
 NET PRESENT VALUE FOR LANDOWNER NET PRESENT VALUE FOR EXTERNALITIES TOTAL NET PRESENT VALUE FOR SOCIETY 
YEAR Without  risk 
With risk Without  
risk 
With risk Without  
risk 
With risk 
A Mariña  
Lucense Fisterra 
 Verín- 
Viana 
A Mariña 
 Lucense Fisterra 
 Verín- 
Viana 
A Mariña 
 Lucense Fisterra 
 Verín- 
Viana 
0 -1,400.00€ -1,400.98€ -1,408.02€ -1,421.66€ 0.00€ 0.00€ 0.00€ 0.00€ -1,400.00€ -1,400.98€ -1,408.02€ -1,421.66€ 
5 -1,400.00€ -1,400.84€ -1,406.90€ -1,418.64€ 107.96€ 107.88€ 107.34€ 106.29€ -1,292.04€ -1,292.96€ -1,407.52€ -1,420.31€ 
10 -1,400.00€ -1,400.72€ -1,405.94€ -1,416.04€ 412.97€ 412.68€ 410.60€ 406.58€ -987.03€ -988.04€ -995.34€ -1,009.46€ 
15 -899.26€ -900.23€ -907.24€ -920.81€ 1,007.10€ 1,006.39€ 1,001.33€ 991.52€ 107.84€ 106.17€ 94.09€ 70.70€ 
20 -323.62€ -324.90€ -334.18€ -352.15€ 1,606.16€ 1,605.04€ 1,596.96€ 1,581.31€ 1,282.54€ 1,280.14€ 1,262.78€ 1,229.16€ 
25 855.77€ 853.74€ 839.06€ 810.64€ 2,084.62€ 2,083.17€ 2,072.68€ 2,052.37€ 2,940.39€ 2,936.91€ 2,911.75€ 2,863.01€ 
30 1,242.34€ 1,240.11€ 1,223.95€ 1,192.66€ 2,379.74€ 2,378.08€ 2,366.11€ 2,342.93€ 3,622.09€ 3,618.19€ 3,590.07€ 3,535.59€ 
35 1,402.33€ 1,400.04€ 1,383.48€ 1,351.40€ 2,535.94€ 2,534.18€ 2,521.42€ 2,496.71€ 3,938.27€ 3,934.21€ 3,904.90€ 3,848.11€ 
40 1,369.13€ 1,366.91€ 1,350.86€ 1,319.77€ 2,560.48€ 2,558.70€ 2,545.82€ 2,520.87€ 3,929.62€ 3,925.61€ 3,896.68€ 3,840.65€ 
45 1,289.25€ 1,287.12€ 1,271.77€ 1,242.03€ 2,504.90€ 2,503.15€ 2,490.55€ 2,466.15€ 3,794.15€ 3,790.28€ 3,762.32€ 3,708.18€ 
Max. 1,402.33€ 1,400.04€ 1,383.48€ 1,351.40€ 2,560.48€ 2,558.70€ 2,545.82€ 2,520.87€ 3,938.27€ 3,934.21€ 3,904.90€ 3,848.11€ 
The government can provide incentives to encourage landowners to take out forest insurance, 
so that the forestry policy can include subsidies for the insurance premium based on the 
production of carbon sequestration amenities. It is therefore simulated that the government 
pays one part of the insurance cost according to the marginal increase in the carbon 
sequestered. The NPVs of landowners and public interests are represented in Table 4.3 
according to respectively Eq. 4.19 and Eq. 4.16.  
TABLE 4.3: Net Present Value with a partial insurance subsidy for Pinus pinaster Aiton. 
YEAR 
NET PRESENT VALUE FOR 
LANDOWNER WITH PARTIAL 
INSURANCE SUBSIDY 
TOTAL NET PRESENT VALUE FOR PUBLIC 
INTEREST WITH PARTIAL INSURANCE 
SUBSIDY 
A Mariña 
 Lucense Fisterra  Verín-Viana 
A Mariña  
Lucense Fisterra  Verín-Viana 
0 -1,400.98€ -1,408.02€ -1,421.66€ 0.00€ 0.00€ 0.00€ 
5 -1,400.84€ -1,406.90€ -1,418.64€ 107.88€ 107.34€ 106.29€ 
10 -1,400.72€ -1,405.94€ -1,416.04€ 412.68€ 410.60€ 406.58€ 
15 -900.08€ -906.01€ -917.50€ 1,006.24€ 1,000.10€ 988.20€ 
20 -324.79€ -333.26€ -349.68€ 1,604.93€ 1,596.04€ 1,578.83€ 
25 853.86€ 840.08€ 813.40€ 2,083.04€ 2,071.66€ 2,049.62€ 
30 1,240.19€ 1,224.65€ 1,194.53€ 2,378.00€ 2,365.42€ 2,341.06€ 
35 1,400.10€ 1,384.04€ 1,352.92€ 2,534.11€ 2,520.86€ 2,495.20€ 
40 1,366.96€ 1,351.24€ 1,320.80€ 2,558.65€ 2,545.44€ 2,519.85€ 
45 1,287.16€ 1,272.09€ 1,242.89€ 2,503.12€ 2,490.24€ 2,465.29€ 
Max. 1,400.11€ 1,384.10€ 1,353.08€ 2,568.40€ 2,555.03€ 2,529.15€ 
Based on these results, we can observe that the NPV increases slightly for the landowners, so 
they are more interested in forest production. On the other hand, the net public value of the 
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 externalities decreases because the public policy will pay the incentive, although there are 
more guarantees of continuing the production of ecosystem services because the insurance 
model includes restoration after wildfires. 
Therefore, an insurance policy may include these restoration costs, as this measure guarantees 
future forest production: the next forest plantation may be controlled then by the insurance 
policy and, subsequently, the public policy could shape the characteristics of the restoration 
process that will continue the production of ecosystem services. However, this measure also 
involves the landowners in the forest production, as their timber stock is insured, at least 
partially, in exchange for paying a lower insurance premium in comparison to purchasing it 
in a free insurance market. As a result, the social planner may pay all the coverage of forest 
restoration and also one part of the timber coverage cost according to the previous incentive. 
The NPV for the landowner and the ecosystem services to the public interest are included in 
Table 4.4. However, the landowner faces a lower risk in the forest investment because the 
losses are smaller at the beginning of the forest rotation. Therefore, if the interest rate does 
not change, the investment in forestry production is more attractive. Consequently, the 
ecosystem services are guaranteed by the forest insurance, and the landowners have more 
incentives to invest in forest production, and also less land may be abandoned. 
TABLE 4.4: Net Present Value (NPV) with public subsidy in restoration costs and partial 
insurance premium for Pinus pinaster Aiton. 
YEAR 
LANDOWNER FOREST VALUATION WITH  
FULL COVERAGE IN RESTORATION COSTS AND 
 PARTIAL INSURANCE SUBSIDY 
EXTERNALITY VALUATION WITH FULL 
COVERAGE IN RESTORATION COSTS AND  
11. PARTIAL INSURANCE SUBSIDY 
A Mariña 
Lucense Fisterra Verín-Viana 
A Mariña 
Lucense Fisterra Verín-Viana 
0 -1,400.00€ -1,400.00€ -1,400.00€ -0.98€ -8.02€ -21.66€ 
5 -1,400.00€ -1,400.00€ -1,400.00€ 107.04€ 100.44€ 87.64€ 
10 -1,400.00€ -1,400.00€ -1,400.00€ 411.96€ 404.66€ 390.54€ 
15 -899.56€ -901.78€ -906.07€ 1,005.73€ 995.87€ 976.77€ 
20 -324.31€ -329.33€ -339.04€ 1,604.45€ 1,592.11€ 1,568.20€ 
25 854.28€ 843.57€ 822.82€ 2,082.62€ 2,068.18€ 2,040.20€ 
30 1,240.57€ 1,227.74€ 1,202.90€ 2,377.62€ 2,362.33€ 2,332.69€ 
35 1,400.43€ 1,386.73€ 1,360.19€ 2,533.78€ 2,518.17€ 2,487.92€ 
40 1,367.24€ 1,353.59€ 1,327.14€ 2,558.37€ 2,543.09€ 2,513.51€ 
45 1,287.41€ 1,274.11€ 1,248.36€ 2,502.87€ 2,488.21€ 2,459.82€ 
Max. 1,400.43€ 1,386.73€ 1,360.19€ 2,568.10€ 2,552.56€ 2,522.47€ 
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 4.8. CONCLUSION 
This forest valuation exercise extends the models of Faustmann (1849), Hartman (1976) and 
Reed (1984) with the implications of forest insurance in landowners’ valuations. This 
framework also includes the incentives in the NPV and their effects on the landowner’s 
decisions, with the incentives affecting the NPV and encouraging landowners to produce 
ecosystem services. The role of the insurance with incentives to produce ecosystem services 
increases with the forest conservation status, given that the landowners have more economic 
incentives to develop a better forest management in order to guarantee their production. In 
order to minimize the moral hazard, the insurance policy should include certain specific 
forest management requirements that the landowners have to fulfil. In that way, a minimum 
forest management would be guaranteed, given that the landowners could lose the payments 
for ecosystem services, if they do not fulfil the insurance policy. In several countries, such as 
Spain, Canada or Brazil (Mahul and Stutley, 2010), the government currently provides 
incentives to sign forest insurance contracts through their national agriculture subsidies 
program. These incentives depend on the public policy and government requirements. 
Therefore, if the government introduces forest management requirements to obtain insurance 
subsidies, this public policy could be a measure to protect the production of ecosystem 
services. Taking into account the results of this research, these subsidies should focus on 
linking the production of ecosystem services with the subsidy payment. Furthermore, if this 
subsidy involves conditions to encourage a better forest conservation, then this payment will 
link the private and public interest. 
The application of these incentives is extensive and can be a good mechanism to introduce or 
consolidate the insurance policy on the forestry areas to produce ecosystem services. Also, 
these incentives could be used to develop some variables that affect the insurance policy or 
reduce others, such as forest management expenses or taxes. Obviously, the success of this 
application depends on the context and on the specific public policies. Therefore, more 
sustainable development could be achieved in the forest and rural areas through this type of 
public policy. This research could be extended with an analysis of the landowners’ 
management, based on the type of incentives applied through public policies. Other way to 
expand this research is by assessing the landowner preferences according wildfire risk 
perceptions and incentives. 
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 CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS OF FOREST INSURANCE 
DEMAND IN THE NORTH OF GALICIA 
 
 
 
Abstract: Forest production faces many risks, including wildfires, pests, floods or strong 
winds, among others. Landowner may contract a forest insurance to avoid the possible 
economic losses caused by such events. The current research uses a choice experiment to 
identify the insurance attributes desirable by landowners. Also, this framework allows for the 
estimation of the willingness to pay (WTP) for the different insurance attributes and their 
corresponding marginal utilities. The insurance cost, the coverage level of timber losses, the 
coverage of restoration costs and the requirement of forest certification are all included as 
attributes of the insurance contract. A survey of forest owners/managers was conducted in the 
North of Galicia (NW Spain) collecting a total of 210 responses. Results show that the 
coverage of restoration costs is the most desirable attribute. The Random Parameters Logit is 
used to identify the influence of socioeconomic variables the landowners’ decisions, showing 
that social factors, such as the age or the type of landowner affect considerably the forest 
insurance demand. 
 
Keywords: choice experiment, forest certification, forest insurance, restoration cost, wildfire. 
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 5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Wildfires cause many losses in the forest areas which affect both private landowners and 
public goods (Barrio et al., 2007; González-Gómez et al., 2013). While the landowners lose 
timber production, they are also focused to restore the burned area to start a new forest 
rotation. Furthermore, wildfires damage the production of ecosystem services (Hurteau et al., 
2013). Thus, society loses the production of environmental services, at least until the starting 
of a new forest rotation. In Spain, there were around 17,127 wildfires each year during the 
first decade of the current century (2001-2010). In average, these wildfires affected 113,850 
forestry hectares each year (MAAMA, 2012a). The Pinus Pinaster (102,117 Ha.) is the main 
affected species by wildfires in Spain, and the Eucalyptus globulus (52,598 Ha.) and Pinus 
halepensis (41,743 Ha.) are respectively the second and the third most affected species during 
this period (MAAMA, 2012a).  
In the specific case of Galicia, located in Norwest Spain, an annual average of 7,242 wildfires 
affects 28,890 forestry hectares during 2001-2010 (IGE, 2013a). These wildfires mainly 
affected the plantations of Pinus pinaster (54,108 Ha.) (MAAMA, 2012a). Eucalyptus 
globulus (40,906 Ha.) is the second most affected plantation, and the third, Quercus robur 
(5,315 Ha.). In this area, wildfires affect more the private than public lands, with 72.65% of 
the burned area belonging to private landowners. The remaining area depends on public or 
forest committee management.  
With this forest potential, Galicia is logging a total of 6,876,697 cubic meters of timber 
(Xunta de Galicia, 2011), which represents 52% of Spanish logs (MAAMA, 2013). However, 
only 7.78% of this forest area is certified, representing only 111,249 hectares MAAMA 
(2011). The lack of certification is a serious shortcoming for Galician forests, given that 
nowadays, the global markets demand eco-labeled goods and services. Therefore, forest 
certification demand is increasing and this carries a higher premium for the certified 
production. To achieve forest certification, the landowner should fulfil some technical and 
economic requirements (Nussbaum, 2013). Forest certification may also imply better forest 
management (Rametsteiner and Simula, 2003), which in turn, it may decrease wildfire risk.  
In Spain, private firms offer forest insurance, usually subsidized by the public administration 
(BOE, 2011)3. The evolution of forest insurance in Spain and Galicia can be observed in 
3 Thus, one of these requirements determines that the forest insurance should cover the damages caused by 
wildfires, floods, driving rain or strong winds. In case of damages, the reforestation or restoration cost is 
covered to shrub mass, conifers, broadleaf and mixed plantations. However, this subsidy only covers production 
damages to cork plantation. The coverage on restoration cost and production damage depends on the land and 
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 Table 5.1. These data show that the forest insurance policy is not popular among landowners, 
and it is not being used as a management tool. The insured area, number of contracts, and 
insured production have been increasing during the last three years4. However, the insured 
areas have been decreasing in relative terms with respect to the amount of insurable 
production. As a result, in Galicia, the forest insurance is not widely used by landowners 
either, in spite of the high hazard rates. The number of insurance policies that have been sold 
over the years is very low, considering that there are a half million of landowners in Galicia 
and three thousand communities of mountain landowners (Dans, 2006). Furthermore, the 
Galician forest insurance represents 5.5% of Spanish forest insurance. This percentage is very 
low because the Spanish production of conifers and broadleaf is mainly harvested in Galician 
forests (MAAMA, 2011). 
TABLE 5.1: Forest insurance policies in Spain. 
 SPAIN GALICIA 
SEASON 
INSURABLE 
PRODUCTION 
(HA) 
INSURED  
PRODUCTION 
(HA) 
IMPLEMENTATION %  
(INSURED PROD. /  
INSURABLE 
 PROD.) 
NUMBER 
 OF  
POLICIES 
VALUE OF  
INSURED 
PRODUCTION 
(IN 1M €) 
NUMBER 
 OF  
CONTRACTS 
PRODUCTION 
(KG.) 
ENESA 
SUBSIDY 
(IN €) 
NET COST 
(IN €) 
2011 13.165.576 83.473 0,63 1.760 108,08 156 45.886.811 20,628.72 75,672.14 
2010 6.224.029 77.103 1,24 1.588 96,50 144 41.975.020 23,813.30 87,947.32 
2009 1.228.716 66.834 5,44 1.453 81,12 145 43.561.298 17,710.62 63,177.86 
2008 ND ND ND ND ND 167 48.928.321 21,128.46 71,670.07 
Source: Agroseguro (2011a)     
Based on this lack of use, the landowners’ preferences for this type of insurance should be 
analysed in other to assess any potential barriers for its implementation. Therefore, stated 
preferences are used to identify the utility of different insurance attributes given by 
landowners as well as to discover their preferences. The first section of this chapter describes 
the previous literature about insurance policies and environmental valuation. Next, the 
methodology is described, following with the model used and the data collection. Next, the 
paper presents the main results according to the methodology and data collected. Finally, 
some conclusions based on these results are drawn. 
 
plantation characteristics. This public policy establishes that insurance coverage is full for reforestation or 
restoration cost. Nevertheless, the timber coverage is partial and has a 10% deductible.  
4 Some technical requirements should be fulfilled to insure the forestlands. One of them is that the landowner 
should contract an insurance policy to a minimum area (0.25 Ha.), which can be forest or farm land. Moreover, 
the insurance subsidy requires a minimum forest management, which is determined according to laws, 
regulations and cultural conditions. Some examples of this requirement can be mentioned: the species should be 
set according to site characteristics; the land should be adequate by following a restoration plan and the 
plantation should be made considering the optimal density of selected species (BOE, 2011). 
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 5.2. BACKGROUND 
A considerable amount of surveys were developed in order to analyze public policies or to 
value forest services. In this field, Choice Experiments (CE) has been used to value non-
market forest goods or services; and to evaluate incentives or public policies (Kramer et al., 
2003; Horne, 2006; Meyerhoff et al., 2009; Mogas et al., 2009; Farreras and Mavsar, 2012). 
The CE here executed is similar to previous applications, in which this method was used to 
assess the WTP for some environmental services and risk avoidance (Hanley et al., 1998; 
Soliño et al.,2010; Varela et al., 2014) and recreational preferences (Christie et al., 2007; 
Holmes et al., 2012). 
The CE has been used in insurance research before, such as in health insurance in several 
countries, including Switzerland (Becker and Zweifel, 2008), the United States of America 
(Nganje et al., 2004), and Vietnam (Lofgren et al., 2008). CE has also been used to analyse 
the crop insurance program in Cataluña (Spain) (Mercadé et al., 2009). In our particular 
study, the insurance cost, the coverage, the minimum damage to be claimed and the insurance 
compensation are included as attributes contract of the choice. However, as far as we know, 
preferences towards forest insurance contracts have not been much analysed around the 
world. An exception is Brunette et al. (2008), who applied a survey to obtain the insurance 
demand according to a fixed wildfire risk and public compensation5. Therefore, we consider 
this present work innovative, given that it discovers preferences for the design of various 
insurance policies.  
 
5.3. METHODS AND DATA 
5.3.1 CE theory 
The CE is based on Random Utility Theory (RUT). Thus, the respondents’ behavior is 
analysed by a discrete choice in which the utility is maximized (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 
1985). The respondents have a choice set (J), in which they could choose between some 
alternatives [j=1,…, J]. These options are associated with the utility function [U], which 
depends on objective or deterministic variables (v) and a random error component (ε). Then, 
if the respondent nth prefers the option j, his/her utility is described in the Eq. 4.1 as: 
5 Some researchers study the forest insurance (Holecy and Hanewinkel, 2006; Brunette and Couture, 2008; 
Brunette et al., 2012; Barreal et al., 2014) however, none of them analyses the utility of forest insurance 
programs for landowners. 
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 nj nj njU n e= +           [5.1] 
The election implies that the nth respondent prefers the option j than any other alternative p, 
so that the utility of j is greater than the utility of any other alternative p. Therefore, the 
probability of choosing the option j is determined by the Eq. 5.2. 
( ) ( )Prob Prob            ,j j p pj j p mn e n e= + ³ +  Î      [5.2] 
If the error term is independent and identically distributed according to a Gumbel distribution 
(Greene, 2008), the probability of the individual nth choosing alternative j is represented by 
Eq. 5.3. This following expression represents the Conditional Logit Model (CLM) developed 
by McFadden (1974), 
1
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y j
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         [5.3] 
where yn is a random variable that indicates the choice made by the respondent. Then, the 
probability of choosing j is calculated according to its exponential utility over exponential 
utility of total choice set. The vij involves both the attributes of the choice and the 
characteristics of the respondent. The log-likelihood is defined by Eq. 5.4. In this equation, 
djp takes values equal to 1 when j is chosen by the respondent, and djp is equal to 0 otherwise, 
for J possible outcomes. 
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The empirical specification of CLM is represented by Eq. 5.5. In this expression the utility 
depends on the insurance policy (Xij) and the error term (εij). Each insurance attribute (i) 
included in the model is related to the utility through the term βi. The following linear form is 
commonly assumed in most empirical models.  
ij i ij ijU Xb e= +           [5.5] 
The willingness to pay for each attribute is obtained according to the odds ratio of the Eq. 5.6. 
In this expression, the WTP estimate is obtained as a result of dividing the estimated 
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 parameters (βi) by βk, in which k represents the variable related to the cost attribute, and i 
represents the other attributes. 
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Taking into account the previous considerations, the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
(IIA) should be assessed. The IIA implies that the probability of selecting any alternative is 
independent of other alternatives in the choice set (Hausman and McFadden, 1984).  
The Hausman test can be used to analyse the IIA property (Hausman and McFadden, 1984). 
It is assumed that βC is a vector of consistent and efficient estimates under the null hypothesis 
of IIA; nevertheless this coefficient is inconsistent under the alternative hypothesis. The βD is 
consistent under the null and the alternative hypotheses, but inefficient under the alternative 
(Fry and Harris, 1998). Using standard notation, Ω- is the inverse of the covariance matrix of 
a subset D and full choice of a set C. The Hausman test is defined in Eq. 5.7 as follows. 
( )
'^ ^ ^ ^_ 'D C D CD CH q qb b b b
-æ ö æ ö÷ ÷ç ç= - W -W - = W÷ ÷ç ç÷ ÷ç çè ø è ø       [5.7] 
The CLM assumes the IIA property because the relative probabilities of two options in one 
single set are unaffected by other alternatives. Therefore, if the Hausman test fails to reject 
this property, then, this model is suitable (Birol et al., 2006). Otherwise, if the IIA property is 
rejected, then the CLM will be biased. Hence, it will be required an econometric model that is 
not conditioned by the IIA property. One of these possible models is the Random Parameter 
Logit (RPL).  
The RPL model assumes heterogeneous preferences and the model could be described by Eq. 
5.8. In this expression, the utility (Uij) is described by the insurance attributes, which are 
represented by Xij. The βi and ηi relates the utility with forest insurance attributes. The 
coefficient ηi allows the random parameter to be included in the model (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2005: page 513). These random parameters follow a normal distribution, 
; 0, ; , ,
ij i ij ij
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The probability of choosing the option j is represented by the Eq. 5.9. 
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The RPL does not explain the sources of heterogeneity (Boxall and Adamowich, 2002). Thus, 
the interactions between the social and/or economic variables with the choice attributes are 
included in order to detect the observable heterogeneity.  
 
5.3.2 CE survey  
The CE has been selected to analyse the landowner preferences for different forest insurance 
alternatives. To this end, three choice alternatives were designed in the CE. The two first 
alternatives represent different insurance contracts; meanwhile, the latter is the status quo 
option (no contract option). The insurance cost, as well as the coverage level of timber losses 
and restoration costs, and the additional requirement of forest certification are included as 
attributes in the choice set. In this way, each choice card includes four attributes. Table 5.2 
shows an example of a specific choice card (all choice cards are included in the Appendix 
5.1). 
TABLE 5.2: Example of CE card. 
 OPTION A OPTION B 
NOT TO 
CHOOSE 
FOREST 
INSURANCE 
Insurance cost 5.04 €/Ha. 3.36 €/Ha. 
Timber damage coverage 50% 0% 
Restoration coverage 100% 50% 
Forest Certification Yes No 
Mark X to show your main preference:     
According to the insurance companies that offer forest insurance, the average of the forest 
insurance premium in Spain is 4.20 € per hectare. However, a factor of +/- 20% is used to 
provide some variation to the insurance premium into the questionnaire. Therefore, 3.36 
€/Ha. and 5.04 €/Ha. are also included as potential insurance premium costs in the CE. The 
coverage level in the current National Forest Insurance Program (Agroseguro) only involves 
the forest damages on cork production (BOE, 2011). Nevertheless, this present research aims 
to assess the importance of this coverage into all type of forest productions. The coverage 
could be full (100%), partial (50%) or none (0%). The coverage of forest restoration after a 
wildfire could also be full (100%) or partial (50%). To sum up, Table 5.3 describes all the 
different levels as used in the CE. Appendix 4.1 reproduces the nine choice cards included in 
the survey. 
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 TABLE 5.3: Attribute levels of CE cads. 
ATTRIBUTES LEVEL 
Insurance cost 5.04 - 4.20 - 3.36 €/Ha. 
Timber damage coverage 100 - 50 - 0 % 
Restoration coverage 100- 50 % 
Forest Certification Yes – No 
The SSPS program has been used to define the number of choice cards included in the 
survey. Firstly, an orthogonal design was created, in which the orthogonal matrix and the 
optimal number of cards was obtained according to Appendix 5.2. Following the generator 
according to Street and Burgess (2007) and employing a random vector of ones, the D-
efficient rate was calculated6. A design was found containing 9 CE cards with a D-efficiency 
of 99.79%. This result is for a choice set size equal to two. If this size is changed, then D-
efficiency diminishes. Therefore, in order to retain the previous D-efficiency level, the 
following optimal design was used. 
The survey was directed towards landowners and/or forest managers. In total, 210 completed 
responses were collected, with a response rate of 46%. The survey was structured in seven 
sections: (1) the description of the type of land owned, (2) the CE exercise, (3) the 
characteristics and perceptions about their forest management practices, (4) the understanding 
of wildfire risks and its causes, (5) the future patterns on forestry management, (6) risk 
aversion question, and to conclude with (7), socio-economic features of respondent. 
 
5.3.3 Data collection 
The data collection was conducted in the area known as “A Mariña Lucense”, in the region of 
Galicia (Figure 5.1). According to the Galician forest administration (Xunta de Galicia, 
2012), this area represents the Forestry District VI. This area was chosen due to its good 
management practices, and its low number of wildfires with respect to others forestry districts 
of Galicia (Barreal et al., 2012). 
6 D-Efficiency rate compares the information matrix and optimal design for choice experiment (Bailey and 
Kind, 2008). 
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FIGURE 5.1: Research area. 
Within this study area, the managers and landowners are focused on producing forest 
resources, making decisions to maximize their production, and hence those maybe interested 
in protecting themselves against risks. Around 74.500 habitants live in this area, in a total 
surface of 1,395.5 Km2 (IGE, 2013b). Rural lands represent 134,943 hectares that are 
distributed in 379,864 plots (IGE, 2013c). Of particular relevance is the forestland, which 
represents 76.30% of the total surface (106,492 Ha.). A significant amount of it, about 
82.49% (87,849 Ha.) represents productive forestry, while 17.51% (18,643 Ha.) are scrubland 
areas (IGE, 2013d). 
 
FIGURE 5.2: Main forest productions in the study area. 
According to Figure 5.2, the main forest production is Eucaliptus globulus (MAAMA, 
2012b). This is the main species on 67,524 Ha., representing 76.86% of forest areas. The 
second species in terms of importance is the Pinus pinaster, planted on 6,662 Ha., although 
this species only represents 7.58% of the forestry area. 
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 In Table 5.4 the main socioeconomic characteristics of the sample are depicted. In particular, 
54% of respondents are male with an average age of 50 years. Around 53% of sample 
respondents have primary education, while 21% and 13.5% hold respectively professional 
and university degrees. Finally, 12.5% do not have any formal education. Forty nine per cent 
live in the rural areas, and most have a family income below 16,700 €/year (62% of 
respondents). Meanwhile 38% of the respondents belong to an income interval from 16,700 € 
to 52,100 €, and only 0.6% are over 52,100 €7.In this sample, 36% of respondents are 
landowners, 39% are forest managers and, finally, 25% are both landowners and forest 
managers. The 94% of respondents plant eucalyptus at least in one of their forestlands; and 
for 71% of the participants this is the only species they harvest. Nearly 48% of respondents 
have logged their forest lands during the last 10 years, while 82% of these respondents have 
received from the last logging less than 12,000 €.  
In terms of their preferences for the various contracts, the respondents have selected 790 
times (41.8%) the status quo option; meanwhile the contract A and contract B were selected 
664 (34.6%) and 446 (23.6%) times, respectively. These selections show a high preference 
for the status quo option. A control question was also formulated to identify the level of 
knowledge about this insurance. In this question, the respondent selected in a Lickert scale 
from 1 (corresponding with forest insurance being totally unknown) to 5 (denoting that the 
forest insurance is widely known). Overall, it was found that the majority of respondents have 
very little knowledge, selecting levels below 3 (99%). An open-ended follow-up question was 
formulated in case of selection of the status quo option. Overall, respondents prefer not to 
ensure the forestlands because they think that the forest insurance in unnecessary to their 
forest management decisions. To sum up, the high response of status quo option should be 
motivated by the respondents’ lack of knowledge about the wildfire insurance and their 
perception that there is no need for this financial instrument 
  
7 This economic classification corresponds with the Spanish Statistical Office questionnaires, although different ranges are 
added to calculate the lower, medium and high family income. 
127 
                                                 
 TABLE 5.4: Summary statistics. 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION MEAN STD. DEV. 
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Female 1 = if the respondent is a female; 0 = otherwise 0.462 0.499 
Age Age of respondents 50.086 17.896 
No formal 
education 
1 = if the respondent does not have formal education; 0 
= otherwise 0.125  0.331 
Basic education 1 = if the respondent has a primary or high school degree; 0 = otherwise 0.529 0.499 
Professional degree 1 = if the respondent has a professional degree; 0 = otherwise 0.211 0.408 
University Degree 1 = if the respondent holds a university degree; 0 = otherwise 0.135 0.341 
LIFESTYLE 
Rural area 1 = if the respondent lives in a rural area; 0 = otherwise 0.486 0.500 
Low income 1 = if the respondent has a family income below 16,700 €; 0 = otherwise 0.619 0.486 
Medium income 1 = if the respondent has a family income between 16,701 € and 52,100 €; 0 = otherwise 0.376 0.485 
High income 1 = if the respondent has a family income over 52,101 €; 0 = otherwise 0.006 0.074 
FORESTRY DESCRIPTION 
Only landowner 1 = if the respondent is only a landowner and not a forest manager; 0 = otherwise 0.357 0.479 
Only forest 
manager 
1 = if the respondent is only forest manager and is not a 
landowner; 0 = otherwise 0.390 0.488 
Landowner and 
forest manager 
1= if the respondent is a landowner and a forest 
manager; 0 = otherwise 0.252 0.434 
Eucalyptus 1 = if the respondent has planted eucalyptus at least in one forestland; 0 = otherwise 0.938 0.242 
Only Eucalyptus 1 = if the respondent has only planted eucalyptus in his/her forestland; 0 = otherwise 0.707 0.455 
Pine 1 = if the respondent has planted pine at least in one forestland; 0 = otherwise 0.274 0.446 
Oak 1 = if the respondent has planted oaks at least in one forestland; 0 = otherwise 0.024 0.153 
Chestnut 1 = if the respondent has planted chestnut at least in one forestland; 0 = otherwise 0.067 0.251 
Logging 1 = if the forest area was logged during the last 10 years at least once; 0 = otherwise 0.478 0.500 
Year of logging Year in the last 10 years in which the last logging took place 2.008.879 2.750 
Less of 3.000€ 1 = if the last payment for selling timber in the last 10 years is below 3,000 €; 0 = otherwise 0.283 0.450 
From 3.000€ to 
6.000€ 
1 = if the last payment for selling timber in the last 10 
years is between 3,000 € to 6,000 €; 0 = otherwise 0.283 0.450 
From 6000€ to 
12.000€ 
1 = if the last payment for selling timber in the last 10 
years is between 6,000 € - 12,000 €; 0 = otherwise 0.253 0.435 
More of 12.000€ 1 = if the last payment for selling timber in the last 10 years is more than 12,000 €; 0 = otherwise 0.141 0.349 
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 5.4. RESULTS 
The Hausman test carries a 24a  equal to 26.734 with a 0.00002 probability. Thus, the IIA 
property is failed to be rejected with a probability of 99% (Birol et al., 2006). Therefore, both 
the CLM and RPL can be used. The CLM assumes homogeneous preferences across the 
respondents, while the RPL takes into account the heterogeneity (Birol et al., 2006). 
TABLE 5.5: Conditional Logit Model. 
 
 
 
 
 
The CLM provides the results displayed in Table 5.5. All of these results are statistically 
significant at the 1% critical level. As we can observe, the insurance premium decreases 
respondents’ utility. On the other hand, both insurance coverage and forest certification 
increase the respondents’ utility. In addition, the forest restoration costs coverage is more 
preferred than timber damage coverage. Landowners have also a positive view for the 
requirement of certification. This requirement implies a cost for landowners and better forest 
management. This implies, as well, that the wildfire risk is reduced, because the certification 
is related to a specific forest management, which is focused on taking care of the forest 
production. On the other hand, the timber companies increase the wood price when the forest 
production is certified; so this certification also increases the landowner revenues.  
The RPL Model provides evidence about the same relationship between the respondents’ 
preferences and the attributes of forest insurance. The results are shown in Table 5.6. This 
RPL specification assumes the invariability of the insurance payment. There is also statistical 
evidence that the other insurance attributes follow a normal distribution. In accordance, the 
scale parameters are all significant. All variables are significant at the 1% level or below and 
the signs of the coefficients are the same as in the CLM. The willingness to pay (WTP) for 
the forest insurance attributes is obtained dividing the absolute value of the respective 
random parameters by the price coefficient (as shown Eq. 5.6). Preferences for insurance 
attributes are however different when comparing them with the previous CLM results, given 
  COEFFICIENT 
STANDARD 
 ERROR Z 
PROB.  
|Z|>Z* 
95% 
CONFIDENCE  
INTERVAL 
Insurance cost (premium) -0,546*** 0.031 -17.49 0.000 -0,607 -0.485 
Timber damages coverage 1.337*** 0.102 13.09 0.000 1.137 1.537 
Forest restoration coverage  1.411*** 0.137 10.27 0.000 1.142 1.681 
Forest certification requirement 0.155*** 0.039 4.02 0.000 0.080 0.231 
Log likelihood -3,362.37 
Sample Size 5670 
Note: ***, **, * ==> Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level 
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 the consideration of heterogeneity. This is particularly relevant for the timber damages 
coverage becoming the most preferred attribute among all.  
TABLE 5.6: Random Parameters Logit model. 
  
COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERROR Z 
PROB.  
|Z|>Z* 
95% 
CONFIDENCE 
INTERVAL 
Non random parameters 
Insurance cost -0.619*** 0.022 -27.82 0.000 -0.663 -0.575 
Means for random parameters 
Timber damages covered 1.159*** 0.093 12.43 0.000 0.976 1.342 
Forest restoration cost covered 0.833*** 0.112 7.40 0.000 0.612 1.053 
Forest Certification 0.262*** 0.035 7.55 0.000 0.194 0.330 
Scale parameters for dists. of random parameters 
Timber damages covered 2.471*** 0.115 21.49 0.000 2.246 2.696 
Forest restoration cost covered 3.651*** 0.148 24.75 0.000 3.362 3.940 
Forest Certification 1.172*** 0.056 20.91 0.000 1.062 1.282 
Sample Size 5670 
Log likelihood -2,855.01 
Restricted log likelihood 3,449.60 
Chi squared [3 d.f.] 1,189.19 
McFadden Pseudo R-squared 0.172 
Inf.Cr.AIC 5,724.0 
Bayes IC  5,770.5 
Note: ***, **, * ==> Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level 
The WTP for the various forest insurance attributes is displayed in Table 5.7. Based on these, 
the respondents are willing to pay 3.64 €/ha. for an insurance contract that covers the timber 
damages and the forest restoration cost and forest certification. 
TABLE 5.7: Willingness to pay of RPL model. 
INSURANCE ATTRIBUTES COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERROR Z 
PROB.  
|Z|>Z* 
95% 
CONFIDENCE 
INTERVAL 
Timber damages covered 1.872*** 0.135 13.89 0.000 1.608 2.136 
Forest restoration cost covered 1.345*** 0.154 8.74 0.000 1.043 1.647 
Forest Certification 0.424*** 0.057 7.40 0.000 0.311 0.536 
Insurance premium with all attributes 3.641*** 0.145 25.17 0.000 3.357 3.924 
Note: ***, **, * ==> Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level 
In the case of timber damages and restoration costs, the respondents have a positive WTP for 
both; respectively 1.87 €/Ha. and 1.35 €/Ha. Meanwhile, for the eco-certification, the 
respondents have a WTP of 0.42 €/Ha. for this requirement. This cost also influences forest 
production revenues because timber companies pay more for forest certified timber. 
Therefore, the respondents prefer to pay more for an insurance contract that includes forest 
certification as a requirement. Both insurance coverages have a positive relationship with the 
utility function, as expected.  
The RPL with interactions is developed in order to understand the sources of heterogeneity. 
The interaction between the insurance attributes and the socioeconomic variables is used in 
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 this model. The forest manager is who makes the decision to insure the forestland, this is why 
these socioeconomic variables were chosen; being the age variable of particular relevance, 
affecting experience, and risk attitudes. The landowner, who does not take forest 
management decisions, does not decide if forest insurance could be contracted. The results 
are shown in Table 5.8.  
All variables are significant at the 1% critical level, except for the relationship between being 
a manager and the coverage of timber damages. Thus, the age of the respondent has a 
negative relationship with the two types of insurance coverage and forest certification. If the 
landowner or forest manager is older, the utility of insurance coverage and forest certification 
are also more negative in comparison with the mean utility of each insurance attribute. On the 
other hand, if the landowner is a forest manager, he/she has a negative relationship with the 
restoration cost coverage and forest certification. Therefore, if the respondent is a forest 
manager, then this situation implies a negative preference about contracting forest insurance.  
TABLE 5.8: The RPL model with interactions. 
INSURANCE ATTRIBUTES COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERROR Z 
PROB.  
|Z|>Z* 
95% CONFIDENCE 
INTERVAL 
NON-RANDOM PARAMETERS 
Insurance premium -0.621*** 0.022 -27.70 0.000 -.66508 -0.577 
Timber damages covered*AGE -0.025*** 0.006 -4.19 0.000 -.03707 -0.013 
Forest restoration cost covered*AGE -0.031*** 0.005 -6.19 0.000 -.04110 -0.021 
Forest Certification*AGE -0.007*** 0.002 -3.19 0.001 -.01195 -0.003 
Timber damages covered*FOREST MANAGER 0.291 0.227 1.28 0.200 -.15403 0.735 
Forest restoration cost covered*FOREST MANAGER -0.650*** 0.189 -3.44 0.001 -1.021 -0.279 
Forest Certification*FOREST MANAGER -0.340*** 0.087 -3.92 0.000 -0.509 -0.170 
MEANS FOR RANDOM PARAMETERS 
Timber damages covered 2.202*** 0.404 5.45 0.000 1.410 2.995 
Forest restoration cost covered 2.945*** 0.340 8.66 0.000 2.278 3.611 
Forest certification 0.852*** 0.157 5.42 0.000 0.544 1.161 
SCALE PARAMETERS FOR DISTS. OF RANDOM PARAMETERS 
Timber damages covered 2.505*** 0.117 21.38 0.000 2.275 2.734 
Forest restoration cost covered 3.453*** 0.139 24.86 0.000 3.181 3.725 
Forest certification 1.206*** 0.057 20.99 0.000 1.094 1.319 
Sample Size 5670 
Log-Likelihood -2,847.39 
Restricted log likelihood    -3,405.21 
Chi squared [3 d.f.] 1115.64 
McFadden Pseudo R-squared 0.164 
Inf.Cr.AIC 5720.8 
Bayes IC  5807.1 
Note: ***, **, * ==> Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level 
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 5.5. CONCLUSIONS 
The insurance demand is studied by conducting a survey addressed to landowners and forest 
managers. In this questionnaire, most of respondents decided not to select any forest 
insurance contract, among those offered; showing their preferences for assuming the current 
wildfire risk. Therefore, the data collection shows a high proportion of responses in the status 
quo option. This behaviour could be common on respondents who ignore the forest insurance 
options or who believe that they do not need this policy. In this way, the lack of awareness 
about this insurance could also make the respondents more suspicious. Subsequently, 
insurance companies should advertise the insurance policy to increase its knowledge. If the 
landowners know the forest insurance, then contracting may be increased. 
The insurance demand depends on the coverage of the insurance policy. Nevertheless, 
previous results highlight the importance of the forest insurance with respect to the damage 
coverage. Following the RPL results, the landowner prefers to pay for guaranteeing the 
expected timber profits, than for restoring their forestland. The WTP estimated using the RPL 
is near the average of the forest insurance premium in Spain. However, this average price 
includes the commercial costs and subsidies, but the WTP found for this research does not 
involve such elements. It is pointed that National Forest Insurance Program (Agroseguro) has 
lower insurance coverage and forest management requirement than the proposed in this 
research. The dissertation results show that the WTP for a restoration cost is below the 
Agroseguro average cost. Then, the National Forest Insurance Program should cover higher 
forest damages or reduce its insurance cost, given the landowners demand. 
The timber coverage is very important for the landowners’ finances. If the landowner is 
insured, the forest investment will have lower volatility when a wildfire occurs. This result 
also shows that the landowners’ awareness of timber profits is bigger than the importance of 
restoring the burned land. Accordingly, landowners prefer the actual timber production than 
the expected futures incomes, so they perceive the forest plantation as “savings” to be used in 
the emergency occasions of need. In other words, the landowner will pay more for ensuring 
the present stock than for the guarantee of the next rotation. However, the forest policy 
should encourage both types of coverages. On one hand, the restoration coverage implies the 
production of environmental services, so the social welfare will be guaranteed. On the other 
hand, the timber coverage represents an economic incentive to invest in forest productions. 
Therefore, both public and private interests are considered if the forest policy includes both 
types of insurance coverages. 
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 The RPL results evidence different landowner perceptions about forest insurance attributes. 
The WTP for forest certification is an unexpected result because this requirement is an initial 
cost for the landowner. Nevertheless, this finding could have two interpretations. The first 
one is that the landowners identify this requirement as a lower cost in comparison with the 
“induced” wildfire risk reduction. The second is that the respondents ignore this certification 
and they identify this requirement as included in the insurance price. If this requirement is 
also included in an insurance policy, then the insurance companies could avoid information 
problems using forest certification as a proxy of forest management types. Therefore, the 
landowners will expect that to be insured and certified is cheaper for their forest management 
in opposite to contract these two attributes separately. 
This research also recognizes the need of having knowledge about the socioeconomic 
characteristics of the landowners in order to identify the insurance demand. A RPL model is 
developed to identify the respondent’s aptitudes according to some socioeconomic features. 
In this case, the age and the type of forest management conditions determined the demand of 
forest insurance.  
All previous results are conditioned by the research sample and area of study. The survey was 
conducted in a special area in which the forest production has high economic value and 
landowners have a business oriented management. This area also records lower wildfire risk 
during the last decades in comparison with other Forest Galician Districts. Consequently, 
these issues could explain in a way the lower WTP of landowners. These results could be 
expanded to other Spanish forest areas in where there is a high importance of the forest sector 
and lower wildfire risk is recorded. If the traditional wildfire risk is higher, the insurance 
coverage would be more demanded and its WTP would be also higher.  
Finally, the risk aptitudes of forest managers should be studied in order to improve the 
present findings. This could be done by using utility functions in which the risk perceptions 
could be included. In this way, taking into account the cultural factors such as the educational 
background, family income or the economic use of forest could also be also included in order 
to gain a deeper understanding of the demand for forest insurance. 
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 APPENDIX 5.1: CE CARDS INCLUDED IN THE SURVEY 
CHOICE CARD 1 
 OPTION A OPTION B NEITHER  
A OR B:  
WITHOUT 
 FOREST 
 INSURANCE 
Forest insurance premium 5.04 €/Ha. 3.36 €/Ha. 
Timber coverage 50% 0% 
Restoration coverage 100% 50% 
Mandatory forest certification Yes No 
Mark X in your election:     
CHOICE CARD 2 
 OPTION A OPTION B NEITHER  
A OR B:  
WITHOUT 
 FOREST 
 INSURANCE 
Forest insurance premium 5.04 €/Ha. 3.36 €/Ha. 
Timber coverage 0% 100% 
Restoration coverage 100% 50% 
Mandatory forest certification No Yes 
Mark X in your election:     
CHOICE CARD 3 
 OPTION A OPTION B NEITHER  
A OR B:  
WITHOUT 
 FOREST 
 INSURANCE 
Forest insurance premium 4.20 €/Ha. 5.04 €/Ha. 
Timber coverage 100% 50% 
Restoration coverage 100% 50% 
Mandatory forest certification No Yes 
Mark X in your election:     
CHOICE CARD 4 
 OPTION A OPTION B NEITHER  
A OR B:  
WITHOUT 
 FOREST 
 INSURANCE 
Forest insurance premium 4.20 €/Ha. 5.04 €/Ha. 
Timber coverage 0% 100% 
Restoration coverage 50% 100% 
Mandatory forest certification Yes No 
Mark X in your election:     
CHOICE CARD 5 
 OPTION A OPTION B NEITHER  
A OR B:  
WITHOUT 
 FOREST 
 INSURANCE 
Forest insurance premium 4.20 €/Ha. 5.04 €/Ha. 
Timber coverage 50% 0% 
Restoration coverage 100% 50% 
Mandatory forest certification Yes No 
Mark X in your election:     
CHOICE CARD 6 
 OPTION A OPTION B NEITHER  
A OR B:  
WITHOUT 
Forest insurance premium 3.36 €/Ha. 4.20 €/Ha. 
Timber coverage 0% 100% 
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 Restoration coverage 100% 50%  FOREST 
 INSURANCE Mandatory forest certification Yes No 
Mark X in your election:     
CHOICE CARD 7 
 OPTION A OPTION B NEITHER  
A OR B:  
WITHOUT 
 FOREST 
 INSURANCE 
Forest insurance premium 3.36 €/Ha. 4.20 €/Ha. 
Timber coverage 100% 50% 
Restoration coverage 100% 50% 
Mandatory forest certification Yes No 
Mark X in your election:     
CHOICE CARD 8 
 OPTION A OPTION B NEITHER  
A OR B:  
WITHOUT 
 FOREST 
 INSURANCE 
Forest insurance premium 5.04 €/Ha. 3.36 €/Ha. 
Timber coverage 100% 50% 
Restoration coverage 50% 100% 
Mandatory forest certification Yes No 
Mark X in your election:     
CHOICE CARD 9 
 OPTION A OPTION B NEITHER  
A OR B:  
WITHOUT 
 FOREST 
 INSURANCE 
Forest insurance premium 3.36 €/Ha. 4.20 €/Ha. 
Timber coverage 50% 0% 
Restoration coverage 50% 100% 
Mandatory forest certification No Yes 
Mark X in your election:     
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 APPENDIX 5.2: ORTHOGONAL MATRIX 
ID CARD ATTRIBUTE 1 ATTRIBUTE 2 ATTRIBUTE 3 ATTRIBUTE 4 
1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 2 Level 1 
2 Level 2 Level 2 Level 1 Level 1 
3 Level 3 Level 1 Level 2 Level 1 
4 Level 3 Level 3 Level 1 Level 2 
5 Level 1 Level 1 Level 1 Level 1 
6 Level 1 Level 2 Level 2 Level 2 
7 Level 1 Level 3 Level 1 Level 1 
8 Level 2 Level 1 Level 1 Level 2 
9 Level 3 Level 2 Level 1 Level 1 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
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 6.1. MAIN FINDINGS BY CHAPTER 
The current thesis consists of six chapters that present several conclusions. Chapter II shows 
the main socioeconomic, climatic and environmental factors that influence wildfire risks. 
These factors were identified using econometric models, spatial patterns and temporal trends. 
They are relevant to explain wildfire occurrence in Galicia, and should be taken into account 
by regulators when designing public policy. If socioeconomic factors such as population 
structure, the stage of the rural economy or the type of land cover are included in the public 
policy, then effectiveness of preventing wildfires may increase. Public policy should also 
encourage landowners to plant species that are less vulnerable to fire and to develop 
sustainable rural management. 
In Chapter III, a wildfire insurance model was designed and proposed to safeguard forest 
restoration after wildfires. It includes coverage for timber damages and restoration costs, 
thereby incorporating both financial and environmental factors into the proposed policy. This 
implies greater security for forest investments while guaranteeing the next forest rotation and 
preventing forestland abandonment. This kind of insurance policy is novel in the theory of 
forest valuation and expands the relevant literature. Wildfire risk, insurance premiums and 
corresponding compensations were included in the proposed forest valuation model. This 
chapter mainly concludes that the landowner will obtain a higher NPV when the wildfire risk 
is lower or when the insurance premium is fair in low-risk areas.  
In Chapter IV, the previous insurance models were enhanced by using public policies to 
encourage the production of ecosystem services. The proposed forest valuation involves 
landowner and public interests. To link both interests, mandatory restoration after wildfire 
was included in the insurance policy, making it a mechanism for guaranteeing ecosystem 
services production and preventing forestland abandonment. Wildfire risk affects timber 
production and ecosystem valuation, according to the Faustmann model. However, the 
economic and environmental impact of fire can be reduced if forest insurance is 
implemented. This mechanism impacts both landowners and social interests. Forestlands 
would be better protected and appropriate environmental management could be achieved if 
the proposed insurance was implemented as a form of payment for providing ecosystem 
services. 
In Chapter V, landowner’s demand for insurance was analysed, including interest in 
contracting forest insurance with timber and restoration coverage. The mean WTP for forest 
insurance is 3.64 €/Ha according to RPL results. Landowners have higher WTP for covering 
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 timber damages than restoration costs. Forest certification emerged as an important factor for 
insuring forestland. Landowners were aware of the positive effect of certification as a way of 
reducing wildfire risk and increasing timber prices. Thus, the payment of insurance premium 
can generate better forest management and economic results. This chapter concludes that the 
landowners’ characteristics influences insurance demand: WTP for insurance attributes varies 
according to landowners’ age and performance of management activities. 
 
6.2. DISCUSSION 
Forest management are affected by several factors that threat its production. Wildfires are one 
of the most important risks that influence forest management in Galicia. Hence, 
understanding the factors that explain wildfire occurrence, forest policy could be improved 
and forest production could be protected. Previous literature has established the importance 
of identifying these factors in order to reduce and prevent wildfire occurrence (Butry, 2009, 
Martínez et al., 2009). The current dissertation shows how both spatial patterns and temporal 
trends explain wildfire occurrence. In light of this, Moran’s I and LISA statistics are proposed 
for studying wildfire patterns (Moran, 1948; Anselin, 1995; Ord and Getis, 1995).  
The results shows that both meteorological and socioeconomic factors affect wildfire 
occurrence. Study of these components suggests that precipitation and temperature should be 
considered in predicting wildfire occurrence. Socioeconomic variables such as population 
structure, rural economy, agricultural characteristics and forest distribution are also relevant 
to explain wildfire occurrence. These factors should be considered in order to design better 
forest regulations and the public policies that affect rural areas. Some spatial patterns can be 
also observed by using graphs, statistics and econometric models. Wildfire prevention plans 
should consider these spatial patterns when organizing fire fighters and preventive efforts, in 
order to reduce wildfire suppression time cost and affected areas.  
Landowners may reduce forest investment risk by contracting wildfire insurance. The use of 
this financial asset can change forest valuation (Faustmann, 1849). The contracting of forest 
insurance implies a management cost for landowners: while wildfire risk would be shared 
with the insurance company. Insurance could be also used as a measure for avoiding forest 
abandonment by making restoration costs mandatory in the policy. Wildfire risk should also 
be considered according to real threats. Landowners will not be interested in contracting 
insurance if insurance premiums do not accurately reflect the real wildfire risk. Thus, forest 
valuation will be lower if the premium is calculated using higher wildfire risk in comparison 
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 with real wildfire exposure. If premiums are standard, the forest valuation will be worse in 
lower risk areas. 
Ecosystem services production could also be included in forest valuation (Hartman, 1976; 
Samuelson, 1976). Society is interested in conserving this production because it increases 
well-being. Therefore, public policy could be designed to preserve ecosystem services 
production after wildfires. However, since landowners’ take forest management decisions, 
the private forest rotation could be different than that based on public interests. In this setting, 
an incentive that addresses both sets of interests and increases both NPV’s should be 
designed. Thus, forest insurance could be subsidized to link the landowner with the 
ecosystem services. The insurance premium would be partially paid by society according to 
the degree of ecosystem services production. Thus, forest insurance could be used as a partial 
payment for ecosystem services. The proposed insurance policy covers both timber damage 
and restoration costs.  
Demand for forest insurance is studied in the fifth chapter of this dissertation. The proposed 
insurance policy attributes includes timber damages, restoration costs and forest certification 
requirement. The Random Parameters Logit is used to calculate the mean WTP for the 
proposed insurance policy. Landowners express a WTP for both insurance coverage and 
forest certification requirements. The landowner may expect an increment of timber prices if 
forest production is certified, show that the certification requirement has a positive average 
utility. Demand for forest insurance depends on the landowner’s characteristics; particularly 
age or profile. This suggests that insurance companies may consider landowner’s 
characteristics in order to increase forest insurance policy demand. 
 
6.3. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
The second chapter demonstrates that social and natural factors influence Galician wildfire 
patterns. Therefore, public policies should be designed in order to avoid wildfires for either 
both normal and extreme years with high affected area. Different econometric models can be 
used to research wildfire occurrence. Here, OLS regression, NBMR and RE were used to 
identify the main factors that explain wildfire occurrence. The results concluded that the 
wildfire risk could be reduced by good public policies. These results may help to develop an 
effective public policy against wildfires.  
The third and fourth chapters present some conclusions about the effects of forest insurance 
on landowner management, along with the policy implications of such insurance. Scientific 
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 research is not extensive in this area and the current thesis expands the relevant literature. The 
proposed insurance model could include different types of insurance coverage, such as timber 
stock and ecosystem services production. Optimal forest rotation would depend on forest 
valuation that incorporates private and public goods, services and costs. If public and private 
interests are not connected, optimal forest rotations will differ. Management activities do not 
currently involve both agents and all forest decisions correspond exclusively to the 
landowner’s interests in private forestlands. However, public policy could develop incentives 
to better align both sets of interests: forest insurance could be used as a singular or 
complementary payment for ecosystem services. The landowner could receive a portion of 
insurance premium by year based on the production of ecosystem services. If this insurance 
includes coverage for timber damage and restoration costs, public and private interests would 
be accounted for: timber production is one of the most important factors in landowner 
decision-making, while restoration coverage guarantees ecosystem production and prevents 
forestland abandonment. Landowners would thereby reduce investment volatility as a 
function of ecosystem services production and would be motivated to produce these societal 
services. Besides, the society would be willing to pay for this insurance premium because it 
guarantees ecosystem services production. In summary, the reduction of forest investment 
volatility and the guarantee of ecosystem services production constitute the main benefits of 
applying the insurance premium as a payment for ecosystem services. 
The fifth chapter concludes that the demand for forest insurance is fairly low in Galicia. This 
situation could change if insurance providers designed a policy based on landowner 
characteristics. The landowner should be able to contract different insurance attributes 
according to his/her personal preferences. Other requirements could be taken into account in 
order to calculate the premium by considering the real risk. The forest insurer could design 
attractive policies for the best forest managers by using these requirements. A management 
qualification would evaluate the manager’s interest in his/her own forest resources. The forest 
certification requirement could be included to accurately measure risk. The insurance 
provider should also include coverage for timber damage in the policy design. Currently, only 
restoration costs are considered in public forest insurance subsidy, but landowners were 
positive about increasing insurance coverage. To increase the demand for forest insurance, 
the contracts should offer timber coverage and the policy should also be adapted to 
socioeconomic characteristics. 
Finally, the limited scope of relevant scientific literature regards that forest insurance must be 
highlighted. This underscores the need to study the implications of insurance in forest 
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 management. Previous literature has not addressed the demand for insurance as a mechanism 
to improve the forest management. The current dissertation expands the research on wildfire 
risk by contributing to literature in forest insurance. 
 
6.4. FUTURE RESEARCH NEEDS 
Each chapter of the current thesis could be extended. In the second chapter, econometric 
models could be expanded by using more disaggregated data (perish level). Geographical 
information systems might also be used to obtain new variables from socioeconomic or 
environmental maps. Other infrastructures, such as roads or railways could also be used to 
achieve this goal. The econometric models and statistics developed in this chapter could be as 
well implemented in other geographical regions.  
The third and fourth chapters could be extended by using actuarial methods to analyse the 
economic results of forest insurance. The influence of premium cost and wildfire risk in 
forest management should be taken into account. The insurance could be analysed by using 
utility theory in order to understand landowner’s behaviour. Additionally, the proposed 
insurance as a payment for ecosystem services could be studied as public policy for 
protecting income stability in areas of high hazard rates. This model could be studied as a 
pro-poor measure that provides poor landowners the opportunity of insuring their forestlands. 
The fifth chapter could be improved by expanding the sample to include other Galician 
forestry districts that record different kinds of wildfire risk. Districts with lower, medium and 
higher wildfire risk should be also considered. Forest insurance demand could thus be 
analysed in different contexts of wildfire risk. The relationship of the different kinds of 
wildfire risk with the preferences for insurance attributes could also be studied. Likewise, this 
chapter could be expanded by analysing insurance offer and identifying the factors that 
explain the non-offer of the type of forest insurance proposed in this thesis. With this, it 
might be possible to identify and refine the insurance policy that providers would be 
interested to offer. The findings of the current dissertation may contribute in this direction.  
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 APPENDIX 1: RESUMEN EN CASTELLANO 
1. INTRODUCCIÓN 
La producción forestal se enfrenta a numerosos riesgos que pueden dañar la riqueza forestal. 
En Galicia los incendios son el principal factor de riesgo al que se enfrenta la producción 
forestal (Barrio et al., 2007; González-Gómez et al., 2013). Por ello esta tesis estudia el 
riesgo de los incendios y cómo actuar sobre sus factores a través de las políticas públicas. 
Seguidamente se estudia la implicación del seguro forestal en las decisiones productivas. En 
este apartado se propone un seguro con diversas coberturas en los que se intenta englobar 
tanto los intereses privados como los públicos. En este sentido los intereses privados abarcan 
todos los intereses del productor forestal. Mientras que los intereses públicos están 
relacionados con el bienestar que a la sociedad produce determinados servicios ambientales. 
En este sentido la tesis propone un seguro forestal como pago por la prestación de servicios 
medioambientales. Con esta propuesta se estudia que implicación tiene en ambas riquezas 
forestales la existencia de este tipo de incentivo. Finalmente, la tesis concluye con un estudio 
de la demanda de seguro forestal centrado en la propuesta formulada en los capítulos 
anteriores.  
Los incendios forestales en Galicia dependen de factores climáticos o medioambientales, sin 
embargo también se ven altamente condicionado por el comportamiento humano. Esta 
situación se puede controlar a través de las políticas públicas. Al conocer la relación entre las 
variables socioeconómicas o ambientales con la ocurrencia de incendios, se pueden diseñar 
políticas enfocadas a prevenirlos y mitigar sus daños. 
Para conocer cómo influyen los factores socioeconómicos, ambientales o climáticos en el 
riesgo de incendio se emplean modelos estadísticos y econométricos (Aguado et al., 2007; 
Chuvieco et al., 2010; Martínez et al., 2009; Romero-Calcerrada et al., 2010).Los incendios 
se pueden medir por número y por superficie afectada, por ello en esta tesis se estudia el 
número de incendios y el ratio anual de superficie forestal quemada en Galicia. Los dos 
anteriores factores serán considerados como variables dependientes y se analizará a través de 
diversos modelos econométricos su relación con las variables socioeconómicas, ambientales 
o climáticas. Por otra parte, los incendios no afectan homogéneamente a los montes gallegos. 
Esto es, la ocurrencia de los incendios en Galicia tiene un alto componente espacial al 
presentar un mayor o menor número de incendios dependiendo del municipio, parroquia o 
área de referencia. Teniendo en cuenta dicha dependencia espacial, esta tesis también emplea 
estadísticos para analizar y corroborar esta situación en Galicia (Balsa-Barreiro and 
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 Hermosilla, 2013; Fuentes-Santos et al., 2013). Para el desarrollo de los modelos estadísticos 
se tiene en cuenta que los servicios de prevención y extinción en Galicia se ordenan en 
función de los Distritos Forestales. Por tanto, dicha ordenación territorial es la empleada para 
analizar el comportamiento de los incendios en Galicia. Asimismo, también se tiene 
considera en los modelos econométricos empleados el componente temporal que presentan 
los incendios en Galicia, 
El riesgo de incendio es un factor que añade incertidumbre a la inversión forestal. Por lo que 
conocer los factores que lo explican ayuda a predecirlo mejor. Sin embargo, el propietario 
puede realizar esfuerzos en la gestión forestal con el fin de reducir su exposición al riesgo de 
incendio. Así, el propietario o gestor forestal también puede contratar activos financieros que 
cubran las posibles pérdidas. Uno de esos mecanismos es el seguro forestal. 
El seguro supone un mecanismo que reduce el riesgo en la inversión, pues minimiza el 
impacto económico de la pérdida en caso de incendio forestal. Cabe mencionar que tanto el 
esfuerzo en gestión forestal como el empleo de activos financieros suponen medidas 
complementarias no excluyentes para la buena administración de los recursos forestales. De 
tal manera que el propietario o gestor forestal puede emplear ambos mecanismos para reducir 
el riesgo de pérdida en su producción. 
La valoración forestal y la rotación óptima del cultivo se verán condicionada por la presencia 
de un seguro forestal. Así, a partir de fórmula de Faustmann y considerando sus posteriores 
desarrollos (Faustmann, 1849; Hartman, 1976; Samuelson, 1976; Reed, 1984), se incluye el 
riesgo de incendio y el seguro para calcular la valoración forestal. De tal manera que la 
rotación forestal dependerá de ambos factores. Las coberturas son muy importantes cuándo se 
diseña un seguro forestal. En este sentido la cobertura en reforestación ayuda a recuperar la 
producción de una manera más rápida y controlada. Sin embargo, la cobertura por daños en la 
madera, supone para el asegurado recuperar parte de la inversión esperada y tener cierta 
liquidez a pesar de los daños ocasionados. De estas dos coberturas, la primera tiene un interés 
más alto desde el punto de vista social mientras que la segunda desde un punto de vista 
financiero. Así, después del incendio se garantiza la producción de servicios 
medioambientales, mientras que la cobertura en daños reduce las pérdidas en la inversión. 
La valoración forestal anterior solo se ve condicionada por los intereses privados del 
propietario. Entonces, las decisiones productivas recaen en el propietario particular sin tener 
en cuenta el bienestar social. Por tanto, la valoración forestal se amplía con el fin de incluir la 
producción de servicios ambientales que beneficien a la sociedad. De esta manera se obtiene 
la rotación óptima para el propietario y la sociedad. Ambas no tienen por qué coincidir, pues 
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 una no está influyendo sobre la otra. Por lo tanto es necesario desarrollar mecanismos que 
influyan en el propietario para que éste considere las necesidades sociales en sus decisiones. 
Uno de esos mecanismos es el pago por la producción de servicios ambientales. Esto genera 
un ingreso para el propietario y un gasto para la sociedad, lo que supone que ambos agentes 
sean partícipes de la rotación forestal y que las posibles diferencias entre la rotación forestal 
de ambos intereses se pueda ver reducida. Uno de los incentivos puede ser el pago total o 
parcial de la prima del seguro anteriormente planteada. Con este pago se involucran las dos 
partes, es decir la sociedad y el propietario, en la producción de servicios medioambientales. 
Esto implica que si el propietario quiere recibir el incentivo, entonces debe de cumplir una 
serie de condiciones forestales para favorecer la generación de servicios medioambientales.  
Por otro lado, la demanda del actual seguro forestal es muy reducida a pesar de que existen 
ayudas estatales para fomentar su contratación (Agroseguro, 2011). Sin embargo, este apoyo 
ayudas no contempla la cobertura del seguro por daños en la madera, solo incluye los costes 
de reforestación tras el incendio. Por ello, el propietario tiene garantizada la siguiente 
rotación pero la inversión forestal afectada por el incendio no le genera ningún retorno. 
Asimismo, la garantía de reforestación supone que la sociedad asegure beneficiarse de 
servicios ambientales. No obstante, el propietario no tiene garantizadas las posibles pérdidas 
en su producción actual, solo tiene la expectativa de alcanzar una futura rotación forestal. Por 
lo tanto un seguro que englobe ambas opciones es un mecanismo de gestión forestal 
interesante para el propietario y la sociedad.  
Dada la poca demanda de seguro forestal en España y en Galicia, esta tesis realiza un 
experimento de elección para analizar la disposición a pagar por parte del propietario por un 
seguro con las coberturas anteriormente planteadas. A este modelo asegurador también se 
incluye la opción de que el seguro obligue al propietario a estar certificado como medida de 
control de su gestión forestal. En ningún estudio previo se empleó este modelo con la 
finalidad de conocer las utilidades que le reportan al gestor o propietario forestal la 
contratación de un seguro contra pérdidas causadas por incendio. De esta manera también se 
estudia la utilidad que las diversas clausulas crediticias le generan al propietario. Por último, 
también se puede analizar cómo influyen las características socioeconómicas de estos 
gestores o propietarios con respecto a la opción de contratar un seguro forestal. 
Con esto se diseña una encuesta para que los propietarios o gestores forestales seleccionaran 
las opciones del experimento de elección de acuerdo con sus preferencias. En el cuestionario 
se incluyen preguntas relativas a la gestión forestal y también a las características 
socioeconómicas del encuestado. Con esta finalidad, se realizó una encuesta en el Distrito 
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 Forestal VI de Galicia ubicado en “A Mariña Lucense”. La encuesta contiene nueve tarjetas 
con tres posibles alternativas, las dos primeras recogen un modelo de seguro conforme a los 
parámetros establecidos en el estudio, mientras que la última hace referencia al status quo. 
Las opciones del seguro son el coste, la cobertura en daños de la madera, cobertura en 
restauración y la posible obligación de poseer la certificación forestal para poder contratar el 
seguro. 
Con esto, la tesis se estructura en seis capítulos. En el primer capítulo introduce los temas que 
se tratarán en la tesis. En el segundo se estudia la causalidad de los incendios en Galicia con 
el fin de analizar la influencia humana en la ocurrencia de incendios. En los dos siguientes 
capítulos se elabora y analiza un modelo de seguro forestal para ver su incidencia en la 
rotación y en la inversión forestal. El quinto capítulo realiza un análisis de la demanda del 
seguro forestal en el VI Distrito Forestal de Galicia. Para finalizar se ofrece una sección con 
las principales conclusiones obtenidas en la tesis. 
2. PRINCIPALES RESULTADOS OBTENIDOS 
Los resultados y conclusiones particulares de esta tesis se encuentran al final de los cuatro 
principales capítulos que vertebran esta tesis. Además, en esta tesis se incluye un capítulo 
final que enumera las conclusiones generales. En el segundo capítulo se señala que las 
variables socioeconómicas, ambientales y climáticas inciden en el riesgo de incendio forestal, 
tanto en número como en superficie. En este sentido, a través de estadísticos espaciales se 
logra detectar que el comportamiento de los incendios no es homogéneo entre los distritos 
gallegos. Empleando modelos econométricos se observa que los incendios pueden explicarse 
por una serie de variables socioeconómicas, climáticas o forestales. Así, factores como la 
ordenación forestal, la estructura agro-ganadera, la densidad poblacional o la climatología 
inciden en la ocurrencia de incendios. De tal manera que las políticas públicas deberían 
incidir en estos apartados para poder reducir los incendios. Se observa que también existe un 
factor temporal en la evolución de los incendios en Galicia.  
El tercer capítulo muestra que el riesgo de incendio y el seguro forestal pueden implicar 
cambios en la rotación óptima de los cultivos forestales. Con esto se observa que las 
producciones forestales en localizaciones de menor riesgo tienen un mayor atractivo para el 
inversor. Sin embargo, aquellas áreas con mayor riesgo de incendio son atractivas 
financieramente al reducir la volatilidad de la inversión. En este capítulo también se observa 
que el ajuste de la prima al riesgo real de incendio supone un factor clave en la valoración 
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 forestal. En este sentido, si la prima es inferior al riesgo real, entonces la valoración forestal 
aumenta. 
En el cuarto capítulo se observa que se puede implantar el seguro forestal como un incentivo 
a la producción de servicios ambientales. Esto implicaría una transmisión de valor entre la 
sociedad y el propietario, provocando que cambie la independencia del propietario al tomar 
decisiones productivas. Al igual que en el capítulo anterior, este apartado observa que la 
riqueza del propietario se ve condicionada por el riesgo de incendio y que existe una 
reducción en la volatilidad de su inversión. Este hecho también se traslada a la producción de 
servicios ambientales. Sin embargo, la presencia del seguro como un incentivo reduce los 
resultados económicos sociales al producirse un traspaso de éstos recursos hacia el productor. 
Tal pérdida económica por parte de la sociedad supone una garantía de que la producción de 
servicios ambientales continuará en el futuro. 
Por último, los resultados del quinto capítulo señalan que el seguro forestal reporta al 
propietario una utilidad en función de las coberturas e incluso de la obligación de estar 
certificado. Asimismo, se obtiene la disposición al pago para el seguro forestal, alcanzando 
un valor de 3.64 €/Ha. También se observa que factores como la edad o ser quien efectúa la 
actividad forestal son elementos condicionantes en la contratación del seguro forestal.  
3. DISCUSIÓN 
Esta tesis logra identificar una serie de factores que afectan a la gestión forestal. Entre éstos 
destaca la implicación del riesgo de incendio, el seguro forestal y los incentivos en la gestión 
forestal. Esto contribuye a identificar empíricamente una serie de variables socioeconómicas 
que inciden en el riesgo de incendio, por lo que éste se puede controlar y reducir mediante la 
formulación de políticas públicas. De la misma manera, se identificó una serie de variables 
climáticas, espaciales y ambientales que influyen conjuntamente en la ocurrencia y afección 
de incendios. De ello se deduce que la capacidad predictiva de los factores climatológicos 
tiene un factor importante. Igualmente, se observa que la ordenación agro-ganadera y forestal 
incide significativamente en la ocurrencia de incendios. Asimismo, se puede observar que 
existe un comportamiento espacial y estacional dependiendo del año. Por ello las 
administraciones públicas deberían desarrollar modelos predictivos más fiables para reducir 
el riesgo de incendio. Esto favorecería la creación de más fiables políticas preventivas contra 
incendios. 
La existencia de incendio forestal provoca que el propietario pueda asegurarse contra este 
riesgo. Así, la gestión forestal está condicionada por la existencia de un seguro que contemple 
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 esta amenaza. Empleando la fórmula de Faustmann, se ha logrado observar la incidencia que 
tiene el seguro en la inversión forestal, así como el efecto que tiene el riesgo de incendio en la 
rotación forestal. Aunque este seguro se ha formulado con múltiples coberturas, está 
encaminado a paliar los efectos económicos y medioambientales de los incendios. El seguro 
propuesto reduce la volatilidad en la inversión del propietario, y garantiza que la producción 
forestal no será abandonada, pues la póliza de seguro garantiza la recuperación forestal tras 
un incendio. 
Al emplear el modelo de Faustmann, se incluye de la producción maderera y la generación de 
servicios ambientales de manera independiente. La primera supone un interés económico para 
el productor, mientras que la segunda supone un bienestar para la sociedad. En ambos casos 
se observa que el riesgo de incendio afecta a su Valor Actual Neto (VAN). Sin embargo, se 
observan diferencias de valoración y de rotación forestal entre ambas perspectivas, públicas y 
privadas. Dado que la decisión de rotación recae sobre el productor forestal, se plantea la 
inclusión de un incentivo para relacionar ambos intereses. La transferencia de riqueza supone 
que ambos intereses se relacionen y equilibren, provocando que la diferencia de períodos 
óptimos de rotación se acorte.  
Por último, la demanda del seguro forestal está condicionada por diversos factores, como 
pueden ser las coberturas o las condiciones para suscribir un seguro forestal. En este sentido, 
la cobertura por daños en la madera y para restauración de la propiedad tras incendio, supone 
características demandadas por los encuestados; ellos desean asegurar lo producido, al mismo 
tiempo que asegurar la siguiente rotación. Por otro lado, una cláusula que establezca que la 
producción forestal asegurada debe estar certificada se puede incluir en la póliza del seguro. 
Esta característica del estudio destaca el interés del propietario por la inclusión de dicha 
cláusula en la póliza. Esta situación implica que el propietario y la sociedad garantizan un 
mayor ingreso por su respectiva producción, mientras que para la aseguradora supone un 
mecanismo de control del riesgo. Por otro lado, para el estudio de la demanda del seguro 
forestal se tiene en cuenta las características socioeconómicas del mercado objetivo, pues se 
observa que la demanda se clasifica según la edad y las características personales. Por ello, se 
deben establecer parámetros con los que la aseguradora llegue al público interesado en 
contratar el seguro forestal. Del mismo modo que la aseguradora podría adaptar el seguro a 
las necesidades de cada grupo de clasificación. 
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 4. CONCLUSIONES GENERALES 
La gestión forestal se ve condicionada por el riesgo de incendio, por la política forestal y por 
la posibilidad de contratar un seguro. En el riesgo de incendio influyen una serie de variables 
ambientales, climáticas y socioeconómicas. Estos factores pueden ser utilizados en las 
políticas públicas para prevenir y mitigar la ocurrencia de incendios. De esta manera, la 
gestión forestal se enfrentaría a un menor riesgo de incendio, lo que provocaría que la 
inversión forestal tuviera una menor incertidumbre. 
El seguro forestal es otro mecanismo que ayuda a reducir el riesgo en la inversión forestal. 
Sin embargo, esto condiciona la gestión forestal al realizar el esfuerzo que determine la 
póliza aseguradora. Este seguro confiere al gestor forestal el derecho a recibir una 
compensación en caso de incendio a cambio de realizar la gestión forestal suscrita en el 
contrato. Las compensaciones pueden ir orientadas a sufragar las pérdidas ocasionadas en la 
producción maderera y en la recuperación de la generación de servicios ambientales. De esta, 
manera los intereses privados y públicos están incluidos en la póliza de seguro. Para 
relacionar estos intereses, la administración podría decidir realizar un pago al propietario por 
la generación de servicios ambientales. La proposición de esta tesis es que sea la parte 
proporcional de la prima de seguro en función de la producción de servicios 
medioambientales. De esta manera el productor vería garantizado su interés económico y la 
sociedad tendría seguridad en la continuación de los servicios ambientales tras un incendio. 
La rotación forestal estará vinculada tanto a los intereses del productor como de la sociedad 
mediante la transferencia de riqueza de la sociedad al propietario. Esto equilibra los intereses 
en la rotación forestal de ambos agentes. Esto sucedería siempre y cuando se produzca una 
transferencia de acuerdo con la producción de servicios medioambientales.  
Por último, la utilidad que reporta a los propietarios y gestores forestales la contratación del 
seguro contra incendio dependerá de las cláusulas que se presenten en la póliza. En este 
sentido, las coberturas son uno de los principales factores que afectan la utilidad que reporta 
el seguro al propietario forestal, aunque dicha utilidad depende de las características del 
propietario o gestor forestal. También se destaca que el propietario o gestor tenga una utilidad 
positiva ante el requerimiento obligatorio de estar certificado para asegurar la producción 
forestal. Esto muestra que el propietario reconoce que esta condición supone una declaración 
del riesgo de incendio y un beneficio para su explotación forestal. Así, la compañía 
aseguradora conoce el riesgo al que se enfrenta el asegurado y podrá discriminar precios de 
acuerdo con dicho riesgo. Por otra parte, el requerimiento de este sello de calidad productiva 
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 repercute económicamente en el propietario al incrementar el precio de su producción 
forestal. Con todo esto, la compañía aseguradora debería diseñar un seguro forestal centrado 
en las coberturas que ofrece, en las obligaciones contractuales que establece y en las 
características socioeconómicas de la zona. 
5. FUTURAS INVESTIGACIONES 
La temática de este trabajo de investigación podría ampliarse con nuevos datos y 
herramientas teóricas. Por ello, las futuras investigaciones se centrarán en aplicar nuevos 
modelos econométricos en los que se logre una mayor comprensión de los factores que 
afectan al riesgo de incendio. Del mismo modo, se profundizará en los mecanismos de 
valoración forestal y en la utilidad del seguro forestal de acuerdo con las percepciones de 
riesgo del propietario. La demanda del seguro será influenciada por este condicionante 
socioeconómico; por ello, nuevas variables deberán incluirse en los modelos empleados por 
este estudio. 
El segundo capítulo podría ampliarse con más detalle, usando la metodología propuesta por 
los modelos de econometría espacial para muestras temporales. Con esto se lograría 
identificar y estimar las relaciones espaciales entre entidades que determinan la ocurrencia de 
incendios. Esto debe hacerse sin olvidar la inclusión de variables socioeconómicas en el 
modelo, así como aquellas de carácter ambiental o climático. En el tercer y cuarto capítulo se 
podría emplear métodos actuariales para valorar el riesgo de la aseguradora. Con apoyo en 
estos capítulos, también se podría estudiar la influencia de incentivos públicos en la gestión 
forestal para observar su mutua influencia. 
Por último, el quinto capítulo podría incluir un estudio sobre la percepción de riesgo del 
propietario/gestor forestal. Para ello se podría estudiar la utilidad del seguro forestal en 
función de aptitudes del entrevistado al riesgo de incendio. Además, se podrían emplear 
modelos más sofisticados para identificar las distintas clases de demandantes. De esta manera 
se podría refinar el estudio sobre la demanda del seguro forestal planteado. 
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 APPENDIX 2: LANDOWNER QUESTIONNAIRE 
This survey is addressed to forest owner as well as to forest managers. This people are in 
charge of activities such as: maintenance, reforestation or cleanings in other forest owners its 
lands. An individual questionnaire was applied to this focus group and is the source of our 
confidential and anonymous data. Your implication and time responding this questionnaire is 
appreciated as well as your sincere and honest responses. There are not correct or incorrect 
responses, all are valid. The obtained data will be used to a PhD Thesis development and 
under any circumstances this data will be released to thirds. Cross X to answer the current 
questionnaire. Thanks for your attention; we hope that you will be pleased by this 
questionnaire. 
1. Approximately, how many hectares and/or plots of rustic and/or forest ownership are 
you owner and/or manager? 
 Mark X Type of land Number of plots 
Number of  
hectares 
Landowner  Agricultural land (pastures, farms, ...)   Forestry areas    
Manager  Agricultural land (pastures, farms, ...)   Forestry areas    
1.1. At lands that you are not the owner but you do manage, who is the owner of this 
lands? 
 
1.2. If you are the forestlands owner and you have a manager in charge of 
maintenance or reforestation, among other activities, who is the manager?  
□ It is not performed 
by anyone. 
□ The management 
is ceded to ________ 
□ Others: ________ 
 
2. Which activities do you develop in your rural lands and how much area involves each 
activity? 
Mark X Market Mark X Type Area (Hectares) 
 
Livestock 
 Bovine  
 Caprine  
 Ovine  
 Equine  
 Porcine  
 Others:____________  
 
Woodstock 
 Pine  
 Eucalyptus  
 Oak  
 Chestnuts  
 Others:____________  
 Agriculture  
 Harvest (mushrooms, truffle, etc.)  
 Fruit production  
 Hunting  
 Energy production (solar, wind, etc.)  
 Apiculture (bees breeds and honey production)  
 Other (specify): _________________________  
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 2.1. Have you sold wood stock during the last ten years at lands that you own or manage? 
□ Yes □ Non □ Dk/Da 
 
2.1.1. If previous response is affirmative, when have you did the last cutting and 
aproximately how much profit do you record? 
The last cutting was made at ___________ and the profit was 
aproximately: 
□ Lower than 3.000€ 
□ From 3.000€ to 6.000€ 
□ From 6.001€ to 12.000€ 
□ More than 12.000€
2.2. Are the forest land activities or management your main source of income? 
□ Yes, forest land activities support my family and I. 
□ No, the forest only gives me an extra-income during the year, but it is not my 
main income. 
□ No, I only obtain occasional income depending on the year. 
□ No, nowadays, I have no income from forest land activities. 
 
3. If you are forest owner:  
3.1. Do you live at the same municipality of your main forest land area? 
□ Yes □ No □ Dk/Da 
 
⁫ If previous response is negative, what is the main council of your forest 
land?  
 
 
3.2. How do you get the forest land? 
□ Familiar heritage 
□ Land purchase 
□ Donation 
□ Other: ___________ 
 
4. Do you know about the Forest Certification? 
□ Yes □ No □ Dk/Da 
 
4.1. If you do not know about Forest Certification: 
Forest certification is obtained from an independent agency; it certifies that forest production 
is managed according to a set of standards and criterions. The type and requirements of each 
certification depends on their supervisory agency. These requirements define a suitable forest 
management according to actual regulations. Forest certification implies a timber price 
increment; however, the landowner should pay for red tape and administrative costs for 
certifying the forest production. A forest management plan of cleanings, forest structure, 
fertilizing, etcetera, should be also applied in order to fulfil the certification requirements. 
 
4.2. If question 4 is affirmatively answered: 
4.2.1. What forest certification do you know? (Choose as many options as you need) 
□ PEFC 
 
□ FSC 
 
□ Other:______
 
4.2.2. Have you certified any of your forest lands? 
□ Yes 
 
□ No 
 
□ Dk/Da 
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 Why do you decide whether to certified or not your forest lands? 
 
 
 If you have not certified your forest lands, would you be able to certified 
you lands in case of (choose one option only): 
□ Simplify the red tape. 
□ Subsidy (almost in part) the cost of being certified. 
□ If the timber price will be increased over its habitual cost because of 
being certified. 
□ If in case of being certified, the timber price could increase over the 
cost of achieve the certification. 
□ Is not interested by any circumstance. 
□ Dk/Da 
 
5. What familiarity rate do you have about forest insurance? If 1 represents that you have 
not any knowledge and 5 represents that you know very well this insurance. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
5.1. If the familiarity rate is lower or equal to 3:  
The forest insurance involves the coverage of wildfire, flood or storm damages caused in the 
forest plantation. An insurance premium should be paid in order to be covered by previous 
damage risks. If forest insurance is contracted, the compensation could be received by 
insured when the coverage damages occurs. In Spain, forest insurance premium is subsidized 
from 14% to 44% of its cost. This percentage depends on the kind of landowner and the 
insured antiquity. 
 
1.1. If the familiarity rate is lower or equal to 3:  
1.1.1. How did you know it? 
 
 
 
 
1.1.2. Have you contracted a forest insurance policy?
□ Yes 
 
□ No 
 
□ Dk/Da 
 
 If question 5.5.2. is negatively answered, why have you not contrated any 
forest insurance? 
□ I do not know it. 
□ I do not need it. 
□ Forest insurance is expensive than its cover offered. 
□ Other:_________________ 
 
 If question 5.5.2. is affirmatively answered, 
• How do you describe the forest insurance experience? 
□ Positive 
 
□ Neutral 
 
□ Negative 
 
165 
 
 • Do you receive a forest insurance subsidy? 
□ Yes, with a ____ percentage. 
□ No 
□ Dk/Da 
 
2. The next question shows some possible insurance policy. Different costs, coverage and 
requirements are included in this policy. Three bids are proposed to cover the possible 
wildfire damages. You must choose one of the proposed options in each choice card. 
You should consider that either the unmentioned features or the external risk effect not 
vary between policies. 
 
FOREST INSURANCE PREMIUM represents the expense of being insured against the 
possible forest damages. This payment should be made in Euros per insured hectare. The 
TIMBER COVERAGE and RESTORATION COSTS COVERAGE are defined as the 
damage percentage that insurance company covers. The FOREST CERTIFICATION 
REQUIREMENT is a mandatory condition to get the insurance; without this certification 
any property could be insured.  
 
2.1. From previous insurance attributes, which are the most important? Choose the 
feature according its increase importance. Select 1 to the most important, 2 to the 
second, 3 to the third… 
 
Forest insurance premium  
Timber coverage  
Restoration cost coverage  
Mandatory Forest Certification  
 
2.2. Choose an insurance policy from each choice card. You could decide not to choose 
any insurance policy when both policy options are not of your interest.  
CHOICE CARD 1 
 OPTION A OPTION B NEITHER  
A OR B:  
WITHOUT 
 FOREST 
 INSURANCE 
Forest insurance premium 5.04 €/Ha. 3.36 €/Ha. 
Timber coverage 50% 0% 
Restoration coverage 100% 50% 
Mandatory forest certification Yes No 
Mark X in your election:     
CHOICE CARD 2 
 OPTION A OPTION B NEITHER  
A OR B:  
WITHOUT 
 FOREST 
 INSURANCE 
Forest insurance premium 5.04 €/Ha. 3.36 €/Ha. 
Timber coverage 0% 100% 
Restoration coverage 100% 50% 
Mandatory forest certification No Yes 
Mark X in your election:     
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CHOICE CARD 3 
 OPTION A OPTION B NEITHER  
A OR B:  
WITHOUT 
 FOREST 
 INSURANCE 
Forest insurance premium 4.20 €/Ha. 5.04 €/Ha. 
Timber coverage 100% 50% 
Restoration coverage 100% 50% 
Mandatory forest certification No Yes 
Mark X in your election:     
CHOICE CARD 4 
 OPTION A OPTION B NEITHER  
A OR B:  
WITHOUT 
 FOREST 
 INSURANCE 
Forest insurance premium 4.20 €/Ha. 5.04 €/Ha. 
Timber coverage 0% 100% 
Restoration coverage 50% 100% 
Mandatory forest certification Yes No 
Mark X in your election:     
CHOICE CARD 5 
 OPTION A OPTION B NEITHER  
A OR B:  
WITHOUT 
 FOREST 
 INSURANCE 
Forest insurance premium 4.20 €/Ha. 5.04 €/Ha. 
Timber coverage 50% 0% 
Restoration coverage 100% 50% 
Mandatory forest certification Yes No 
Mark X in your election:     
CHOICE CARD 6 
 OPTION A OPTION B NEITHER  
A OR B:  
WITHOUT 
 FOREST 
 INSURANCE 
Forest insurance premium 3.36 €/Ha. 4.20 €/Ha. 
Timber coverage 0% 100% 
Restoration coverage 100% 50% 
Mandatory forest certification Yes No 
Mark X in your election:     
CHOICE CARD 7 
 OPTION A OPTION B NEITHER  
A OR B:  
WITHOUT 
 FOREST 
 INSURANCE 
Forest insurance premium 3.36 €/Ha. 4.20 €/Ha. 
Timber coverage 100% 50% 
Restoration coverage 100% 50% 
Mandatory forest certification Yes No 
Mark X in your election:     
CHOICE CARD 8 
 OPTION A OPTION B NEITHER  
A OR B:  
WITHOUT 
 FOREST 
 INSURANCE 
Forest insurance premium 5.04 €/Ha. 3.36 €/Ha. 
Timber coverage 100% 50% 
Restoration coverage 50% 100% 
Mandatory forest certification Yes No 
Mark X in your election:     
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 CHOICE CARD 9 
 OPTION A OPTION B NEITHER  
A OR B:  
WITHOUT 
 FOREST 
 INSURANCE 
Forest insurance premium 3.36 €/Ha. 4.20 €/Ha. 
Timber coverage 50% 0% 
Restoration coverage 50% 100% 
Mandatory forest certification No Yes 
Mark X in your election:     
 
 
2.2.1. If you mainly mark the option “Not to choose forest insurance” (then you have 
chosen, at least, a half choice cards), how do you explain this main decision? 
 
 
 
 
 
3. If you manage the maintaining, reforestation or cleaning, among other activities in 
forestlands: 
 
3.1. Mark the activities that you develop: 
 
Activity My family or me  Contracting services 
Is not 
performed ⁫Dk/Da 
Plantation     
Cleanings     
Pruning     
Cutting     
 
3.2. Do you consider that the adjacent forestlands to yours are property cleaning?  
□ Yes □ No □ ⁫Dk/Da
 
3.3. Do you consider the adjacent forestlands of influence to your own forestlands 
cleaning decisions? 
□ Yes, my forestland is cleaner when the adjacent forestlands are also clean. 
□ Yes, my forestland is less cleaned when the adjacent forestlands are clean. 
□ The adjacent forestlands do not influence my cleaning decisions. 
□ Dk/Da
3.4. In comparison with the adjacent forestlands landowner/managers, describe your own 
landforest management: 
□ Lower than the 
other landowner 
or manager 
 
□ Equal to the other 
landowner or 
manager 
 
□ Higher than the 
other landowner or 
manager 
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3.5. What is the risk that your lands being affected by adjacent wildfires? 
□ Critical 
 
□ Important 
 
□ Minor important 
 
□ Not important 
3.6. Do you support that the cleanings would be regulated by laws? 
□ Yes □ No □ Dk/Da
 
3.6.1. Why? 
 
 
 
3.7. The next public policies will be applied in order to increase the cleanings and to 
punish the landowners of uncleaning’s lands. You could value these policies by using 
the question rate, in which 1 represents that you are disagree with proposed public 
policy and 5 represent that you are agree with proposed public policy. 
 
Public Policy 1 2 3 4 5 
Administrative penalties (fines, returns subsidies...).      
The public administration charge the cleaning cost to 
landowners that do not performed this activity. 
     
Charge the wildfire suppression costs to landowners that do 
not clean their lands during the previous years. 
     
Increase the rural land property tax when the forest is not 
cleaned. 
     
If the landowner does not clean their forests after being 
informed several times, the public administration will 
expropriate these lands. 
     
 
3.8. If you are a forest owner, what criteria do you use to cut your forest plantation? 
(Choose only one option) 
□ When the plantation is prepared to be cut. 
□ When I need money. 
□ When timber price is high.  
□ When I decide it. 
□ Others: ___________ 
 
3.9. Nowadays, if you consider the wildfire risk of your forestlands, what is your 
perception of the next situations (choose in the next range in which 1 represent lower 
rate and 5 high rate): 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Your forestland could be burned and a portion of timber 
production could be recovered 
     
Your forestland could be burned and anything could be 
recovered 
     
Your forestland could not be burned      
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 3.10. If your forest is affected by wildfire, would you plant again the burned area? 
□ Yes □ No □ Dk/Da 
 
3.10.1. If question 10.12. is negatively answered, 
 Yes No Dk/Da 
I will replant the burned area if the government subsidize it    
I will replant the burned area if the government subsidize it 
in exchange of contracting forest insurance 
   
 
3.10.2. If question 10.12. is affirmatively answered, would you plant again the same 
specie? 
□ Yes 
□ No, I will plant: __________________________. 
□ Dk/Da 
 
3.11. If your forest is affected by wildfire, would you manage the forestland in the same 
way that you previously did? 
□ Yes 
□ No, I will increase the forest cleanings. 
□ No, I will decrease the forest cleanings. 
□ No, I will invest on prevention measures to avoid wildfire occurrence. 
□ No, others:___________ 
 
3.12. Besides cleaning activities, would you develop another prevention measures to 
avoid forest fires? 
□ Yes □ No □ Dk/Da 
 
3.12.1. If previous question is affirmatively answered, what prevention measures 
would you develop?  
□ Firewalls. 
□ Setting and maintaining 
water points. 
□ Cleaning forest roads. 
□ Others:________________ 
 
4. Do you know any forestry producers association? 
□ Yes, I know:__ 
 
□ No 
 
□ Dk/Da 
4.1. If previous question is affirmatively answered, are you member of any forestry 
producers association? 
□ Yes, I know:___ 
 
□ No 
 
□ Dk/Da 
 
5. Approximately, how many times does your forestland were affected by wildfires during 
the last 10 years? 
 
The forestlands were burned ______ times during the last ten years. 
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6. What is your opinion about the influence of next socioeconomic factors in wildfire 
occurrence? Choose between critical, important, minor importance or not important 
according to your perceptions: 
 Critical Important Minor importance 
Any 
importance 
Progressive ageing population     
Scatter forest properties     
Lower incidence of agricultural activities on 
forestland 
    
Bad firefighting organization     
Climate change     
Lower forest supervision     
Abandon or inefficient forest management     
Lower society importance of forestland     
Personal or neighbourhood dispute     
Soft punishment or legal implications for 
arsonists 
    
Natural phenomena (lightening)     
People with mental health problems     
Negligence or carelessness     
Political interests     
Economic interests     
 
7. Considering the burned areas in the rest of Galician municipalities, what is the relation 
between your municipality wildfires and another Galicia area? 
□ In average, wildfires affect LESS hectares in my council than the rest of Galicia. 
□ In average, wildfires affect the SAME hectares in my council than the rest of 
Galicia. 
□ In average, wildfires affect MORE hectares in my council than the rest of Galicia. 
□ I do not know. 
 
8. Considering the number of wildfires in the rest of Galician, what is the relation between 
your municipality wildfire and another Galicia area? 
□ The wildfire number is LOWER recorded in my council than other Galician areas. 
□ The wildfire number is recorded at SAME level in my council than other Galician 
areas. 
□ The wildfire number is HIGHER recorded in my council than other Galician areas. 
□ I do not know. 
□  
9. If you are forest owner, what is your opinion about who will be the forest manager in 
20 years? 
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 10. How would you predict that the forest sector will be in 15-20 years? 
 
 Will 
increase 
Actual trend will 
be maintained 
Will 
diminish Dk/Da 
The forest sector demanding of 
timber certification 
    
Forest cleaning     
Forest producers association     
Timber price     
Forest stand production     
Forest management subsidies     
Galician timber certification     
Forestland abandon     
 
11. If you are forest owner, what is the probability rate of this situation in 15-20 years? 
(Choose in the next range, in which 1 represent lower rate and 5 high rate) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
My inheritors will ignore where the lands are      
The forestlands will not be distributed in heritage      
The forest production will be certified      
The forestlands will be associated to forest producers in order to obtain better 
rents 
     
The forestlands will be sold      
Forest management will be transferred to a relative, neighbour, company, etc.       
All forestlands will be concentrated in one plot      
A forest insurance will be contracted      
 
12. You could participate in a lottery with 6€, what option do you choose? 
 
  Mark X 
Option A 
15€ will be received with a 10% 
probability. Meanwhile, 5€ will be 
received with a 90% probability. 
 
Option B 
20€ will be received with a 30% 
probability. 
 
Option C 
Indifferent between both previous 
options. 
 
 
 
13. If you have 20€ prepared to expend in a raffle, what is your willingness to pay by one 
raffle ticket in which there are 10 tickets and only one could achieve the prize of 100€?  
 
I will pay ___________ Euros by ticket. 
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14. To finalize the current questionnaire, personal data are requested (any identification 
questions are included): 
 
 Gender: 
 
 Residence municipality: 
 
 
 Post code of your permanent address: 
 
 Born date: 
 
 Occupation: 
 
 Studies: 
□ Not able to read or write 
□ Can read and write, but went to 
school less than 5 years 
□ Went to elementary school 5 or 
more years, but secondary 
education has not been completed 
(EGB, ESO or Bacharelato 
Elemental) 
□ Secondary education degree 
(Bacharelato Elemental, EGB or 
ESO completa) 
□ High school education degree 
(Bacharelato superior, BUP, 
Bacharelato LOGSE, COU, PREU) 
□ First degree of professional 
training (FPI, FP grado medio, 
Oficiaría Industrial or equivalent) 
□ Second degree of professional 
training (FPII, FP superior, Mestría 
industrial or equivalent) 
□ Diploma course degree, Technical 
architecture or engineering degree. 
Pass three curses on Architecture, 
Engineering, Bachelor degree 
□ Architecture, Engineering, 
Bachelor degree or equivalent 
□ Doctorate 
 
 Family annual income: 
□ Lower than 8.000 € 
□ From 8.001 € to 16.700 € 
□ From 16.701 € to 25.900 € 
□ From 25.901 € to 36.700 €  
□ From 36.701 € to 52.100 € 
□ From 52.101 € to 80.800 € 
□ More than 80.801 € 
 
 What kind of area do you live in? 
□ Urban area 
□ Rural area 
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